Families v. El Dorado County

94 Cal.Rptr.2d 205 (Cal.App. 3 Dist. 2000)

FAMILIES UNAFRAID TO UPHOLD RURAL EL DORADO COUNTY et al Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. EL DORADO COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS et al Defendants and Respondents;

COOK RANCH PARTNERS, Real Party in Interest and Respondent.

3 Civil C031681

COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT, (El Dorado)

Filed 3/29/00

APPEAL from the orders of the Superior Court of the County of El Dorado. Winslow Christian, Assigned Judge. Affirmed in part and reversed in part.

(Super.Ct.No. PC001195)

Mackenroth, Ryan & Fong, Randy L. Barrow, Law Office of Thomas P. Infusino and Thomas P. Infusino for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Louis B. Green, County Counsel, Edward L. Knapp, Chief Assistant County Counsel for Defendants and Respondents El Dorado County Board of Supervisors and County of El Dorado.

Ellman, Burke, Hoffman & Johnson, Howard N. Ellman and Kenneth N. Burns for Real Party in Interest and Respondent, Cook Ranch Partners.

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

DAVIS, J.

In this environmental land use dispute, the City of Plymouth, the Foothill Conservancy, and an unincorporated association, Families Unafraid to Uphold Rural El Dorado County (known by its acronym, The Future) (collectively, the plaintiffs), appeal from two orders denying their motions for attorney fees under the private attorney general theory of Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5 (hereafter, section 1021.5).

In denying the two motions for attorney fees, the trial court concluded that plaintiffs had failed to show that their financial burden in bringing suit was out of proportion to their financial interest in the suit. We conclude the trial court abused its discretion in this respect. We also conclude that the plaintiffs' non-financial interests in the suit, including their aesthetic interests, are a relevant factor to consider in whether to award attorney fees under section 1021.5. We therefore reverse and remand for the trial court to consider the plaintiffs' non-financial interests and, if the cost of litigation is out of proportion to the plaintiffs' non-financial interests, to determine the amount of attorney fees to award.

BACKGROUND

The plaintiffs' attorney fee requests arise from a lawsuit they instituted against El Dorado County and its Board of Supervisors (County). In that suit, the plaintiffs alleged that County failed to comply with its draft general plan and with the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) in approving the "Cinnabar" residential subdivision project. Cook Ranch Partners (Cook), the real party in interest, is Cinnabar's developer.

Cinnabar is an upscale residential subdivision project encompassing 566 lots on 7,868 acres of land (about 12 square miles), with an equestrian theme and nearly 2,900 acres of open space. The project site is in the southwestern portion of County and is currently used for grazing. The site is roughly six miles in length (north to south) and two miles in width. The northern boundary of the project site is about four miles south of the town of El Dorado. The southern boundary is about six miles north of the City of Plymouth (which is in Amador County).

In the plaintiffs' lawsuit against County, the trial court ruled in County's favor, but we reversed. We concluded, in the published part of our opinion, that Cinnabar was inconsistent with the land use element of County's draft general plan, which basically precluded "leapfrog" development. (Families Unafraid to Uphold Rural Etc. County v. Board of Supervisors (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 1332, 1335, 1339-1341 (Future I).) In the unpublished part of our opinion, we concluded that Cinnabar was inconsistent with the noise element of the draft general plan and that one of the County's findings regarding consistency with the agriculture and forestry element was not supported by substantial evidence; we also found five CEQA deficiencies, encompassing the rejection of various project alternatives, the analyses regarding mining contamination and wildlife habitat, and the environmental impact report's responses to public inquiries about the County's erosion plan and Cook's compliance history with mitigation measures. (Future I, supra, 62 Cal.App.4th at p. 1335.)

Plaintiffs first moved for their attorney fees for the appeal, and then moved for their trial fees. Aside from granting the City of Plymouth $1,650 for attorney fees on appeal (a matter not at issue here), the trial court denied both motions. This appeal ensued.

