Feldleit v. Long Island Rail Road

723 F. Supp. 892

Steve FELDLEIT and Rose Feldleit, Plaintiffs, v. The LONG ISLAND RAIL ROAD, Martin Saggese, Sheila Keller and Guy Tower, Defendants.

No. CV-89-0779.

United States District Court, E.D. New York.

October 24, 1989.

Samuel J. Gottlieb, New York City, for plaintiffs.

Thomas M. Taranto, Richard J. Berka, Roger J. Schiera, Jamaica, N.Y., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

WEINSTEIN, District Judge.

Plaintiffs Steve Feldleit and his wife Rose Feldleit, citizens of Pennsylvania, sue his former employer, the Long Island Rail Road, and three individual employees of the LIRR residing in New York. Mr. Feldleit claims to have been falsely accused of, and wrongly disciplined for, leaving an obscene phone message on his female supervisor's home answering machine. Plaintiffs seek compensatory and punitive damages under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq., and the Federal Employers Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51 et seq., as well as a number of state tort and contract theories. At issue is whether the employer, in its effort to protect a female employee from job-related sexual harassment, breached its duty of fair treatment to a male employee.

Defendants move to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and (6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on the grounds that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the RLA dispute because of preemption and over the FELA claims because of the lack of a cognizable claim. As demonstrated below, no viable federal claim has been pleaded.

Preemption and lack of any basis thus far demonstrated in fact or law for the state claims appears to require granting judgment dismissing the state law contentions. Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits the court to treat a 12(b)(6) motion as one for summary judgment, but requires that plaintiff be permitted to support the complaint by enhancing the record. See also Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e), 56(f) (allowing supplementation of the record). While plaintiff and defendants have submitted substantial documentary evidence on the 12(b) motion, it may be that, spurred by the prospect of a dismissal, plaintiff may be able to produce more persuasive material. Accordingly, unless within thirty days, plaintiff shows good cause, judgment will be entered dismissing the complaint.

I. Facts

Feldleit had been employed for eight years by the LIRR as a senior financial analyst. His immediate supervisor was defendant Sheila Keller. Keller reported directly to vice president of management and financial services, defendant Martin Saggese.

On April 5, 1988, plaintiff was summoned to the office of Saggese, where he was informed that Keller had received a sexually explicit and insulting telephone message on her home answering machine on or about March 29 and had identified the voice as plaintiff's. The tape recorded message was played for Feldleit. He denied responsibility.

Immediately, plaintiff was taken by LIRR police officers to a conference room visible to his co-workers. He was read his Miranda rights and asked to make a statement. Plaintiff refused. Saggese and the LIRR police then insisted that he leave the premises. No criminal charge was ever prosecuted.

Subsequently plaintiff was accused of insubordinate, disrespectful and sexually harassing conduct toward his supervisor. He was suspended with pay pending an internal investigation. He claims that the reason for his suspension was made known to his colleagues and co-workers.

In accordance with the provisions established by the collective bargaining agreement between the LIRR and plaintiff's union, a company trial date of April 28, 1988 was set. Defendant Guy Tower, the LIRR's manager of financial planning, informed plaintiff in writing of the charge, the date of his trial and his right to have a "duly accredited representative" present. This letter also notified plaintiff that he was entitled to produce his own witnesses and to cross examine any witnesses produced by the employer.

Four days before the trial was to take place Feldleit was informed by letter that it had been cancelled. Presumably the employer's internal investigation, which included lie detector and voice comparison tests, failed to substantiate the charges.

Accompanied by Frederick Gerrain, the local chairman of the union, plaintiff met with Saggese and asked to be returned to his old job. Saggese denied his request and instead offered plaintiff a job in the payroll department at no loss in pay. Plaintiff was recalled from administrative leave and began his new job on May 18, 1988. He claims that, as a condition to retaining his employment with the LIRR, he was forced to accept a demotion to a job for which he was overqualified.

