Feist v. Howard Cnty. Det. Ctr. Howard Cnty. Gov't Unnamed S Conmed

JASON FEIST #80340 Plaintiff v. HOWARD COUNTY DETENTION CENTER HOWARD COUNTY GOVERNMENTUNNAMED OFFICERS CONMED, INC. Defendants

CIVIL ACTION NO. WDQ-13-2978

c/w WDQ-13-3869

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

Dated: July 22, 2014

MEMORANDUM OPINION

On October 9, 2013, Plaintiff Jason Feist ("Feist"), then a detainee housed at the Howard County Detention Center ("HCDC"),¹ filed a document entitled ''affidavit" with the Clerk. The document contains a plethora of grievances against HCDC personnel, ranging from denial of an opportunity lo place criminal charges on HCDC staff to placement in solitary confinement. The claims were initially dismissed, with one exception; the alleged failure by HCDC staff to provide treatment for Feist's seizure disorder and asthma. ECF No. 1. The case, consolidated with Feist's separate civil rights action naming additional Defendants (ECF No. 7), is ready for dispositive review. Defendant Conmed, Inc.. HCDC's medical contractor, has filed a Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 12), and the Howard County Defendants have filed a Motion to Dismiss or. Alternatively, for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 14),² to which Feist has filed an opposition.³ (ECF 20). A hearing is not needed to resolve this case. See Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2014).

Background

On July 25, 2013, Feist was arrested for a violation of probation stemming from a 2009 guilty plea.⁴ Unable to post bail, he was held as a pretrial detainee at HCDC pending an October 25, 2013 hearing.⁵ ECF No. 14. Affidavit of Jack Kavanagh, Director of the Howard County Department of Corrections. At the time of arrest, he alleges he told staff of his "health issues that could result in the loss of [his] life," but his request to keep his inhaler was denied, and he was"refused any health care or help." He further claims that on the night of his arrest, he suffered a seizure and woke up in pain on the floor of his cell, where a nurse only looked at his face "cursorily" and "perhaps [his] blood pressure was taken," and the nurse "refused to help." He had a second seizure when he was returned to his cell and his requests for help were ignored. He states he was taken to "medical" a number of times over the next few days to be given Librium, but again his requests for his inhaler were denied, as was his request to be hospitalized. Feist claims he "filed many grievances which were disregarded." He claims he had a "severe asthma attack" and was '"resuscitated" by another inmate who allowed him to use his inhaler. When taken to medical, a nurse stated that nothing was wrong with him. Feist also claims he was "denied one, some, or all" of his medications: he received no medical treatment after he dislocated his shoulder and had to "set" it on his own; he continued to have seizures but was told by HCDC doctors that "they cannot treat every little thing;" and he was subjected "every day" to sleep deprivation as an "advanced interrogation technique." On September 17, 2013, his demands for medication resulted in the administration of only some of his medications. He further states that on several days in September his requests for a nurse to take his blood pressure were repeatedly denied, and in November, after his inhaler ran out, he was repeatedly denied an inhaler and other breathing treatments. ECF No. 1.

Defendants provide medical records to support their argument that Feist received ongoing medical care, beginning on July 26, 2013, the day after he was arrested. Defendants provide progress notes in his medical chart indicating he was seen or assessed by medical staff on July 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, and 31, August 5, 8, 16, 19, 20, and 28, September 5, 6, 10, 11, 15, 16. 17, 18, 19, 20, 21. and 30, October 2, 9, and 24, November 1, 8, and 25, December 1, 2, 3, 9, 12, 13, 14, and 29, 2013, and January 14, 2014. ECF No. 18, Medical Records, Bates # 10, 11 - 14, 16 - 17, 20, 23, 25 - 32, 34 -43, 45, 46 - 50.⁶ Defendants also provide physicians' orders for Feist, dated July 26, August 5, 19, and 28, September 6, 11, 15, 16, and 30, November 1 and 22, and December 1, 2, 13, and 14, 2013. ECF No. 18. Medical Records, Bates #2-7. Medical staff ordered laboratory work for Feist on August 8 and an x-ray on December 2, 2013. ECF No. 18. Medical Records, Bates # 51 -52. Defendants also submit medication records showing every time Feist was administered medication. Medical Records Bates # 59 - 76. Finally, Defendants state that Feist refused medical treatment on several occasions. ECF No. 18, Medical Records. Bates # 18, 21, 22, and 24.

