Febus-Rodriguez v. Questell-Alvarado

660 F.Supp.2d 157

Angel FEBUS-RODRIGUEZ, et al., Plaintiffs v. Enrique QUESTELL-ALVARADO, et al., Defendants.

Civil No. 06-1627(SEC).

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

September 18, 2009.

Opinion Denying Reconsideration October 2, 2009.

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Frank D. Inserni-Milam, Frank D. Inserni Law Office, Luis R. Mellado-Gonzalez, Luis R. Mellado Gonzalez Law Office, Carlos J. Morales-Bauza, Rossello & Morales, CSP, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiffs.

Christian E. Pagan-Cordoliani, Puerto Rico Department of Justice, Anabelle Quinones-Rodriguez, Maymi, Rivera & Rotger, P.S.C., San Juan, PR, Johanna M. Emmanuelli-Huertas, Carmen Edith Torres-Rodriguez, Pedro Ortiz Alvarez Law Offices, Ponce, PR, Jorge Martinez-Luciano, M.L. & R.E. Law Firm, Hato Rey, PR, for Defendants.

OPINION and ORDER

SALVADOR E. CASELLAS, Senior District Judge.

Pending before this Court is the Municipality of Santa Isabel's ("Municipality") Motion for Summary Judgment (Dockets ## 56 & 72), Plaintiffs' opposition thereto (Dockets ## 113 & 121), and the Municipality's Reply (Docket # 124-2). On July 13, 2009, the Municipality's Mayor, Enrique Questell-Alvarado ("Questell"), and the Human Resources Director, Natalie Rodriguez-Cardona, requested leave to join the Municipality's motion for summary judgment. Said request is hereby GRANTED. Upon reviewing the filings, and the applicable law, the Municipality, Questell, and Rodriguez's (collectively "Defendants") Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

Factual Background

On June 22, 2006, Plaintiffs filed suit against Defendants under Section 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and Articles 1802 and 1803 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, §§ 5141 & 5142.¹ In the complaint,² Plaintiffs, employees of the Municipality, allege that they were terminated from their positions due to their political affiliations with the Popular Democratic Party ("PDP"), after Questell, the candidate for the New Progressive Party ("NPP"), won the November 4, 2004 mayoral elections in the Municipality. After extensive discovery, the Municipality filed a motion for summary judgment on the following grounds: (1) that Plaintiffs' political harassment claims are time-barred; (2) that they have failed to adequately state procedural due process claims; (3) that Plaintiffs have failed to establish a prima facie case for political discrimination; (4) that there are legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for Plaintiffs' terminations; (5) that Questell and Rodriguez are entitled to qualified immunity; and (6) that Antonia Leon Alvarado, Juana Ortiz Perez, Jose Sanchez Rodriguez, Sonia Campos-Colon, and Luis Soto Santiago's claims are time-barred.

Plaintiffs opposed, arguing that they have set forth a prima facie case for political discrimination, and there are material issues of fact as to Defendants' proffered reason for Plaintiffs' terminations/demotions that preclude summary judgment. Plaintiffs also posit that Questell and Rodriguez are not entitled to absolute immunity. Notwithstanding, Plaintiffs assent to voluntarily dismiss their political harassment claims, except for Candida Jiménez Moreno and Cereida Muñoz's claims on this issue. Moreover, Plaintiffs concede that Antonia Leon Alvarado, Juana Ortiz Perez, Jose Sanchez Rodriguez, and Luis Soto Santiago's claims are time-barred.³ Also, all transitory and Law 52 Plaintiffs assert to voluntarily dismiss their due process claims. Thus, pending before this Court is whether Plaintiffs pled a prima facie case of political discrimination, whether Cereida Muñoz and Candida Jiménez's claims for political harassment are time-barred, whether the career employees' due process claims prosper, and whether Questell and Rodriguez are entitled to qualified immunity.

Standard of Review

R. FED. CIV. P. 56

The Court may grant a motion for summary judgment when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Ramírez Rodríguez v. Boehringer Ingelheim, 425 F.3d 67, 77 (1st Cir.2005). In reaching such a determination, the Court may not weigh the evidence. Casas Office Machs., Inc. v. Mita Copystar Am., Inc., 42 F.3d 668 (1st Cir. 1994). At this stage, the court examines the record in the "light most favorable to the nonmovant," and indulges all "reasonable inferences in that party's favor." Maldonado-Denis v. Castillo-Rodríguez, 23 F.3d 576, 581 (1st Cir.1994).