Feldleit subsequently asked his union to bring a grievance against the LIRR on the basis of both the false charge and his subsequent "demotion." He discussed the "entire incident at length" with union chairman Gerrain. Gerrain initially suggested that plaintiff retain an attorney and pursue the matter through the courts. Later the union informed Feldleit that it was investigating the matter. On August 12, 1988, Gerrain wrote to Saggese, detailing plaintiff's complaints, and requesting that a meeting be held to discuss the alleged demotion. The letter suggested that, under the circumstances, it might have been more appropriate to transfer Keller, rather than plaintiff.

Plaintiff claims that his attempt to prod the union to take further action met with no effective response. Eventually he went over Gerrain's head in the union. The following day Gerrain called plaintiff and told him that the union had decided not to take any further action and considered the matter closed.

On November 2, 1988, after three-and-a-half months in his new position, plaintiff resigned from the LIRR. He claims to have taken this step because of distress over his suspension and "demotion."

Plaintiffs have alleged at least eight state law claims against the LIRR and various combinations of the individual defendants including: (1) false arrest, (2) defamation, (3) intentional infliction of emotional harm, (4) conspiracy to defame, (5) breach of contract, (6) tortious interference with contract, (7) loss of consortium, and (8) invasion of privacy and violation of civil rights under state law.

II. Railway Labor Act's Grant of Exclusive Jurisdiction

The statutory bases for what have become known as minor disputes under the RLA are found in 45 U.S.C. § 152 Sixth and § 153 First (i). These sections set forth conference and compulsory arbitration procedures for resolution of disputes arising "out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions." Id. at § 152 Sixth.

Minor disputes in the railroad industry are subject to binding and compulsory arbitration before either a national adjustment board, id. at § 153 First, or before an adjustment board established by both the employer and the union representing the employee. Id. at § 153 Second. These adjustment boards have exclusive jurisdiction over such disputes. Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Railway Labor Executives, ___ U.S. ___, 109 S.Ct. 2477, 2480-81, 105 L.Ed.2d 250 (1989).

Congress sought to "promote stability in labor-management relations" in railroads by providing for "prompt, orderly and final settlement of grievances that arise daily between employees and carriers regarding ... working conditions." Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557, 563 n. 9, 107 S.Ct. 1410, 1414 n. 9, 94 L.Ed.2d 563 (1987) (citations omitted). The jurisdiction of the federal courts over minor disputes is limited to narrow judicial review of the arbitral decision. Consolidated Rail, 109 S.Ct. at 2481; Buell, 480 U.S. at 563, 107 S.Ct. at 1414 (citation omitted); International Bhd. Teamsters v. Pan American World Airways, 716 F.Supp. 726, 729 (E.D.N.Y.1989) ("Except in unusual circumstances, a district court has no jurisdiction over minor disputes.").

Minor disputes relate to the "meaning or proper application of a particular provision" in an existing collective bargaining agreement. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 723, 65 S.Ct. 1282, 1290, 89 L.Ed. 1886, 1894 (1945). In its most recent attempt to distinguish minor from major disputes, the Court defined the former as those labor disputes in which the employer "asserts a contractual right to take the contested action" where that action "is arguably justified by the terms of the parties' collective-bargaining agreement." Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Railway Labor Executives, ___ U.S. ___, 109 S.Ct. 2477, 2482, 105 L.Ed.2d 250 (1989). If the dispute is minor, either party is "free to act in accordance with its own interpretation of the disputed contractual provision pending resolution of the dispute by the board of adjustment." Teamsters v. Pan American World Airways, 716 F.Supp. 726, 729-30 (E.D.N.Y.1989) (citing CSX Transp., Inc. v. United Transp. Union, 879 F.2d 990, 997 (2d Cir.1989)).

An obscene phone call from an employee to a supervisor's house — or, for that matter, from one co-worker to another — undeniably constitutes improper work-related conduct. The effects of such disrespectful behavior would almost certainly spill over into the workplace, creating the kind of disciplinary problem that is resolvable under the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement between the LIRR and the union. Failure to take prompt action to protect a female employee from such insulting conduct could not only disrupt harmonious labor-management relations, but could lead to legal action against the company by the harassed female employee.

In response to the complaint by Keller, the employer properly suspended plaintiff, with pay, pending an internal investigation. When a "major offense" has been committed, the labor union agreement allows an employee suspected by the LIRR of being guilty to be "held out of...