Fallon v. Mercy Catholic Med. Ctr. of Se. Pa.

200 F.Supp.3d 553

Paul FALLON, Plaintiff,

v.MERCY CATHOLIC MEDICAL CENTER OF SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA d/b/a Mercy Fitzgerald Hospital, et al., Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION No. 16-00834

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania.

Signed August 9, 2016

Adam L. Schorr, Schorr & Associates PC, Cherry Hill, NJ, for Plaintiff.

Andrea Meryl Kirshenbaum, Benjamin L. Shechtman, Post & Schell PC, Philadelphia, PA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM

PAPPERT, District Judge

Paul Fallon ("Fallon") opposes vaccines, believing that their benefits are exaggerated and risks minimized. He questions specifically the efficacy of vaccines for influenza as well as the stated number of flu-related deaths and hospitalizations annually in the United States. Fallon was fired by Mercy Catholic Medical Center ("Mercy")¹ for refusing to obtain a flu vaccination. Before his termination and in support of that refusal, Fallon submitted to Mercy a letter and twenty-two page essay.

Fallon now sues Mercy for religious discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII" or "the Act"), 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e et seq. , and wrongful termination in violation of Pennsylvania public policy. Mercy moves to dismiss the complaint. While Fallon articulates numerous reasons for his unwillingness to be vaccinated, none of them are grounded in a sincere religious belief required to state a claim under Title VII. In addition, there is no public policy exception of the type Fallon seeks to the at-will employment doctrine in Pennsylvania. The Court grants Mercy's motion.

I.

Mercy hired Fallon in 1994 as a Psychiatric Crisis Intake Worker. (Compl. ¶ 6, ECF No. 1.) Beginning in 2012 Mercy required its employees to "either obtain a flu vaccination or submit an exemption form to obtain a medical or religious exemption." (Id. ¶ 7.) Those who were granted an exemption had to wear a mask. (Id. ) In 2012 and 2013 Fallon sought exemptions "on the basis of a strong moral or ethical conviction similar to a religious belief." (Id. ¶ 8.) In each of those years Fallon provided Mercy with his lengthy essay "explaining his sincerely held moral and ethical convictions." (Id. ) Mercy granted Fallon exemptions in both 2012 and 2013 and he accordingly wore a mask "during those flu seasons." (Id. ¶ 9.)

Fallon applied for an exemption again in 2014 but was denied. (Id. ¶ 10.) On December 4, 2014 Chief Human Resources Officer John Cigler ("Cigler") told Fallon that Mercy changed its policy regarding exemptions. (Id. ¶ 11.) Cigler told Fallon that he needed to "provide a letter on official clergy letterhead supporting his exemption request." (Id. ) Mercy gave Fallon an official warning on December 7, 2014 after he failed to obtain a flu vaccination or approved exemption. (Id. ¶ 13.)

Four days later Fallon submitted his exemption request and essay, along with a letter explaining why he could not obtain a letter on clergy letterhead. (Id. ¶ 14.) Fallon's letter stated:

As I state on the accompanying [form]: "I am not a member of an organized religion and thus cannot obtain a signature from Clergy." In addition, I cannot submit a letter to you "from clergy on official letterhead explaining the religious doctrine or practice that must accompany this exemption request."

(Def.'s Reply Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss ("Def.'s Reply"), Ex. A at *13, ECF No. 9.) Fallon's letter also explained the reasoning behind his exemption request:

I call my belief system, "My Conscience" and it dictates what I must do to live in harmony with it. Not to do so, to act against it, to violate it, would be to commit a crime against oneself. Not to do so would entail a rejection of one's autonomy and a surrendering of one's body to others for their self-interest.

My body belongs to me and from this fact it follows that the right to make a medical risk decision belongs to me alone. This is why the ethical practice of medicine has as its foundation the concept of "informed consent" which is voluntary by definition as opposed to mandatory "informed consent."

