Feather v. Kijakazi

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DEVON NICOLE FEATHER, Plaintiff, v. KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Social Security Commissioner, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 3:21-cv-01588

United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania

March 29, 2023

MEMORANDUM

JOSEPH F. SAPORITO, JR., UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.

In this matter, the plaintiff, Devon Nicole Feather, seeks judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying her claims for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income, pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 405(g) and 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3). The matter has been referred to the undersigned United States magistrate judge on consent of the parties, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 73.

I. Background

On August 24, 2017, Feather protectively filed applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income, both asserting a disability onset date of August 14 2017. Her claims were initially denied by state agency reviewers on November 27, 2017. The plaintiff then requested an administrative hearing.

A hearing was held on January 23, 2019, before an administrative law judge, Richard E. Guida (the “ALJ”). In addition to the plaintiff herself, the ALJ received testimony from the plaintiff's mother, Karen Feather, and an impartial vocational expert, Paul A. Anderson. The plaintiff was represented by counsel at the hearing.

On March 25, 2019, the ALJ denied Feather's application for benefits in a written decision. The plaintiff sought further administrative review of her claims by the Appeals Council. On May 26, 2020, the Appeals Council vacated the ALJ's March 2019 decision and remanded the matter for further proceedings.

A second hearing was held on December 16, 2020, before the same ALJ. In addition to the plaintiff herself, the ALJ received testimony from an impartial vocational expert, Michael Kibler. The plaintiff was again represented by counsel at this second hearing.

On February 2, 2021, the ALJ denied Feather's application for benefits again in a second written decision. The ALJ followed the familiar five-step sequential evaluation process in determining that Feather was not disabled under the Social Security Act. See generally Myers v. Berryhill, 373 F.Supp.3d 528, 534 (M.D. Pa. 2019) (describing the five-step sequential evaluation process). At step one, the ALJ found that Feather had engaged in substantial gainful activity during two quarters-the fourth quarter of 2019 and the first quarter of 2020-but she had otherwise refrained from engaging in substantial gainful activity since her alleged onset date. The remaining findings by the ALJ were therefore addressed to the periods when Feather did not engage in substantial gainful activity.

At step two, the ALJ found that Feather had the severe impairments of: epilepsy; migraine headaches; obesity; bipolar disorder; generalized anxiety disorder; major depressive disorder; obsessivecompulsive disorder; and panic disorder.

At step three, the ALJ found that Feather did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. In doing so, the ALJ considered Feather's limitations in four broad functional areas as a result of her mental disorders, finding moderate limitations in three functional areas- (1) interacting with others, (2) concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace, and (3) adapting or managing oneself-and mild limitations in the fourth area-understanding, remembering, or applying information. See generally 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520a(c), 416.920a(c) (explaining functional limitation rating process for mental impairments); 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app.1, § 12.00(E) (explaining the four areas of mental functioning); id. § 12.00(F) (explaining process for using paragraph B criteria to evaluate mental impairments). In connection with listings 12.04 and 12.06, the ALJ also considered whether Feather's mental disorders were “serious and persistent,” finding that her impairments had not required medical treatment, mental health therapy, psychosocial support, or a highly structured setting that is ongoing and that diminished the symptoms and signs of her mental disorders, nor that she had achieved only marginal adjustment as a result. See generally Id. § 12.00(G) (explaining process for using alternative paragraph C criteria to evaluate certain mental impairments).

Between steps three and four of the sequential-evaluation process, the ALJ assessed Feather's residual functional capacity (“RFC”). See generally Myers, 373 F.Supp.3d at 534 n.4 (defining RFC). After evaluating the relevant evidence of record, the ALJ found that Feather had the RFC to perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b),^[1]with the following limitations:

[T]he claimant can only occasionally climb ramps/stairs; can never climb ladders/ropes/scaffolds; must avoid all exposure to dangerous machinery and unprotected heights; is limited to the performance of simple, routine tasks involving only simple work-related decisions with few, if any, workplace changes; may not perform production pace work; and may have no contact with the public in the performance of job duties

(Tr. 20.)

In making these factual findings regarding Feather's RFC, the ALJ considered her symptoms and the extent to which they could reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective medical evidence and other evidence of record. See generally 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529, 416.929; Soc. Sec. Ruling 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304 (revised Oct. 25, 2017). The ALJ also considered and articulated how persuasive he found the medical opinions and prior administrative medical findings of record. See generally 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c, 416.920c.

At step four, the ALJ concluded that Feather had no past relevant work.

At step five, the ALJ concluded that Feather was capable of performing work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy. Based on her age, education, work experience, and RFC, and based on testimony by the vocational expert, the ALJ concluded that Feather was capable of performing the requirements of representative occupations such as bakery racker (DOT # 524.687-018), housekeeping cleaner (DOT # 323.687-014), or small products assembler (DOT # 739.687-030). Based on this finding, the ALJ concluded that Feather was not disabled for Social Security purposes.

The plaintiff sought further administrative review of her claims by the Appeals Council, but her request was denied on July 20, 2021, making the ALJ's February 2021 decision the final decision of the Commissioner subject to judicial review by this court.

The plaintiff timely filed her complaint in this court on September 15, 2021. The Commissioner has filed an answer to the complaint, together with a certified copy of the administrative record. Both parties have filed their briefs, and this matter is now ripe for decision.

II. Discussion

Under the Social Security Act, the question before this court is not whether the claimant is disabled, but whether the Commissioner's finding that he or she is not disabled is supported by substantial evidence and was reached based upon a correct application of the relevant law. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)(sentence five); id. § 1383(c)(3); Myers, 373 F.Supp.3d at 533 (describing standard of judicial review for social security disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income administrative decisions).

Feather asserts on appeal that the ALJ's decision is not supported by substantial evidence because: (1) the ALJ found certain of her impairments “not severe” at step two of the five-step sequential evaluation process, despite compelling evidence to the contrary; (2) the ALJ failed to properly evaluate prior administrative findings, including the medical opinions of non-examining state agency medical and psychological consultants; (3) the ALJ failed to properly evaluate the medical opinions of an examining psychologist; (4) the ALJ failed to properly evaluate the medical opinions of her treating physician; and (5) the ALJ failed to properly consider subjective evidence regarding Feather's symptoms, including statements or testimony by Feather herself.^[2]

A. Step Two Determination

The plaintiff appears to contend that the ALJ erred in finding that various of Feather's medical conditions were not severe impairments.

At step two, the ALJ found that Feather had several severe impairments including: epilepsy; migraine headaches; obesity; bipolar disorder; generalized anxiety disorder; major depressive disorder; obsessive-compulsive disorder; and panic disorder. The ALJ then proceeded on to step three of the five-step sequential evaluation process.

At step two, a claimant bears the burden of proving that she suffers from “a medically severe impairment or combination of impairments.” Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5 (1987). But the step-two inquiry is merely “a de minimis screening device to dispose of groundless claims.” Newell v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 347 F.3d 541, 546 (3d Cir. 2003). “[T]he analysis at step two is wholly independent of the analysis at later steps.... [N]ot finding certain impairments severe at step two does not affect the ultimate disability determination.” Alvarado v. Colvin, 147 F.Supp.3d 297, 311 (E.D. Pa. 2015); see also Orr v. Comm'r Soc. Sec., 805 Fed. App'x 85, 88 (3d Cir. 2020) (“[B]ecause the ALJ progressed to a later step, any error at Step Two would not alter that remainder of the five-step process, much less the overall outcome.”); Ray v. Berryhill, 915 F.3d 486, 492 (7th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (“Step two is a threshold inquiry; so long as one of a claimant's limitations is found to be...