Faughn v. Soc. Sec. Admin.

KATHRYN FAUGHN, Plaintiff, v. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, Commissioner, Defendant.

Case No. 1:19-cv-02025-SGC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA EASTERN DIVISION

March 31, 2021

MEMORANDUM OPINION¹

The plaintiff, Kathryn Faughn, appeals from the decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (the "Commissioner") denying her application for Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB"). Faughn timely pursued and exhausted her administrative remedies, and the Commissioner's decision is ripe for review pursuant to 42 U.S.C §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3). For the reasons discussed below, the Commissioner's decision is due to be affirmed.

I. Procedural History

Faughn has a master's degree in psychology and previously has been employed as a therapist. (Tr. at 24, 35). In her application for DIB, Faughn alleged she became disabled on September 9, 2016, due to a variety of physical and mentalimpairments. (Id. at 15, 17-19). After her claim was denied, Faughn requested a hearing before an administrative law judge ("ALJ"). (Id. at 15). Following a hearing, the ALJ denied Faughn's claim. (Id. at 12-28). Faughn was 47 years old when the ALJ issued her decision. (Id. at 24-25). After the Appeals Council denied review of the ALJ's decision (id. at 1-6), that decision became the final decision of the Commissioner, see Frye v. Massanari, 209 F. Supp. 2d 1246, 1251 (N.D. Ala. 2001) (citing Falge v. Apfel, 150 F.3d 1320, 1322 (11th Cir. 1998)). Thereafter, Faughn commenced this action. (Doc. 1).

II. Statutory and Regulatory Framework

To establish eligibility for disability benefits, a claimant must show "the inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months." 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i)(1)(A), 423(d)(1)(A); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505(a). Furthermore, a claimant must show she was disabled between her alleged initial onset date and her date last insured. Mason v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 430 F. App'x 830, 831 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1209, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005); Demandre v. Califano, 591 F.2d 1088, 1090 (5th Cir. 1979)). The Social Security Administration ("SSA") employs a five-step sequential analysis to determine an individual's eligibility for disability benefits. 20 C.F.R. §404.1520(a)(4).

First, the Commissioner must determine whether the claimant is engaged in "substantial gainful activity." Id. at § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity, the Commissioner will find the claimant is not disabled. Id. at § 404.1520(a)(4)(i) and (b). At the first step, the ALJ determined Faughn meets the SSA's insured status requirements through December 31, 2021, and had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since September 9, 2016, the alleged onset date of her disability. (Tr. at 17).

If the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful activity, the Commissioner must next determine whether the claimant suffers from a severe physical or mental impairment or combination of impairments that has lasted or is expected to last for a continuous period of at least twelve months. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). If the claimant does not have a severe impairment or combination of impairments, the Commissioner will find the claimant is not disabled. Id. at § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii) and (c). At the second step, the ALJ determined Faughn has the following severe impairments: migraines, fibromyalgia, Sjögren's syndrome, and/or some other connective tissue disease. (Tr. at 17).

If the claimant has a severe impairment or combination of impairments, the Commissioner must then determine whether the impairment or combination of impairments meets or equals one of the "Listings" found in 20 C.F.R. Part 404,Subpart P, Appendix 1. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If the claimant's impairment or combination of impairments meets or equals one of the Listings, the Commissioner will find the claimant is disabled. Id. at § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii) and (d). At the third step, the ALJ determined Faughn does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the Listings. (Tr. at 20).

If the claimant's impairment or combination of impairments does not meet or equal one of the Listings, the Commissioner must determine the claimant's residual functional capacity ("RFC") before proceeding to the fourth step. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). At the fourth step, the Commissioner will compare an assessment of the claimant's RFC with the physical and mental demands of the claimant's past relevant work. Id. at § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv) and (e). If the claimant can perform her past relevant work, the Commissioner will find the claimant is not disabled. Id. at § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If the claimant cannot perform her past relevant work, the Commissioner must finally determine whether the claimant is able to perform other work that exists in substantial numbers in the national economy in light of her RFC, age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v) and (g)(1). If the claimant can perform other work, the Commissioner will find the claimant is not disabled. Id. at § 404.1520(a)(4)(v) and (g)(1). If the claimant cannot perform other work, the Commissioner will find the claimant is disabled. Id. at § 404.1520(a)(4)(v)and (g)(1).

