Feliciano v. United States

1

RUBEN FELICIANO, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.

CIVIL No. 3:20-CV-01819 (JCH)

United States District Court, D. Connecticut

March 23, 2024

RULING ON MOTION TO VACATE, SET ASIDE, OR CORRECT SENTENCE (DOC. NO. 1)

JANET C. HALL, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Ruben Feliciano (“Feliciano”) moves, pursuant to section 2255 of title 28 of the United States Code, to vacate his conviction under section 924(c) of title 18 of the United States Code. See Motion to Vacate Section 924(c) Conviction (“Pet'r's Mot.”), at 1 (Doc No. 1). Feliciano relies primarily on the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Davis, 139 S.Ct. 2319 (2019), to argue that his conviction for using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence is unconstitutional because it is predicated on conspiracy which “is not categorically a crime of violence.” Id. Feliciano also argues, in the alternative, that “the Connecticut state murder statute is [also] not categorically a crime of violence[.]” Id. at 2. The government opposes the Motion. See Government's Memorandum in Opposition to Feliciano's Motion Under Section 2255 (“Gov't's Opp.”) (Doc. No. 7).

For the reasons set forth below, the Motion is denied.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

Feliciano was a member of the Meriden, Connecticut chapter of Los Solidos, “a gang with members in Meriden and other Connecticut cities.” See United States v. Feliciano, 223 F.3d 102, 107 (2d Cir. 2000). On the night of March 24, 1997, Feliciano, along with fellow gang members Ronald Pagan (“Pagan”) and Alex Rivera (“Rivera”), “drove with fellow member” Edwin Ramos (“Ramos”), who was 16 years old, “to a cemetery in Meriden.” Id. There, in the early morning hours of March 25, Feliciano shot Ramos in the head, resulting in Ramos' death. See id. The murder was ordered by Nelson Gonzalez, the president of the gang's Meriden chapter. See id. at 109.

On September 1, 1998, a grand jury indicted Feliciano, Pagan, and Gonzalez. See id. at 107. Feliciano was charged with conspiracy to commit a violent crime in aid of racketeering (“VCAR”), in violation of section 1959(a)(5) of title 18 of the United States Code (Count One); VCAR murder, in violation of section 1959(a) (Count Two); and using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, in violation of section 924(c) (Count Three). See id. Feliciano's co-defendant Pagan was charged with aiding and abetting under the same Counts.^[1] See id.

On February 8, 1999, the jury found Feliciano guilty of all three Counts. See United States v. Feliciano, No. 3:97-CR-00204, Verdict Form (Doc. No. 305). Pagan was similarly found guilty of all three Counts. Id. On April 29, 1999, Judge Peter Dorsey sentenced Feliciano and Pagan to “life imprisonment on Count Two (the substantive VCAR count), to run concurrently with a sentence of ten years' imprisonment on Count One (the VCAR conspiracy count) and consecutively to a sentence of sixty months' imprisonment on Count Three.” See Feliciano, 223 F.3d at 110; accord United States v. Feliciano, No. 3:97-CR-00204, Judgment (Doc. No. 309). The Second Circuit upheld the convictions and sentences of Feliciano and Pagan on appeal. Feliciano, 223 F.3d at 126.

B. Procedural Background

In 2001, Feliciano sought habeas relief for the first time by filing a pro se petition, which was denied. See Feliciano v. United States, No. 3:01-CV-2100, Motion to Vacate (Doc. No. 1); United States v. Feliciano, No. 3:97-CR-00204, Ruling on Motion to Vacate (Doc. No. 383). In June 2005, Feliciano filed a pro se Motion to modify his sentence under section 3582(c) of title 18 of the United States Code, which was also denied. See United States v. Feliciano, No. 3:97-CR-00204, Order (Doc. No. 411). Feliciano also submitted a pro se Motion to file a successive habeas petition in July 2005, which was transferred to, and ultimately denied by, the Second Circuit. See Id. (Doc. Nos. 407, 421, 424).

