Favors v. Jesson

Joseph Anthony Favors, Petitioner, v. Lucinda Jesson, Respondent.

Court File No. 14-cv-3473 (JRT/LIB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

July 20, 2015

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This matter comes before the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge upon Petitioner Joseph Anthony Favors's Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody, [Docket No. 1] ("the Petition"). The Court has referred the Petition to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for report and recommendation, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Local Rule 72.1. For reasons discussed herein, the Court recommends DENYING Petitioner's Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody, [Docket No. 1], with prejudice.

I. BACKGROUND AND STATEMENT OF FACTS

On September 17, 2014, Petitioner Joseph Anthony Favors ("Petitioner"), an individual civilly committed to the Minnesota Sex Offender Program (MSOP), filed a Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody with the Court, challenging his civil commitment to MSOP. (Petition [Docket No. 1], at 1). Petitioner argues that:

1. The committing court relied on "illegal evidence" to civilly commit Petitioner;

2. The committing court relied on "false testimonies" to civilly commit Petitioner;

3. Petitioner's counsel during the civil commitment proceeding was ineffective;4. Petitioner's commitment suffers from "multiple errors," including "selective prosecution," "false witness testimony," and "judicial bias"; and

5. The committing court "arbitrarily" committed Petitioner because "Petitioner does not pose a real, continuing, and serious danger to society[.]"

(Id. at 4-10).

A. The Petition and Petitioner's Memorandum in Support, [Docket Nos. 1 & 2]

The Petition advances five discrete claims; Petitioner supports each with numerous and varied arguments and allegations.

First, Petitioner challenges the sufficiency and admissibility of evidence received during the underlying commitment proceedings. Petitioner argues that the state trial and appellate courts erroneously relied on "illegal" (i.e., inadmissible) hearsay evidence, in violation of federal law; that the courts erroneously determined that Petitioner engaged in a "habitual course of sexual misconduct" as a result of "illegal" hearsay evidence; and that the courts erroneously presumed a "course of harmful sexual conduct" as a result of "illegal" evidence and application of incorrect Minnesota state statutory standards. Petitioner generally argues that the state courts violated Petitioner's Fourteenth Amendment due process rights.

Second, Petitioner argues that the state trial and appellate courts received and relied on "false testimonies" to civilly commit Petitioner. Petitioner argues that the state trial and appellate courts improperly found that Petitioner "refused sex offender treatment," in reliance on Dr. Alsdurf's false testimony; that the courts improperly found that Petitioner did not have a "relapse prevention plan," in reliance on Dr. Alberg's and Dr. Alsdurf's false testimony; and that the district court made numerous, erroneous findings of fact. Petitioner vaguely referencesFourteenth Amendment due process protections and argues that his commitment "rests in part on false testimony" in violation of "federal law." (Pet.'s Mem. [Docket No. 2], at 27).

Third, Petitioner argues that his attorney for the civil commitment proceeding, identified as "Joe Dalager," was ineffective, in violation of Petitioner's Sixth Amendment rights. Petitioner argues that Mr. Dalager had numerous conflicts of interests, failed to raise sufficient challenges on direct appeal, and only asserted "vague arguments," among other alleged shortcomings.

Fourth, Petitioner argues that the underlying commitment court committed "multiple errors." Petitioner argues that he was subject to "selective prosecution" and confined for criminal, "non-sexual" reasons; that he was denied statutory pre-petition screening procedures in violation of Minn. Stat. § 253B.07, subd. 1(a)(1), et seq.; that he was denied the opportunity to represent himself; and that he was subject to judicial bias because the presiding judge received and relied on false testimony and had numerous conflicts of interest. Petitioner only generally references violations of "federal law" and Fourteenth Amendment due process.

Finally, Petitioner argues that the Government "arbitrarily" civilly committed him. Petitioner's fifth claim largely advances insufficiency-of-the-evidence arguments. Petitioner argues that he does not suffer from antisocial personality disorder and that the court erroneously civilly committed Petitioner based on this diagnosis; that Petitioner is not violently sexually deviant under applicable Minnesota state statutes; that MSOP cannot treat antisocial personality disorder, rendering commitment for said disorder unconstitutional; that the DSM-V has "discontinued" sexual dysfunction NOS, rendering the diagnosis inappropriate; and that the evidence never demonstrated that Petitioner met the criteria for a sexual dysfunction NOS diagnosis. Again, Petitioner generally argues that his "arbitrary" commitment violates federal law and his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process.