Before proceeding to the fourth step, the ALJ determined Faughn has the RFC to perform a limited range of light work. (Tr. at 20).² At the fourth step, the ALJ determined Faughn can perform her past relevant work as a therapist. (Id. at 24). Notwithstanding her determination at the fourth step of the sequential analysis, the ALJ proceeded to the fifth step and determined in the alternative that considering Faughn's age, education, work experience, and RFC there are jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy, such as those of assembler, office helper, and inspection checker, that Faughn can perform. (Tr. at 24-25). Therefore, the ALJ concluded Faughn is not disabled. (Id. at 25).

III. Standard of Review

Review of the Commissioner's decision is limited to a determination of whether that decision is supported by substantial evidence and whether the Commissioner applied correct legal standards. Crawford v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004). A district court must review the Commissioner's findings of fact with deference and may not reconsider the facts, reevaluate the evidence, or substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner.Ingram v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 496 F.3d 1253, 1260 (11th Cir. 2007); Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005). Rather, a district court must "scrutinize the record as a whole to determine if the decision reached is reasonable and supported by substantial evidence." Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983) (internal citations omitted). Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Id. It is "more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance." Id. A district court must uphold factual findings supported by substantial evidence, even if the preponderance of the evidence is against those findings. Miles v. Chater, 84 F.3d 1397, 1400 (11th Cir. 1996) (citing Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990)).

A district court reviews the Commissioner's legal conclusions de novo. Davis v. Shalala, 985 F.2d 528, 531 (11th Cir. 1993). "The [Commissioner's] failure to apply the correct law or to provide the reviewing court with sufficient reasoning for determining that the proper legal analysis has been conducted mandates reversal." Cornelius v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1143, 1145-46 (11th Cir. 1991).

IV. Discussion

On appeal, Faughn argues (1) the ALJ was not properly appointed and, therefore, lacked legal authority to hear her case and (2) the ALJ erred in assigning no more than partial weight to the opinions of Dr. David A. McLain. (Doc. 9).

A. Appointments Clause Challenge

The Supreme Court held in Lucia v. S.E.C. that ALJs for the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") are "Officers of the United States" and, therefore, required under the Appointments Clause, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2, to be appointed by the President, a court of law, or a head of department. 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2051-55 (2018). It further held that because SEC ALJs were not so appointed, the petitioner was entitled to a new hearing before a constitutionally appointed ALJ. Id. at 2055.

Following Lucia and an executive order concluding "at least some - and perhaps all - ALJs are 'Officers of the United States' and thus subject to the Appointments Clause," see EXEC. ORDER NO. 13,843, 83 FED. REG. 32,755 (July 10, 2018), the Acting Commissioner of Social Security ratified the appointments of SSA ALJs and approved those appointments as her own on July 16, 2018, see SSR 19-1p.

In the wake of the foregoing, Social Security claimants have presented federal courts with Appointments Clause challenges arguing they are entitled to new hearings because the ALJs who presided over their cases had no legal authority to do so. The Commissioner has defended against these challenges on the ground that a claimant who did not raise the challenge before the ALJ or the Appeals Council has failed to exhaust her administrative remedies and, therefore, forfeited thechallenge. In reply, claimants have argued there is no exhaustion requirement for Appointments Clause challenges related to SSA proceedings. Faughn impliedly concedes she did not present her Appointments Clause challenge to the ALJ or the Appeals Council. (Doc. 9 at 5). Consequently, the question before the undersigned is whether, as the Commissioner argues, that failure has resulted in a forfeiture of...