(Id. )

The twenty-two page essay attached to the letter consisted of seven subsections titled: The Lack of Evidence Based Medicine; 36,000 Average Annual Flu Deaths – Fact or Fiction?; Risks Involved in Influenza Vaccination ; Criminality and the Pharmaceutical Industry; The Mandatory Influenza Vaccination Controversy; Why is there an Influenza Vaccination Controversy?; and Mandatory Consent. (Id. at *15–36.) In the subsection titled "Mandatory Consent," Fallon quotes Siddhartha Gautama, the founder of Buddhism:

Do not believe in anything simply because you have heard it. Do not believe in anything simply because it is spoken and rumored by many. Do not believe in anything merely on the authority of your teachers and elders. Do not believe in traditions because they have been handed down for many generations. But after observation and analysis, when you find that anything agrees with reason and is conducive to the good and benefit of one and all, then accept it and live up to it.

(Id. at *31; Compl. ¶ 24.) Fallon concluded the essay by stating:

Based on my analysis, the influenza vaccine has not been shown to be effective, its benefits are grossly inflated, its risks are dangerously downplayed, the lethality of the virus is grossly exaggerated, and the industry that produces the vaccine "is the biggest defrauder of the federal government under the False Claims Act." This industry does not have a conscience, it knows nothing about right and wrong and "it is compelled to cause harm [to me] when the benefits of doing so outweigh the costs." By yielding to coercion and "consenting" to the hospital mandatory policy I would violate my own conscience as to what is right and what is wrong. Consequently I am compelled to follow my conscience and refuse the influenza vaccine.

(Def.'s Reply, Ex. A at *31.)

Cigler denied Fallon's request and issued another warning on December 12, 2014. (Id. ¶ 15.) Four days later Sue Szilagyi ("Szilagyi"), Patient Care Manager, informed Fallon that he was suspended pending termination. (Id. ¶ 16.) Over the next three weeks Fallon, Szilagyi and Cigler discussed Fallon's "removal from the schedule and potential termination." (Id. ¶ 17.) Mercy ultimately terminated Fallon in early January 2015 for failing to comply with the vaccination policy. (Id. ¶ 18.)

Fallon properly exhausted his administrative remedies and filed his complaint on February 22, 2016. (ECF No. 1.) Mercy filed its motion to dismiss on June 1, 2016, Fallon responded on June 14 and Mercy replied on June 21. (ECF Nos. 7–9.) The Court held oral argument on Mercy's motion on July 26, 2016. (ECF No. 11.)

II.

To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must plead factual allegations sufficient "to raise a right to relief above the speculative level ... on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). The "mere possibility of misconduct" is not enough. Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). The court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp. , 809 F.3d 780, 790 (3d Cir.2016) (citations omitted). A court should "consider only the allegations in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, and documents that form the basis of a claim." Lum v. Bank of Am. , 361 F.3d 217, 221 n. 3 (3d Cir.2004). Whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a context-specific task that "requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (citation omitted).

Under Twombly and Iqbal , a court reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint must take three steps. See Connelly , 809 F.3d at 787. First, it must "tak[e] note of the elements [the] plaintiff must plead to state a claim." Id. (quoting Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 675, 129 S.Ct. 1937 ). Second, it should identify allegations that, "because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Id. (quoting Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937 ). Finally, "[w]hen there are well-pleaded factual allegations, [the] court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Id. (quoting Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937 ).

III.

At oral argument Fallon objected to the Court considering his letter and essay on the grounds that the documents were not attached to the complaint. (Oral Arg. 24:1–4, ECF No. 12.) Mercy attached the documents to its reply brief. (See Def.'s Reply, Ex. A.) A district court ruling on a motion to dismiss generally may not consider matters extraneous to the pleadings. See In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig. , 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir.1997) (citation omitted). However, "an exception to the general rule is that a document integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint may be considered without converting the motion [to dismiss] into one for summary judgment." Id. (citation and internal quotations omitted). Fallon's complaint explicitly cites and relies upon a number of passages from the essay that he submitted to Mercy. (See Compl. ¶¶ 24–27.) The essay and letter provide the basis for Fallon's exemption request and subsequent termination; they are both "integral to" and "explicitly relied upon in the complaint." In re Burlington , 114 F.3d at 1426.

IV.

Count I of Fallon's complaint alleges a claim for religious discrimination against Mercy under Title VII.² (Compl. ¶¶ 19–47.) Title VII prohibits employers from discharging or disciplining an employee based on their religion. See Webb v. City of Philadelphia , 562 F.3d 256, 259 (3d Cir.2009) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1) ). The Act extends protection to "all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as...