DISCUSSION

1. Governing Principles and Standard of Review

"Section 1021.5 codifies the 'private attorney general' doctrine under which attorney fees may be awarded to successful litigants. [Footnote omitted.] 'The doctrine rests upon the recognition that privately initiated lawsuits are often essential to the effectuation of the fundamental public policies embodied in constitutional or statutory provisions, and that, without some mechanism authorizing the award of attorney fees, private actions to enforce such important public policies will as a practical matter frequently be infeasible. [Citations.]' (Woodland Hills Residents Assn., Inc. v. City Council (1979) 23 Cal.3d 917, 933.) Entitlement to fees under section 1021.5 requires a showing that the litigation: '(1) served to vindicate an important public right; (2) conferred a significant benefit on the general public or a large class of persons; and (3) [was necessary] and imposed a financial burden on plaintiffs which was out of proportion to their individual stake in the matter.' (Baggett v. Gates (1982) 32 Cal.3d 128, 142.)" (California Licensed Foresters Assn. v. State Bd. of Forestry (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 562, 568-569 (Foresters Assn.), parallel citations omitted.) In short, section 1021.5 acts as an incentive for the pursuit of public interest-related litigation that might otherwise have been too costly to bring. (See Los Angeles Police Protective League v. City of Los Angeles (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 1, 17; Foresters Assn., supra, 30 Cal.App.4th at p. 570.)¹

The trial court's determination regarding the above-noted three criteria of section 1021.5 lies within the court's discretion. (Feminist Women's Health Center v. Blythe (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1641, 1666 (Blythe).) The trial court is to assess the litigation realistically and determine from a practical perspective whether these criteria have been met. (Hewlett v. Squaw Valley Ski Corp. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 499, 544 (Hewlett).)

The trial court's discretion may not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing that the court abused it--for example, where the record establishes there is no reasonable basis for the determination. (Blythe, supra, 32 Cal.App.4th at p. 1666.) In reviewing the trial court's decision, we must pay "'particular attention to the trial court's stated reasons in denying or awarding fees and [see] whether it applied the proper standards of law in reaching its decision.'" (Hewlett, supra, 54 Cal.App.4th at p. 544.) "The pertinent question is whether the grounds given by the court for its denial of an award are consistent with the substantive law of section 1021.5 and, if so, whether their application to the facts of th[e] case is within the range of discretion conferred upon the trial courts under section 1021.5, read in light of the purposes and policy of the statute." (City of Sacramento v. Drew (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1287, 1298 (Drew).)

County and Cook on appeal do not dispute, and indeed cannot dispute, that the plaintiffs' action (i.e., Future I) enforced an important public right and conferred a significant public benefit. County requested that we publish our decision in Future I, explaining that public agencies, project applicants, and citizens statewide would find the decision useful because it clarifies the extent to which a public agency and project applicant must comply with particular provisions of a general plan. We agreed and granted County's request.

Moreover, County and Cook on appeal do not dispute the necessity of private enforcement here. Nor again could there be any such dispute. "'Where suit is brought against governmental agencies and officials [as here], the necessity of private enforcement is obvious. In such situations private citizens alone must 'guard the guardians' and the disparity in legal resources is likely to be greatest.'" (Drew, supra, 207 Cal.App.3d at p. 1299.)

That leaves the criterion of financial burden of private enforcement. The trial court denied the plaintiffs' two motions for attorney fees on this basis. The principal issue here is whether the trial court abused its discretion in making this determination.

2. Motion for Attorney Fees For Appeal of Future I

We first consider the criterion of financial burden of private enforcement as it relates to the plaintiffs' motion for attorney fees for the Future I appeal. In considering this issue, we must initially clarify the applicable legal standard regarding this criterion and then we can examine the record.

The "financial burden of private enforcement" criterion of section 1021.5 (hereafter, "financial burden" criterion) is met "'when the cost of the claimant's legal victory transcends his personal interest, that is, when the necessity for pursuing the lawsuit placed a burden on the plaintiff "out of proportion to his individual stake in the matter."'" (Woodland Hills Residents Assn., Inc. v. City Council, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 941 (Woodland Hills), quoting with approval a decision from this court, County of Inyo v. City of Los Angeles (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 82, 89 (County of Inyo); Blythe, supra, 32 Cal.App.4th at p. 1667.) The "personal interest" at issue in our decision in County of Inyo, and quoted with approval in Woodland Hills, was "local environmental values" which Inyo County "sought to preserve for the benefit of its present and future inhabitants." (County of Inyo, supra, 78 Cal.App.3d at p. 90.) Inyo County had successfully challenged the...