B. Relevant Underlying Proceedings¹

In 2008, Dakota County, Minnesota filed a petition to civilly commit Petitioner to the Minnesota Sex Offender Program (MSOP). Favors v. Jesson, No. 13-cv-108 (JRT/LIB), 2013 WL 4052668, at *1 (D. Minn. Aug. 9, 2013) (citing In re Civil Commitment of Favors, No. A09-2306, 2010 WL 2486349, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. June 22, 2010) ("Favors I")). The state district court determined that Petitioner is a sexually dangerous person and a sexual psychopathic personality and committed Petitioner to MSOP for an indeterminate term. Favors I, at *3. Petitioner appealed, and on June 22, 2010, the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's findings. Id. at *1. The Minnesota Supreme Court declined review on August 24, 2010. Id. (rev. denied Minn. Aug. 24, 2010); (Resp. App'x [Docket No. 11-2], at A-144).

On or about February 7, 2011, Petitioner initiated his first state court post-commitment proceedings and filed his first state court habeas petition in Washington County, Minnesota. See Favors v. Jungers, No. A11-2055, 2012 WL 2079848, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. June 11, 2012) ("Favors II"). Relevant to his commitment to MSOP, Petitioner argued that he faced "ongoing retaliation" in violation of the Eighth Amendment as a result of reporting inappropriate behavior by an MSOP employee. Id. After some confusion concerning the correct venue for Petitioner's post-commitment claims (the respondents, at that time, for an unknown reason, filed their answer to the petition in Carlton County as opposed to Washington County), the details of which are not relevant to the present Petition before the Court, the Minnesota Court of Appeals (affirming Washington County's decision below) transferred Petitioner's claims concerning his commitment to MSOP to Carlton County. Id. at *4.

Relevant to the claims advanced in the present Petition, in March 2013, Petitioner initiated a second round of state court post-commitment proceedings, arguing:

(1) the evidence was insufficient to prove that he is an SDP and SPP; (2) the judge who presided over his civil-commitment trial was biased; (3) three statutory violations violated his due-process right; (4) his counsel was ineffective; (5) the district court denied him his right to represent himself; and (6) the prosecutor selectively prosecuted him.

Favors v. Jesson, No. A13-1579, 2014 WL 997055, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 17, 2014), review denied (May 28, 2014) ("Favors III"). The district court denied the petition without a hearing, noting that "habeas proceedings cannot be used as a substitute for appeal" and that the district court was "limited to considering jurisdictional and constitutional challenges." Id. Petitioner appealed, and on March 17, 2014, the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed. Id.

In holding that Petitioner's March 2013 petition "failed to present a case for issuing a writ of habeas corpus[,]" the Minnesota Court of Appeals (i.e., the Favors III court) noted that a habeas petition "may not be used as a substitute for an appeal[.]" Id. at *1, *2 (quoting State ex rel. Shannon v. Tahash, 121 N.W.2d 59, 61 (Minn. 1963)). "A district court properly denies the petition when the petitioner could have raised the underlying claims through other legal means." Favors III, at *2 (citing Kelsey v. State, 283 N.W.2d 892, 893-94 (Minn. 1979) (disapproving of "attempt . . . to use habeas corpus as a means of obtaining review of trial errors," reasoning that "[d]irect appeal and the postconviction remedy . . . are available for that purpose" and, therefore, "the need for another means of raising the claim of trial error is . . . not apparent"); State ex rel. Butler v. Swenson, 66 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. 1954) ("Questions which should be determined at the trial or in a motion for a new trial or reviewed through some other regular legal procedure have no place in a habeas corpus proceeding.")).

The Minnesota Supreme Court denied further review on May 28, 2014.

II. THE PETITION, [DOCKET NO. 1]

A. Standard of Review

"[A] district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) instructs federal courts to engage in a "limited and deferential review of underlying state court decisions." Mark v. Ault, 498 F.3d 775, 782-83 (8th Cir. 2007). Under the AEDPA, a federal court may not grant relief to a petitioner with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the ...