Standard of Review

Defendant Conmed. Inc., the contractual health care provider for HCDC, has moved to dismiss. ECF No. 12. A motion to dismiss or for summary judgment has also been filed on behalf of the Howard County Government and the Howard County Detention Center. ECF No. 14.

'"The purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion [to dismiss] is to test the sufficiency of a complaint.'" McBumey v. Cuccinelli, 616 F.3d 393, 408 (4th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion constitutes an assertion by the defendant that, even if the facts that the plaintiff alleges are true, the complaint fails, as a matter of law, "to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Therefore, in considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court must "'accept[ ] as true the well-pled facts in the complaint and view[ ] them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.'" Brockington v. Boykins, 637 F.3d 503. 505 (4th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted).

Ordinarily, a court cannot consider matters outside the pleadings or resolve factual disputes when ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See Bosiger v. U.S. Airways, 510 F.3d 442, 450(4th Cir. 2007). If the court does consider matters outside the pleadings, "the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56," and "[a]ll parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d); see also Finley Lines Joint Protective Bd. Unit 200 v. Norfolk S. Corp., 109 F.3d 993, 997 (4th Cir. 1997) ("[A] Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss supported by extraneous materials cannot be regarded as one for summary judgment until the district court acts to convert the motion by indicating that it will not exclude from its consideration of the motion the supporting extraneous materials."). This court deems it appropriate to consider the extraneous medical record and the affidavit submitted by HCDC's Director, as they are likely to facilitate disposition of this case.⁷ Accordingly, the motion submitted on behalf of the County Defendants shall be treated as a motion for summary judgment.

Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the "court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The Supreme Court has clarified that this does not mean that any factual dispute will defeat the motion. "By its very terms, this standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986) (emphasis in original).

"A party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment 'may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [his] pleadings,' but rather must 'set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Bouchal v. Baltimore Ravens Football Club, Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 522 (4th Cir. 2003) (alteration in original) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). The court must "view the evidence in the light most favorable to . . . the nonmovant, and draw all reasonable inferences in her favor without weighing the evidence or assessing the witnesses' credibility." Dennis v. Columbia Colleton Med. Cir., Inc., 290 F.3d 639, 645 (4th Cir. 2002). At the same time, the court also must abide by the "affirmative obligation of the trial judge to prevent factually unsupported claims and defenses from proceeding to trial." Boitchat, 346 F.3d at 526 (quoting Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774, 778-79 (4th Cir. 1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986)). This case shall be analyzed in light of this standard of review.

Analysis

Preliminarily, the Court notes that Conmed, Inc., the contractual health care corporation whose employees provide medical care at HCDC. is named a defendant solely under a theory of vicarious liability, otherwise known as the doctrine of respondeat superior. The law in the Fourth Circuit is well established that the doctrine is inapplicable to § 1983 claims involving entities such as Conmed, Inc. See Love-Lane v. Martin, 355 F. 3d 766, 782 (4th Cir. 2004) (no respondeat superior liability under § 1983); Nedd v. Correctional Medical Services, Civil Action No. JFM-92-1524 (D. Md., October 22, 1992), citing Powell v. Shopco Laurel Co., 678 F.2d 504, 506 (4th Cir. 1982); Mcllwain v. Prince William Hospital, 774 F.Supp. 986, 990 (E.D.Va. 1991). Conmed, Inc. shall be dismissed from this case.

The named County entities likewise are entitled to dismissal. Under § 1983, liability is imposed on "any person who shall subject, or cause to be subjected, any person . . . to the deprivation of any rights . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute requires a showing of personal fault, whether based upon the defendant's own conduct or another's conduct in executing the defendant's policies or customs. See Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978); West v. Atkins, 815 F.2d 993, 996 (4th Cir.1987), rev'd on other grounds, 487 U.S. 42 (1988) (no allegation of personal involvement relevant to the claimed deprivation); Vinnedge v....