In September 2019, Feliciano submitted another Motion to file a successive habeas petition, in light of Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015) and Davis v. United States, 139 S.Ct. 2319 (2019). See Feliciano v United States, No. 19-2936. On April 28, 2020, the Second Circuit granted Feliciano's application to file a successive habeas petition. See United States v. Feliciano, No. 3:97-CR-00204, Order of USCA (Doc. No. 484). The matter was then transferred to this court. See id. (Doc. No. 486). On December 4, 2020, Feliciano filed his counseled Motion to Vacate. See Pet'r's Mot.

The government filed its opposition on January 18, 2021. See Gov't's Opp. Feliciano filed a Reply Memorandum on January 29, 2021. See Petitioner's Reply to Government's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Vacate (“Pet'r's Reply”) (Doc. No. 8).

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Section 2255 of title 28 of the United States Code permits a federal prisoner to move to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence “upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). Therefore, relief is available “under [section] 2255 only for a constitutional error, a lack of jurisdiction in the sentencing court, or an error of law that constitutes a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice.” Cuoco v. United States, 208 F.3d 27, 30 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v. Bokun, 73 F.3d 8, 12 (2d Cir. 1995)). The petitioner bears the burden of proving that he is entitled to relief by a preponderance of the evidence. See Skaftouros v. United States, 667 F.3d 144, 158 (2d Cir. 2011).

IV. DISCUSSION

The court notes, at the outset, that it has already decided the two issues advanced in Feliciano's Petition. On October 25, 2021, this court denied a habeas petition filed by Pagan, Feliciano's co-defendant. See Pagan v. United States, 568 F.Supp.3d 156, 168 (D. Conn. 2021). Specifically, the court rejected Pagan's arguments (1) that his conviction for using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence was subject to vacatur because one of the two predicate “crimes of violence”, i.e., conspiracy to commit murder, was not a “crime of violence”, and (2) that murder, under Connecticut law, was not a “crime of violence” for purposes of section 924(c). Id. at 162-69. Feliciano advances the same arguments in his Petition. See Pet'r's Mot.^[2]The court addresses each argument in turn.

A. Whether the Unconstitutionality of the Residual Clause Warrants Vacatur of Feliciano's Section 924(c) Conviction

Feliciano contends that, following the Supreme Court's rulings in Davis and prior, related cases,^[3] this court must vacate his conviction under section 924(c). Section 924(c) criminalizes using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Before Davis, the statute defined “crime of violence” as either (1) “an offense that is a felony and has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another”; or (2) “an offense that is a felony and that by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.” Id. at § 924(c)(3); Pagan, 568 F.Supp.3d at 160-61. The former definition is known as the “elements clause”, whereas the latter definition is known as the “residual clause”. See Davis, 139 S.Ct. at 2323-25.

In Davis, the Supreme Court struck down the residual clause as unconstitutionally vague, meaning that a crime can only meet the statutory definition of “crime of violence” if it falls within the ambit of the elements clause, i.e., the crime must be “a felony that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(a). Conspiracy crimes generally do not meet this criterion. See Pagan, 568 F.Supp.3d at 161. Indeed, both the petitioner and the government agree that conspiracy to commit VCAR murder no longer serves as a valid predicate crime of violence following the new rule of constitutional law established by Johnson and Davis. See Pet'r's Mot. at 10; Gov't's Opp. at 5. Feliciano argues that, because his conviction under section 924(c) was based on conspiracy to commit VCAR murder as the predicate offense, his conviction under section 924(c) must be vacated. See Pet'r's Mot. at 9-11. The government, however, asserts that the conviction remains valid because it was also based on VCAR murder, which is a valid predicate. See Gov't's Opp. at 7.

The court addressed this same issue over two years ago. Pagan, Feliciano's codefendant, filed a habeas petition arguing that, following Davis, his conviction under section 924(c) was no longer valid. See Pagan, 568 F.Supp.3d at 160-62. The court rejected Pagan's argument and held that, when a section 924(c) conviction rests on multiple predicates, one valid and the other invalid after Davis, the valid predicate may still sustain the conviction, provided that the valid predicate is supported by a sufficient factual basis in the record. See id. at 162-67. The court determined that, in Pagan's case, the valid predicate-aiding and abetting substantive murder-was clearly supported by the factual record. See id. at 167.

In reaching its holding, the court concluded that, even in the absence of exactly on point, precedential case law, the overwhelming weight of existing authority supported its view. Id. (coll...