Felder v. State

286 Ga. App. 271

648 S.E.2d 753

FELDER v. The STATE.

No. A07A0750.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

July 3, 2007.

Dwight L. Thomas, for Appellant.

William Kendall Wynne Jr., District Attorney, Layla Vennessa Hinton, Assistant District Attorney, for Appellee.

ELLINGTON, Judge.

A Newton County jury found Reginald Felder guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of bribery, OCGA § 16-10-2. He appeals from the denial of his motion for new trial, contending that the trial court erred in improperly restricting his cross-examination of a witness, in admitting similar transaction evidence, and in failing to give a jury instruction. He also claims he received ineffective assistance of counsel and argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. Finding no error, we affirm.

1. In attacking the sufficiency of the evidence, Felder contends that the evidence was conflicting and that some of the witnesses were not credible. When a criminal defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his or her conviction, "the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond reasonable doubt." (Citation omitted; emphasis in original.) Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319(III)(B), 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). The jury, not this Court, resolves conflicts in the testimony, weighs the evidence, and draws reasonable inferences from the evidence. Id. "As long as there is some competent evidence, even though contradicted, to support each fact necessary to make out the State's case, the jury's verdict will be upheld." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Miller v. State, 273 Ga. 831, 832, 546 S.E.2d 524 (2001). Viewed in this light, the record reveals the following facts.

In 2003, Felder was employed as a detention officer at the Newton County Detention Center ("the jail"). In early April 2003, an inmate, R.H.,¹ was considering escaping from the jail. R.H. decided that he needed a handcuff key, so he approached Felder and asked Felder to get him a key. After some negotiations, Felder and R.H. agreed that R.H. would pay Felder $100 for the key. R.H. arranged for a friend to hide two $50 bills in a greeting card and mail it to him (R.H.) at the jail. A few days after R.H. received the money, Felder and a jail trustee were passing out extra sandwiches to the inmates on the cellblock. When the trustee gave R.H. a ham sandwich, R.H. initially just put it down on a table. Shortly thereafter, Felder came to R.H.'s cell and asked him if he liked the sandwich. R.H. realized that he was supposed to look inside the sandwich and, when he did, he found a handcuff key. R.H. put the key on a chain around his neck and hid it behind his cross. About 45 minutes later, Felder took R.H. to the showers. R.H. gave Felder a dirty towel with the $100 hidden inside. Felder left briefly and, when he returned, he gave R.H. a clean towel.

A few weeks later, R.H. told a jail shift supervisor that he had a handcuff key and that he thought the authorities would want to get it away from the inmate population. He did not tell the supervisor who gave him the key. According to R.H., he decided to report the key because he wanted to be a jail trustee and he thought that it would help him get out of an overcrowded jail cell. R.H. testified that he thought the authorities would appreciate getting the key away from the inmates and that he had not intended to tell the authorities who provided the key. Within a couple of days after R.H. gave the supervisor the key, however, investigators interviewed him and he told them how he got the key. R.H. testified that he had not told anyone else that he had a handcuff key before he approached the jail supervisor. In addition to this evidence, R.H.'s testimony was corroborated by another inmate, C.J., who testified that, while he was in a nearby cell, he overheard R.H. ask Felder about getting him a handcuff key and heard the two men discuss money.

Under OCGA § 16-10-2, a county jail employee commits bribery when he "directly or indirectly solicits, receives, accepts, or agrees to receive a thing of value by inducing the reasonable belief that the giving of the thing will influence his or her performance or failure to perform any official action." The evidence presented in this case, viewed in favor of the jury's verdict, was sufficient for a rational factfinder to find Felder guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of bribery. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. at 319(III)(B), 99 S.Ct. 2781.

2. Felder argues that the trial court improperly admitted similar transaction evidence at trial. He claims that he did not receive timely notice of the State's intent to present such evidence and that neither the State nor the court identified proper purposes for the admission of the evidence.

