Favors v. City of Atlanta

DEMETRIC FAVORS, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF ATLANTA, a municipal corporation of the State of Georgia, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 1:17-cv-03996-SDG

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA ATLANTA DIVISION

July 23, 2020

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Defendant City of Atlanta's (the "City") motion for summary judgment [ECF 105]; Plaintiff Demetric Favors's motion for partial summary judgment [ECF 110]; and the City's notice of objection and request for attorneys' fees [ECF 120]. Based on a careful review of the record, and with the benefit of oral argument, the City's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED; Favors's motion for partial summary judgment is GRANTED; and the City's notice of objection and request for attorneys' fees is DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

Unless otherwise noted, the following facts are not disputed by the parties or are supported by undisputed evidence in the record. On October 10, 2015, Favors visited Magic City—an adult entertainment club in Atlanta, Georgia—with a group of other individuals.¹ After entering Magic City, Favors remained at the bar near the entrance with other individuals in the group.² Soon after, a different male patron—who was later identified as Desmond Brown—grabbed a stack of money from Magic City's stage while the dancers performed.³ About the same time, Favors and the other individuals with whom he arrived exited Magic City.⁴ As Favors walked through Magic City's parking lot, Brown returned to the stage, grabbed another stack of bills from a Styrofoam plate, and exited the club.⁵

Prior to these events, then-Atlanta Police Department ("APD") Officer Emmanuel Thompson had driven to and parked his squad car in a parking lot adjacent to Magic City to show a police presence and generally patrol for crime prevention.⁶ While parked, Magic City's head of security—LiTiesa Alford—alerted Thompson that a male patron wearing a red bandana had taken another patron's money and ran out of the club.⁷ Thompson exited his car and beganassisting Alford and Magic City's on-duty security officer in searching for this male individual (i.e., Brown).⁸

About this time, Magic City's security officer saw a male individual—whom he believed matched the description of the person who had taken the money—enter a white Chevrolet Traverse in the Magic City parking lot.⁹ Favors sat in the front passenger seat—and Brown in the backseat—of that Traverse.¹⁰ The driver of the Traverse was later identified as Dexter Binns.¹¹ As the Traverse attempted to leave the parking lot, the security officer ran alongside it in an attempt to stop it.¹² The Traverse did not stop, and as it exited the parking lot, Thompson discharged his firearm five times into the vehicle.¹³ Two rounds entered the Traverse's front passenger door, striking Favors in the right thigh and ankle.¹⁴ The remaining three rounds struck the Traverse's rear bumper and lift gate door.¹⁵ TheTraverse exited the parking lot at a high rate of speed and crashed into another vehicle.¹⁶ After the crash, Binns and Brown fled on foot while Favors remained at the crash site.¹⁷ Thompson subsequently arrested Favors.¹⁸ Favors was then transported to the hospital for treatment.¹⁹

On March 23, 2016, the APD Office of Professional Standards ("OPS") concluded its investigation into the shooting at Magic City.²⁰ OPS found video surveillance of the incident contradicted Thompson's rationale for firing at the Traverse.²¹ OPS also found that "there [was] no evidence to support any articulable threat of violence towards [Thompson], [or] anyone present."²² Specifically, OPS found no articulable threat that "the driver's escape would create a continuing danger of serious physical harm to any person."²³ Given thesefindings, OPS concluded that Thompson lacked justification for shooting at the Traverse and recommended that he be fired.²⁴

On March 25, 2016, Thompson resigned from the APD.²⁵ As a result of Thompson's resignation, OPS closed its investigation.²⁶ Later, a grand jury indicted Thompson on counts of aggravated assault, violation of oath by a police officer, and making false statements.²⁷ Thompson was eventually charged with simple assault.²⁸ On March 6, 2019, Thompson pleaded guilty to the simple assault charge and received a sentence as a first offender that included 12 months of probation and the revocation of his Peace Officers Standards and Training Counsel ("P.O.S.T.") certification.²⁹

Favors initiated this case on October 10, 2017, asserting two causes of action solely against the City.³⁰ In Count I, Favors asserts a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1983.³¹In Count II, Favors seeks an award of attorneys' fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1988.³² On September 11, 2019, the City filed its motion for summary judgment as to both claims asserted by Favors.³³ On the same day, Favors filed his motion for partial summary judgment only on the issue of whether his constitutional rights were violated.³⁴ On October 2, 2019, both parties filed responses in opposition to the cross-motions for summary judgment.³⁵ The City also filed its notice of objection and request for attorneys' fees that day.³⁶ On October 16, 2019, both parties filed their respective replies to the cross-motions for summary judgment,³⁷ and Favors filed a response in opposition to the City's objection and request for attorneys' fees.³⁸ With leave of Court, the City filed its surreply in opposition to Favors' motion for partial summary judgment on November 14, 2019.³⁹ The Court heard oral argument on the cross-motions on March 10, 2020.⁴⁰

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is "material" only if it can affect the outcome of the lawsuit under the governing legal principles. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). "Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary" are not material. Id. A factual dispute is "genuine . . . if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id.

A party seeking summary judgment has the burden of informing the district court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If a movant meets its burden, the party opposing summary judgment must present evidence showing either (1) a genuine issue of material fact or (2) that the movant is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. at 324. The non-movant "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but . . . must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. If the evidence relied on by the non-movant is "merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Id. at 249.

In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment, "and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn" in favor of that party. Id. at 255. See also Herzog v. Castle Rock Entm't, 193 F.3d 1241, 1246 (11th Cir. 1999). "Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions" and cannot be made by the district court. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. See also Graham v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 193 F.3d 1274, 1282 (11th Cir. 1999). Summary judgment for the moving party is proper "[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). See also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250 ("The inquiry performed is the threshold inquiry of determining whether there is the need for a trial—whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.").

III. DISCUSSION

a. The City's Notice of Objection and Request for Attorneys' Fees

The City requests that the Court exclude eleven exhibits attached to, and relied on by, Favors's motion for partial summary judgment—and award the Cityits attorneys' fees as a sanction—because Favors failed to timely produce these exhibits during the fact discovery period. The City specifically objects to exhibits 23, 25, 26, 29, 31, 34, 36, 38, 40, 42, and 44—all of which are APD police reports. Favors, conversely, contends the Court should not exclude these exhibits, or award the City attorneys' fees, because he disclosed these documents in a reasonable manner under the circumstances.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c)(1) states:

If a party fails to provide information . . . as required by Rule 26(a) or (e), the party is not allowed to use that information . . . to supply evidence on a motion, at a hearing, or at a trial, unless the failure was substantially justified or is harmless. In addition to or instead of this sanction, the court, on motion and after giving an opportunity to be heard:

(A) may order payment of the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the failure . . . .

It is explicit in Rule 37 that "[e]xclusion . . . is not mandatory." In re Delta/AirTran Baggage Fee Antitrust Litig., 846 F. Supp. 2d 1335, 1358 (N.D. Ga. 2012) (citing Bearint v. Dorell Juvenile Grp., Inc. (Ex rel. Bearint), 389 F.3d 1339, 1348 (11th Cir. 2004)). Instead, the Court possesses "broad discretion in determining whether a violation is justified or harmless." Abdulla v. Klosinski, 898 F. Supp. 2d 1348, 1359 (S.D. Ga. 2012) (citing Catalina Rental Apts., Inc. v. Pacific Ins. Co., No. 06-20532-CIV, 2007 WL 1050634, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 03, 2007)).

Under the first prong, "an individual's discovery conduct should be...