Farris v. All. Health Care Braeview

MARVIS FARRIS, PLAINTIFF, v. ALLIANCE HEALTH CARE BRAEVIEW, INC., et al., DEFENDANTS.

No. 1:19-cv-2599

United States District Court, N.D. Ohio, Eastern Division

February 18, 2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

[RESOLVING DOC. NOS. 39, 49, 50, 51]

SARA LIOI UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Before the Court is the motion for summary judgment filed by defendants Alliance Health Care Braeview, Inc. (“Braeview”), Providence Healthcare Management Inc. (“Providence”), and Eli Gunzburg (“Gunzburg”) (collectively “defendants”). (Doc. No. 39.) Plaintiff Marvis Farris (“Farris” or “plaintiff”) filed a response in opposition (Doc. No. 46), and defendants filed a reply (Doc. No. 48). For the reasons set forth herein, defendants' motion is granted in part and denied in part.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

On November 6, 2019, Farris filed her complaint against Braeview under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. (“FLSA”), the Ohio Minimum Fair Wage Standards Act, Ohio Rev. Code § 4111.03 (“OMFWSA”), and the Ohio Prompt Pay Act, Ohio Rev. Code § 4113.15 (“OPPA”), alleging that her former employer had misclassified her as an exempt employee and, therefore, willfully failed to timely pay her overtime. On February 17, 2021, with leave, Farris filed an amended complaint adding Providence and Gunzburg as defendants, alleging that, with Braeview, they were “joint employers” of plaintiff. (See Doc. No. 29.)

Braeview was a nursing and rehabilitation facility located in Euclid, Ohio. (Doc. No. 29 ¶ 8; Doc. No. 43-1, Deposition of Marvis Farris at 88-89.^[1]) It was licensed by the State of Ohio and certified by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”) to provide services to Medicare and Medicaid recipients. Daily operation of Braeview was managed by the Administrator, a position held by Kimberly Armstrong (“Armstrong”) at the time Farris was hired, but also held by different people during Farris' tenure at Braeview. (Doc. No. 43-1 at 66-67, 78, 83, 135.)

Farris has been a Licensed Practical Nurse (“LPN”) in Ohio since 1992. (Id. at 17.) She has more than twenty (20) years experience in the position of Minimum Data Set (“MDS”) Nurse. (Id. at 24.) She was employed at Braeview from July 16, 2016 to July 20, 2018 as its only MDS Nurse. (Id. at 66, 68, 79, 85, 166.) Farris asserts that, during her tenure, she also performed work for several other facilities under the Providence umbrella. (Id. at 163.)

As the MDS Nurse, Farris' primary job duty was assisting in the completion of written assessments, known as the “Minimum Data Set, ” for Braeview's residents. (Id. at 90.) It was her job to “captur[e] all care that was documented” (id.), so Braeview could obtain proper reimbursement from the various payer sources for all the services it provided. (Id. at 92.) Farris also had a role in completing the required “care plan” for each resident using the information provided to her by the interdisciplinary team, the resident's medical providers, the resident, and the resident's family. (Id. at 135-36.)

In her role as the MDS nurse, Farris was classified as exempt and was paid a salary, which was based on an hourly rate. (Id. at 68; see also Doc. No. 44-1, Deposition of Kimberly Armstrong at 27, 29.) Even though Farris was salaried, she was required by the Administrator to track her hours on a hard-copy desk calendar. (Doc. No. 43-1 at 71-72, 84.) Farris regularly worked more than 40 hours per week and was never paid overtime. (Doc. No. 46-8, Declaration of Marvis Farris ¶¶ 5-6.)

In November 2017, Farris was informed by then Administrator Tasha Harris (“Harris”) that, due to “low census” at Braeview, her “work schedule as a MDS Nurse will be reduced from 40 hours weekly to 32 hours weekly[.]” (Doc. No. 46-9 Ex. I (Harris Letter) at 2.) Farris' pay was reduced on her next two paychecks (December 8, 2017 and December 22, 2017). (Doc. No. 46-10 Ex. J (Compensation Detail) at 6.) In June 2018, Farris was similarly informed by then Administrator Richard Washington (“Washington”) that her hours would once again be reduced due to low census; this is reflected in her paycheck for June 22, 2018. (Doc. No. 43-1 at 181; Doc. No. 46-10 at 9.)