(a) Uniform Superior Court Rule 31.1 provides that similar transaction notices must be filed at least ten days before trial unless that time is shortened or lengthened by the judge. Under this rule, the judge has the discretion to admit similar transaction evidence without the requisite ten-day notice, and this Court will not interfere with such discretion absent abuse. Bryant v. State, 226 Ga.App. 135, 138(3)(a), 486 S.E.2d 374 (1997).

The record shows that, on August 2, 2004, over two months before trial in this case, the State filed a notice of intent to introduce evidence of a similar transaction in which Felder provided an inmate, J.D., with contraband (cigarettes) in exchange for a bribe. The next day, the court conducted a similar transaction hearing during which that incident was discussed; Felder was represented by counsel.² During the same hearing, the State notified Felder's counsel that it intended to present evidence that, within two days of the offense at issue in this case, Felder provided another inmate, M.B., with contraband. Then, during a hearing outside the presence of the jury on the second day of trial, Felder's trial counsel complained that he had not received adequate notice of the similar transactions and argued that they should be excluded as prejudicial. The court admitted both similar transactions after finding that the State had given adequate notice to Felder's previous counsel and that Felder was not harmed by the alleged lack of formal notice to his trial counsel. During the motion for new trial hearing, trial counsel acknowledged that the State had given notice of the similar transactions to Felder's previous counsel.

The record also shows that trial counsel interviewed both of the State's similar transaction witnesses before they testified. Notably, both of the inmates involved in the transactions, J.D. and M.B., testified at trial and specifically denied that Felder provided them with contraband. In fact, Felder's counsel admitted during the new trial hearing that J.D.'s testimony regarding the similar transaction allegedly involving him benefitted Felder's case.

Under the circumstances, Felder has not shown that the State failed to give timely notice of the similar transactions or that, even if it did, he was prejudiced by the delayed notice. Therefore, we conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence. Bryant v. State, 226 Ga. App. at 138(3)(a), 486 S.E.2d 374; see Quinn v. State, 221 Ga.App. 399, 403(4), 471 S.E.2d 337 (1996) (court did not abuse its discretion in allowing similar transaction evidence, even though the State did not give notice until after the trial began).

(b) As for Felder's allegation that neither the State nor the court identified permissible purposes for the similar transaction, the record shows that Felder failed to raise this alleged error at trial. Therefore, this argument has been waived. Braithwaite v. State, 275 Ga. 884, 889(10), 572 S.E.2d 612 (2002).

3. Felder contends the trial court improperly restricted his cross-examination of four witnesses. "Although a defendant is entitled to a thorough and sifting cross-examination as to all relevant issues, the trial court, in determining the scope of relevant cross-examination, has a broad discretion." (Citation omitted.) Johnson v. State, 270 Ga. 234, 235(2), 507 S.E.2d 737 (1998). In this case, Felder has failed to show that the court abused its discretion by excluding relevant evidence.

(a) Felder complains that the court did not allow a shift supervisor of the jail to testify regarding his knowledge of the general bad character of R.H., the inmate who received the key from Felder. See OCGA § 24-9-84 (impeaching the credibility of a witness by showing the witness had a general reputation in the community of having a bad character as to truthfulness). The record shows, however, that R.H. had not testified at that point, so impeachment in this manner was improper and any inquiry into his veracity was irrelevant. Moreover, Felder questioned the supervisor on this issue, and the supervisor testified that he did not know about R.H.'s general character or reputation within the jail community. Therefore, Felder's argument lacks merit.

(b) Felder sought to impeach R.H. by introducing evidence to show that R.H.'s alleged medication use and mental problems may have compromised his memory of the events leading to the charges in this case. Outside the presence of the jury, Felder cross-examined R.H. at length on this issue. R.H. testified that neither the medications nor his mental disorder affected his memory or his ability to testify and that he had a clear recollection of the incident at issue in this case. Felder presented no evidence to the contrary. Therefore, absent any evidence that R.H.'s memory had been compromised, the court properly found that this area of inquiry was irrelevant. There was no error.

( c) Felder argues that the court improperly refused to allow counsel to question M.B., a similar transaction witness who was called by...