Farmer v. State

1

DEVONTE LAMONTE FARMER v. STATE OF MARYLAND

No. 1300-2021

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland^[**]

April 6, 2023

Circuit Court for Baltimore County Case No. C-03-CR19-003965

Graeff, Tang, Raker, Irma S., (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned)

OPINION ^[*]

RAKER J.

Appellant Devonte Lamonte Farmer was convicted in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County for violating Md. Code Ann., Transp. § 20-102(b)(1), failure to immediately stop vehicle at scene of an accident resulting in death, and Md. Code Ann., Transp § 20-102(c)(3)(ii),^[1] which identified penalties for failing to stop if defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the accident was likely to result in death. He presents the following questions for our review.

1. "Was there insufficient evidence for the jury to convict Mr. Farmer where he did not know or have reason to know that the accident resulted in a fatality?

2. Were Mr. Farmer's Confrontation Clause Rights violated where witnesses were allowed to testify at trial with face masks, hiding their facial expressions and demeanors?

3. Did the circuit court improperly merge the sentences where it merged the greater offense (Count 6) into the lesser included offense (Count 5), and then sentenced Mr. Farmer to a sentence exceeding the statutory maximum for the lesser included offense?"

We shall affirm.

I.

Appellant was indicted in an eight count indictment by the Grand Jury for Baltimore County for Count 1, Gross negligent manslaughter, Count 2, Criminal negligent manslaughter, Count 3, Driving while texting, Count 4, Use of handheld phone, Count 5, failure to immediately stop vehicle at scene of an accident resulting in death and Count 6, violation of Md. Code Ann., Transp. § 20-102(c)(3)(ii), which identifies the penalties for failing to stop if the driver knew or reasonably should have known that the accident was likely to result in death. The jury acquitted him of manslaughter by motor vehicle and criminally negligent manslaughter.^[2] He was convicted of two charges, Counts 5 and 6. At sentencing, the court merged Count 5 into Count 6, and sentenced appellant to a term of incarceration of ten years, all but seven suspended.

We glean the following facts presented at the trial. On May 8, 2019, appellant was traveling on I-795 to pick up his son from school. According to an eyewitness, appellant's car sideswiped a pickup truck in the lane directly to his right, causing the truck to swerve off the road.^[3] The truck struck a sign and a tree. Sadly, and significantly, the operator of the truck died soon after the collision at the hospital as a result of the accident. The decedent's truck was traveling at seventy-three miles per hour at the time of the crash. There is no comparable data for appellant's vehicle. Appellant failed to stop or return to the scene of the accident.

The police arrived at the scene and then began to search for appellant. Appellant's mother and sister contacted him later that evening and advised him that the police were looking for him. Appellant met the officers and accompanied them to the police station where he answered their questions.

Appellant expressed surprise and shock when advised by the police that anyone had died in the accident or that he was aware that the car he had contact with had swerved off the road. He maintained that he looked for a place to pull over but saw in his rearview mirror a black vehicle he believed to be following him. He exited about a mile later and waited in the parking lot of a nearby school for the car to pull in after him. When the car did not arrive, appellant picked up his son and returned to the Baltimore City District Court for his pending eviction proceeding. After assessing the scene of the collision, police began to search for appellant. Appellant's car suffered significant damage on the passenger side, losing the front right wheel covering. Additionally, after the police had confiscated and searched appellant's vehicle, they found a large piece of the fender trim from the decedent's pick-up truck in the back cargo area.

Appellant's trial took place during the Covid-19 pandemic. The issue of whether jurors would wear face masks arose at the beginning of the trial. Defense counsel asked the court whether the witnesses would be allowed to wear face masks while testifying. The court gave the witnesses two options: (1) wear a face mask, or (2) remove the face mask and testify behind a glass face shield provided by the court. Each witness chose to wear face masks, blocking the lower portion of the face. Defense counsel objected, based upon the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, specifically the Confrontation Clause.