Once the movant has averred that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to establish the existence of at least one fact in issue that is both genuine and material. Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 895 F.2d 46, 48 (1st Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). "A factual issue is `genuine' if `it may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party' and, therefore, requires the finder of fact to make `a choice between the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial.'" DePoutot v. Raffaelly, 424 F.3d 112, 116 (1st Cir.2005) (citing Garside, 895 F.2d at 48 (1st Cir. 1990)); see also SEC v. Ficken, 546 F.3d 45, 51 (1st Cir.2008).

In order to defeat summary judgment, the opposing party may not rest on conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation. See Hadfield v. McDonough, 407 F.3d 11, 15 (1st Cir.2005) (citing Medina-Muñoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir.1990)). Nor will "effusive rhetoric" and "optimistic surmise" suffice to establish a genuine issue of material fact. Cadle Co. v. Hayes, 116 F.3d 957, 960 (1st Cir.1997). Once the party moving for summary judgment has established an absence of material facts in dispute, and that he or she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the "party opposing summary judgment must present definite, competent evidence to rebut the motion." Méndez-Laboy v. Abbott Lab., 424 F.3d 35, 37 (1st Cir.2005) (citing Maldonado-Denis v. Castillo-Rodríguez, 23 F.3d 576, 581 (1st Cir.1994)). "The non-movant must `produce specific facts, in suitable evidentiary form' sufficient to limn a trial-worthy issue.... Failure to do so allows the summary judgment engine to operate at full throttle." Id.; see also Kelly v. United States, 924 F.2d 355, 358 (1st Cir.1991) (warning that "the decision to sit idly by and allow the summary judgment proponent to configure the record is likely to prove fraught with consequence."); Medina-Muñoz, 896 F.2d at 8 (citing Mack v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 871 F.2d 179, 181 (1st Cir.1989)) (holding that "[t]he evidence illustrating the factual controversy cannot be conjectural or problematic; it must have substance in the sense that it limns differing versions of the truth which a factfinder must resolve.").

Uncontested Facts

Because the instant motion is for summary judgment, the parties must comply with the requirements of Local Rule 56, and file a statement of facts, set forth in numbered paragraphs, and supported by record citations. See Local Rule 56(b). In turn, when confronted with a motion for summary judgment, the opposing party must:

[s]ubmit with its opposition a separate, short, and concise statement of material facts. The opposition shall admit, deny or qualify the facts by reference to each numbered paragraph of the moving party's statement of material facts and unless a fact is admitted, shall support each denial or qualification by a record citation as required by this rule.

Local Rule 56(c). If the opposing party fails to do so, "summary judgment should, if appropriate, be entered." FED.R.CIV.P. 56(e)(2). These rules "are meant to ease the district court's operose task and to prevent parties from unfairly shifting the burdens of litigation to the court." Cabán-Hernández v. Phillip Morris USA, Inc., 486 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir.2007). When the parties ignore the Local Rule, they do so at their peril. See Ruiz-Rivera v. Riley, 209 F.3d 24, 28 (1st Cir.2000).

In the present case, Defendant complied with Rule 56, and submitted a Statement of Uncontested Facts (Docket # 72) (hereinafter "Defendant's SUF"), numbered, and supported by record citations. In opposition, Plaintiffs filed a statement of contested material facts ("Plaintiffs' SCMF"), as well as 51 additional uncontested facts ("Plaintiffs' AUF"). Docket # 121. Defendants did not oppose Plaintiffs additional uncontested facts, and as such, this Court will deem uncontested those facts that are properly supported by the record.

Upon reviewing the record, this Court finds that the facts set forth at Defendant's SUF ¶¶ 1, 2, 14⁴ 19-23, 26, 30, 32, 39, 41-45, 49 and 52 were admitted by Plaintiffs, and as such, are deemed uncontested.⁵ However, Plaintiffs properly controverted Defendants' SUF ¶ ¶ 3, 4, 5, 15,⁶ 17,⁷ 18, 25, 27⁸ 29, 34, 35, 36, 40, and 46.

Based on the foregoing, this Court finds that the following pertinent facts, are uncontested:

On November 2, 2004, General Elections were held in Puerto Rico. Defendants' SUF ¶ 1. Prior to the 2004 elections, the PDP had been in power in Santa Isabel for eight years, from 1996 to 2004. Plaintiffs' AUF ¶ 1. In the 2004 Elections, Questell ran under the insignia of the NPP, in the mayoral race for the Municipality, and defeated Angel Sánchez Bermúdez, the incumbent Mayor running for reelection under the PDP. Defendants' SUF ¶ 2. According to some of the plaintiffs' testimony, the 2004 municipal elections were heavily contested, and there was a heated political atmosphere throughout Santa Isabel. Plaintiffs' AUF ¶ 1. During this period, the NPP campaign continuously played and/or ran a musical jingle which stated "You are all going out",...