Farris complained to Washington that, if she was a salaried employee, she should not be subject to deductions in pay and hours due to low census; she emailed him guidance from the United States Department of Labor's website along with provisions of the Code of Federal Regulations regarding the salary basis test for exempt employees. (Doc. No. 46-8 ¶ 9.) Washington forwarded Farris' email to Laurie Urbanowicz (“Urbanowicz”), vice president of human resources at Providence, who directed Washington to “put everyone on hourly[, ]” including Farris. (Doc. No. 42-1, Deposition of Laurie Urbanowicz at 35.) Urbanowicz testified that, the next day, she realized she had made a mistake and later advised Washington to return Farris to salaried status; she also directed that Farris be reimbursed for any lost pay resulting from the mistake. (Id. at 35, 38-40.)

It appears, however, that Farris' employment was terminated on July 20, 2018 (due to repeated unprofessional interactions with a co-worker) before her exempt status was actually restored. (Doc. No. 46-8 ¶ 10; Doc. No. 46-6 Ex. F (Email and Notice of Disciplinary Action) at 2; see also Doc. No. 46-5 Ex. E (November 2017 Write-Up).)

II. Discussion

A. Legal Standard on Summary Judgment

When a party files a motion for summary judgment, it must be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by: (A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record . . .; or (B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1).

In reviewing summary judgment motions, this Court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving party to determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970); White v. Turfway Park Racing Ass'n, Inc., 909 F.2d 941, 943-44 (6th Cir. 1990), impliedly overruled on other grounds by Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 111 S.Ct. 1217, 113 L.Ed.2d 190 (1991). A fact is “material” only if its resolution will affect the outcome of the lawsuit. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Determination of whether a factual issue is “genuine” requires consideration of the applicable evidentiary standards. Thus, in most civil cases the Court must decide “whether reasonable jurors could find by a preponderance of the evidence that the [non-moving party] is entitled to a verdict[.]” Id. at 252.

“Once the moving party has presented evidence sufficient to support a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party is not entitled to trial merely on the basis of allegations; significant probative evidence must be presented to support the complaint.” Goins v. Clorox Co., 926 F.2d 559, 561 (6th Cir. 1991). The party opposing the motion for summary judgment may not rely solely on the pleadings but must present evidence supporting the claims asserted by the party. Banks v. Wolfe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 330 F.3d 888, 892 (6th Cir. 2003); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (Summary judgment is appropriate whenever the non-moving party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial). Moreover, conclusory allegations, speculation, and unsubstantiated assertions are not evidence, and are not sufficient to defeat a well-supported motion for summary judgment. See Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 888, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 111 L.Ed.2d 695 (1990). In other words, to defeat summary judgment, the party opposing the motion must present affirmative evidence to support his or her position; “[a] mere scintilla of evidence is insufficient[.]” Bell v. Ohio State Univ., 351 F.3d 240, 247 (6th Cir. 2003) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Rule 56 further provides that “[t]he court need consider only” the materials cited in the parties' briefs. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(2); see also Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1479-80 (6th Cir. 1989) (“The trial court no longer has the duty to search the entire record to establish that it is bereft of a genuine issue of material fact.”) (citing Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Willoughby, 863 F.2d 1029, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1988)).

B. Analysis

Farris claims in this lawsuit that defendants (whom she characterizes as “joint employers”) improperly classified her as “exempt” under the FLSA and did so willfully. Each of her claims, both federal and state, is predicated on this assertion.

Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment because they properly classified Farris as “exempt” under the FLSA. Defendants further argue that, even if there is a material factual dispute over Farris' exempt classification, defendants Providence and Gunzburg are entitled to summary judgment and dismissal because neither was Farris' “joint employer” under the requisite “economic reality test.” Finally, defendants argue that any failure to properly classify Farris' position cannot be found “willful”-which would entitle Farris to a three-year statute of limitations and liquidated damages. Each argument will be separately addressed.

1. Farris' Exempt...