FEDERAL CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY
I. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 647
II. ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 649
A. Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 649
B. Illegal Goal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 651
C. Knowledge, Intent, and Participation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 652
D. Overt Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 653
III. DEFENSES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 654
A. Statute of Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 654
B. Variance or Constructive Amendment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 655
C. Multiplicitous and Duplicitous Indictment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 657
1. Multiplicitous Indictment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 657
2. Duplicitous Indictment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 658
D. Insufficient Indictment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 658
E. Withdrawal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 659
F. The Buyer-Seller Exception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 659
G. Failed Affirmative Defenses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 660
IV. CO-CONSPIRATOR HEARSAY RULE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 660
A. Evidentiary Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 661
B. Sixth Amendment Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 663
V. PARTIES AND LIABILITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 664
A. Vicarious Liability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 664
B. Joinder and Severance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 665
VI. SENTENCING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 666
I. INTRODUCTION
18 U.S.C. § 371 prohibits conspiracy to commit criminal activity under fed-
eral law. Under § 371, it is a crime for two or more persons to conspire to com-
mit any offense against or to defraud the United States.
1
Other federal statutes
identify more specific conspiracy offenses,
2
but this Article focuses on general
federal conspiracy under § 371. The general federal conspiracy statute differs
1. 18 U.S.C. § 371.
2. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 224 (conspiracy to bribe in the context of sporting events); id. § 241 (conspiracy to
deprive persons of civil rights); id. § 1962(d) (conspiracy to violate Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations (“RICO”) Act); id. § 2384 (seditious conspiracy); id. § 1951 (Hobbs Act Conspiracy); id. § 1512
(k) (conspiracy to commit witness tampering); id. § 1349 (conspiracy to commit bank, wire, mail, securities and
commodities, or health care fraud).
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648 AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:647
from more specific conspiracy statutes because it requires at least one conspirator
to commit an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy.
3
A conspiracy offense is treated separately because it often poses a greater danger
to society than a substantive offense committed by a single individual; conspiracy
“involves deliberate plotting to subvert the laws, educating and preparing the con-
spirators for further and habitual criminal practices.”
4
A conspiracy is distinct from the substantive crime contemplated by the conspir-
acy
5
and may be charged regardless of whether the underlying substantive offense
actually occurred.
6
A defendant’s acquittal on a conspiracy charge does not bar
prosecution on the substantive offense.
7
Similarly, an acquittal on the substantive
offense does not necessarily bar conviction on the conspiracy charge.
8
However,
acquittal on the substantive offense may bar re-prosecution on a conspiracy count
under the doctrine of collateral estoppel.
9
Under § 371, the overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy need not be crimi-
nally proscribed.
10
While a conspiracy to violate a civil law must inflict actual
damage on the plaintiff, no such requirement exists for conspiracies to violate
criminal laws.
11
Prosecutors bring conspiracy charges in a variety of situations because of their
strategic and evidentiary advantages.
12
A conspiracy charge enables the govern-
ment to: (1) join co-conspirator defendants together for trial, resulting in both
3. Compare § 371, with Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 63 (1997) (stating no overt act requirement for a
RICO conspiracy in § 1962(d)).
4. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 644 (1946) (quoting United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78, 88
(1915)); Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 593 (1961) (“[C]ollective criminal agreement—partnership in
crime—presents a greater potential threat to the public than individual delicts. Concerted action both increases
the likelihood that the criminal object will be successfully attained and decreases the probability that the
individuals involved will depart from their path of criminality.”).
5. See United States v. Felix, 503 U.S. 378, 389–90 (1992).
6. Salinas, 522 U.S. at 65 (1997) (noting the “conspiracy is a distinct evil, dangerous to the public, and so
punishable in itself” (quoting Callanan, 364 U.S. at 594)).
7. See, e.g., United States v. Ward, 486 F.3d 1212, 1223 (11th Cir. 2007) (“Conspiracy and mail fraud are not
the same offense, and the fact that [the defendant] was acquitted of conspiracy is not inconsistent with his being a
member of a more limited mail fraud scheme.” (quoting United States v. Funt, 896 F.2d 1288, 1294 n.4 (11th Cir.
1990))); see also United States v. Bearden, 265 F.3d 732, 736 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding acquittal on a conspiracy
charge did not bar retrial on the underlying mail fraud offense).
8. See, e.g., United States v. DeKelaita, 875 F.3d 855, 859 (7th Cir. 2017); United States v. Hernandez, 141
F.3d 1042, 1052 (11th Cir. 1998).
9. Whether prosecution of the conspiracy charges is collaterally estopped may be determined by the scope of
the conspiracy charges. When the substantive charges and the conspiracy charge completely overlap, retrial on
the conspiracy charge is barred following acquittal on the substantive charges. See, e.g., United States v.
Crabtree, 878 F.3d 1274, 1283–84 (11th Cir. 2018). If the conspiracy charges are broader in scope than the
substantive offenses for which the defendant was acquitted, conviction on the conspiracy charges is unlikely to
be barred. See, e.g., United States v. Wittig, 575 F.3d 1085, 1091 (10th Cir. 2009).
10. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 966 F.3d 310, 320 (5th Cir. 2020); United States v. Meredith, 685 F.3d 814,
825 (9th Cir. 2012).
11. See Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639, 650–52 (2008).
12. See, e.g., Shirley A. Selz, Conspiracy Law in Theory and Practice: Federal Conspiracy Prosecutions in
Chicago, AM. J. CRIM. L. 5, no. 35 (1977).