What happened next at the trial as it relates to the jury instructions, the verdict, the sentencing, the merger of Counts 5 and 6, and the Indictment and particular charges are less clear in this record.^[4] The two significant charges, for our purposes, are Count 5 and Count 6.

Count 5 of the Indictment reads as follows:

". . . Devonte Lamont Farmer . . . being the driver of a vehicle involved in an accident that resulted in the death of William Fanning, did fail to immediately stop said vehicle as close as possible to the scene of the accident without obstructing traffic more than necessary, in violation of Transportation Article, Section 20-102(b)(1) of the Annotated Code of Maryland, against the peace, government and dignity of the State. (Failure To Immediately Stop Vehicle At Scene Of Accident Involving Death, TA .20.102.b1,14572.)"

Count 6 of the Indictment reads as follows:

". . . Devonte Lamont Farmer . . . did violate Transportation Article 20-102 ("Driver failing to stop at the scene of an accident resulting in death") and knew or reasonably should have known that the accident might result in death of another person and death occurred to another person, against the peace, government and dignity of the State. (Failure to Stop Vehicle and Remain at Scene of Accident Involving Death, TR.2-.102.c3ii, 14573C.)"

Notably, both Count 5 and Count 6 charge appellant with failure to stop at the scene, although Count 6 adds the aggravator requiring scienter that a death occurred. Neither count includes failure to return to the accident scene.

Along with the manslaughter instructions, the court instructed the jury that the defendant is charged with two offenses: failure to stop at the scene of an accident resulting in death, and failure to return or remain at the scene of an accident resulting in death. As to each of these offenses, the court instructed the jury that to convict the defendant, the jury must find that the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the accident might result in the death of another person. The court included a reasonable doubt instruction. There was no objection to these instructions.

The verdict sheet contained four counts: Count 1, manslaughter by motor vehicle, Count 2, criminally negligent manslaughter, Count 3, failure to stop at accident involving death; and Count 4, failure to return and remain at scene of accident involving death. Counts 5 and 6 were renumbered and sent to the jury as Counts 3 and 4. Notably, Count 4 on the verdict sheet stated, "failure to return and remain at scene of accident involving death," a charge not reflected in the Indictment.

The jury found appellant not guilty of the two manslaughter charges and guilty of failure to immediately stop at the scene, knowing that death would result, and failure to return and remain at the scene, knowing that death would result. At sentencing, appellant's counsel alerted the trial court as to a variance between the charges set out in the indictment and the instructions given by the trial court, stating as follows:

"[O]ne thing I had discovered when I was reviewing the indictment, with respect to which instructions were presented to the jury, and what the verdicts of the counts that the jury came back [with a verdict of] guilty, I had . . . noticed that there was a discrepancy with respect to the sixth count in the indictment and how it is cited and charged .... [T]he sixth count charges [§ 20-102(c)(ii)] which is the citation for the penalty for that . . . particular violation.... What was submitted to the jury was [§ 20-102(b)(2)], . . . [so] I wanted to present that to the Court .... In our opinion, . . . an issue was submitted to the jury that did not exist in the indictment."

The court responded that "(b)(1) and (b)(2) are there, but it's not as if they're---they're cited, that's just in the instructions. It's not as if they're even cited, you know, as exclusive of one another." The discussion turned to remedy and whether the court could impose a separate or consecutive sentence for each count. Defense counsel advised the court that when they get to sentencing, the court should merge the sentence, and the State responded that it "intended to ask for a concurrent sentence on the sixth count to the fifth count." The court responded, stating "upon sentencing, I will be merging Count 6 into Count 5." Everyone agreed that Count 5 was the failure to immediately stop at the scene, § 20-102(b)(1) violation. The court then sentenced appellant to ten years, all but seven years suspended, followed by two years' probation. This timely appeal followed.

II.

Before this Court, appellant argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to convict him of violating § 20-102(b)(1) and § 20-102(c)(3)(ii). Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he knew or reasonably should have known that the accident resulted in death. Appellant maintains that the State presented no evidence to prove that he knew there had been a fatality when he left the scene of...