Falls-Bey v. Cook

ROY FALLS-BEY, Plaintiff, v. WARDEN BRIAN COOK, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action 2:17-cv-1103

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO EASTERN DIVISION

November 1, 2018

Magistrate Judge Jolson

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on the following: (1) Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 24); (2) Plaintiff's Counter Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 25); (3) Plaintiff's Motion for General Discovery for Trial Preparation (Doc. 26); and (4) Defendants' Motion for Extension of Time (Doc. 27). For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 24) is GRANTED and Plaintiff's Counter Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 25) is DENIED. Accordingly, Plaintiff's Motion for General Discovery for Trial Preparation and Defendants' Motion for Extension of Time (Docs. 26, 27) are DENIED as moot.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff initiated this action on December 15, 2017, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging civil rights violations concerning his right to practice his Moorish Science Temple of America religion. (Doc. 1). On March 23, 2018, pursuant to its 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) initial screening, the Court dismissed Defendant State of Ohio from this lawsuit and permitted Plaintiff to proceed on his claims against the remaining defendants. On June 4, 2018, the parties consented to the jurisdiction of a Magistrate Judge (Doc. 20), and all further proceedings were referred to the Undersigned. (Doc. 21).

Defendants filed their Motion for Summary Judgment on September 4, 2018 (Doc. 24), and Plaintiff filed his Counter Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 25) on September 18, 2018. On October 15, 2018, Plaintiff filed a motion seeking general discovery (Doc. 26), and on October 29, 2018, Defendants filed a motion seeking an extension of the discovery and dispositive motion deadlines (Doc. 27). This matter is fully briefed and ripe for review.

II. STANDARD

The standard for summary judgment is well established. Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the court "shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In making this determination, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 90 S. Ct. 1598, 26 L. Ed. 2d 142 (1970). "The standard of review for counter-motions for summary judgment does not differ from the standard when one party files such a motion." Przybysz v. City of Toledo, 302 F. Supp. 3d 915, 926 (N.D. Ohio 2017), aff'd, No. 18-3139, 2018 WL 3993546 (6th Cir. Aug. 20, 2018) (citing Taft Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 929 F.2d 240, 248 (6th Cir. 1991)).

Summary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is genuine, "that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986). Summary judgment is appropriate, however, if the opposing party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S. Ct. 2458, 91 L.Ed. 2d 265 (1986). "The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the opposing party's position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the opposing party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251.

The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion and identifying and demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Catrett, 477 U.S. at 323. Once the moving party has met its initial burden, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party who "must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250 (quoting former Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)); Talley v. Bravo Pitino Restaurant, Ltd., 61 F.3d 1241, 1245 (6th Cir. 1995). "Once the burden of production has so shifted, the party opposing summary judgment cannot rest on the pleadings or merely reassert the previous allegations. It is not sufficient to 'simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.'" Gover v. Speedway Super Am., LLC, 284 F. Supp. 2d 858, 862 (S.D. Ohio 2003) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 547 586, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986)). Instead, the non-moving party must support the assertion that a fact is genuinely disputed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1).

A "court is entitled to rely, in determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists on a particular issue, only upon those portions of the verified pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with any affidavits submitted, specifically called to its attention by the parties." Gover, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 862. See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3).

III. EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES

Defendants, in their summary judgment motion, assert that Plaintiff's claims should be dismissed because Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. (See generally Doc. 24). The Court agrees.

The Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (the "PLRA"), requires that a prisoner filing a § 1983 claim first exhaust available administrative remedies. Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524, 122 S. Ct. 983, a52 L. Ed. 2d 12 (2002); Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 121 S. Ct. 1819, 149 L. Ed. 2d 958 (2001). The PLRA provides, in pertinent part:

No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under Section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.

42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).

To satisfy the exhaustion requirement, an inmate plaintiff must "complete the administrative review process in accordance with the applicable procedural rules . . . as a precondition to bringing suit in federal court." Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 88, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 165 L. Ed. 2d 368 (2006). "[F]ailure to exhaust is an affirmative defense under the PLRA, and [] inmates are not required to specially plead or demonstrate exhaustion in their complaints." Jones v. Block, 549 U.S. 199, 216, 127 S. Ct. 910, 166 L. Ed. 2d 798 (2007). See also Vandiver v. Corr. Med. Servs., 326 F. App'x 885, 888 (6th Cir. May 1, 2009) (noting that failure to exhaust "is an affirmative defense on which the defendant bears the burden of proof"). While exhaustion is not a jurisdictional prerequisite, the requirement is mandatory, Wyatt v. Leonard, 193 F.3d 876, 879 (6th Cir. 1999), even if proceeding through the administrative procedure would appear to the inmate to be "futile." Hartsfield v. Vidor, 199 F.3d 305, 308-10 (6th Cir. 1999).

Inmates, like Plaintiff, incarcerated at institutions that are maintained by the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction ("ODRC"), are bound to follow the three-step inmate grievance procedure set forth in Ohio Admin. Code ("O.A.C.") § 5120-9-31. (Doc. 24-1 (Declaration of Eugene Hunyadi ("Hunyadi Decl.") ¶ 3)). The procedure is available to an inmate"regardless of any disciplinary status, or other administrative or legislative decision to which the inmate may be subject," O.A.C. § 51209-9-31(D), and is intended to "address inmate complaints related to any aspect of institutional life that directly and personally affects the grievant," including "complaints regarding policies, procedures, conditions of confinement, or the actions of institutional staff." O.A.C. § 5120-9-31(A). Certain matters are not grievable, including "complaints unrelated to institutional life, such as legislative actions, policies and decisions of the adult parole authority, judicial proceedings and sentencing or complaints whose subject matter is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the courts or other agencies." O.A.C. § 5120-9-31(B).

The grievance procedure established by O.A.C. § 5120-9-31 involves three steps. First, an inmate must file an informal complaint within fourteen days of the event giving rise to the complaint. O.A.C. § 5120-9-31 (K)(1). The informal complaint must be addressed "to the direct supervisor of the staff member, or department most directly responsible for the particular subject matter of the complaint." Id. If the informal complaint is resolved in a manner that is unsatisfactory to the inmate, the inmate must file a notification of grievance with the inspector of institutional services within fourteen days. O.A.C. § 5120-9-31(K)(2). If the inmate is dissatisfied with the disposition of the grievance, the inmate must then appeal to the office of the chief inspector within fourteen days. O.A.C. § 5120-9-31(K)(3). "The decision of the chief inspector or designee is final." Id. Remedies for valid grievances include "changes to institutional policies or procedures, the implementation of new policies or procedures, and/or corrective action specific to the inmate's complaint." O.A.C. § 5120-9-31(L). "A prisoner's lack of compliance may be excused if the administrative remedies are not available, but [the Sixth Circuit] has required a prisoner to make 'affirmative efforts to comply with the administrative procedures before analyzing whether the facility rendered these remedies unavailable.'" Lee v. Willey, 789 F.3d 673,677 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting Napier v. Laurel Cnty., 636 F.3d 218, 223 (6th Cir. 2011)).

Dismissal without prejudice of a civil rights complaint is appropriate if a prisoner fails to first exhaust administrative remedies. See, e.g., Harbin-Bey v. Rutter, 420 F.3d 571, 580 (6th Cir. 2005). And, relevant here, "the exhaustion affirmative defense may be raised by a motion for...