Felix v. City of N.Y.

Dorrelien Felix, et al., Plaintiffs, v. City of New York, et al., Defendants.

16-cv-5845 (AJN)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

October 13, 2020

OPINION & ORDER

ALISON J. NATHAN, District Judge:

This litigation concerns the attempted arrest and fatal shooting of David Felix. Felix's parents and estate sued the two New York Police Department detectives involved in the incident and the City of New York, asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, federal disability discrimination statutes, and New York law. The Plaintiffs contend that the City is liable for the detectives' alleged violations of Felix's constitutional rights because the City failed to train and supervise officers in the treatment of mentally ill and emotionally disturbed persons.

The City moves for summary judgment on the failure-to-train and disability discrimination claims. The City also requests, by the same motion, that the Court bifurcate the claims against it from those against the individual officers and limit the trial testimony of an expert witness. For the reasons that follow, the Court grants in part and denies in part the City's motion.

I. Background

The factual circumstances of this case are set out in more detail in the Court's prior orders on the City's motion to dismiss and the detectives' motion for partial summary judgment. See Felix v. City of New York (Felix I), 344 F. Supp. 3d 644, 649-52 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); Felix v. City of New York (Felix II), 408 F. Supp. 3d 304, 306-07 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).

As relevant here, Detectives Harold Carter and Vincente Matias arrived at the Bridge, a residential facility for individuals suffering from mental illness, on April 25, 2015, to arrest Felix for a robbery and assault. Felix II, 408 F. Supp. 3d at 306; Plaintiffs' Responses to Defendants' Rule 56.1 Statement ("Plf. Counter 56.1"), Dkt. No. 142, ¶¶ 1-2. A Bridge employee informed the detectives that Felix suffered from paranoid schizophrenia. Felix II, 408 F. Supp. 3d at 306; Plf. Counter 56.1 ¶¶ 3, 6. The employee attempted to buzz Felix, and then led the detectives to his apartment door. Felix II, 408 F. Supp. 3d at 306; Plf. Counter 56.1 ¶¶ 7, 9. The employee knocked and heard no answer. Felix II, 408 F. Supp. 3d at 306; Plf. Counter 56.1 ¶¶ 10-11. The employee then opened the door with her master key. Felix II, 408 F. Supp. 3d at 306; Plf. Counter 56.1 ¶ 16. The detectives entered the apartment. Felix II, 408 F. Supp. 3d at 306; Plf. Counter 56.1 ¶¶ 17-20. Matias saw Felix descending down the fire escape outside the window. Felix II, 408 F. Supp. 3d at 306; Plf. Counter 56.1 ¶ 22. The detectives ran down the stairs to intercept him. Felix II, 408 F. Supp. 3d at 306; Plf. Counter 56.1 ¶¶ 23-25. Detective Carter grabbed Felix by the front door of the building lobby. Felix II, 408 F. Supp. 3d at 306; Plf. Counter 56.1 ¶¶ 27-30. After a brief struggle—the circumstances of which the parties dispute—Carter fatally shot Felix. Felix II, 408 F. Supp.3d at 306; Plf. Counter 56.1 ¶ 33; Defendants' Counter-Statement Pursuant to Local Rule 56.1 ("Def. Counter 56.1"), Dkt. No. 146, ¶¶ 117-132.

The NYPD receives over 100,000 calls involving emotionally disturbed persons each year. Def. Counter 56.1 ¶ 5. The NYPD has long acknowledged that police encounters with mentally ill or emotionally disturbed persons present heightened risks for police use of force, andit has required new recruits and some promoted officers undergo training related to emotionally disturbed persons. Id. ¶¶ 1-3; 14-16; Patrol Guide Procedure No. 216-05, Dkt. No. 143, Ex. 28. However, it did not require detectives, including Carter and Matias, to undergo training upon promotion. Def. Counter 56.1 ¶¶ 23-26. Carter last received training related to emotionally disturbed persons in 1994, and Matias last received training related to emotionally disturbed persons in 1992. Id. ¶¶ 132-134. The NYPD also did not require police officers to undergo Crisis Intervention Training ("CIT"), which teaches de-escalation techniques to avoid violent confrontations with mentally ill and emotionally disturbed persons, until 2015. Id. ¶¶ 41-44. A 2017 report by the NYPD Office of the Inspector General found what it considered to be significant deficiencies in the NYPD's CIT Program. Id. ¶ 45; see New York Police Department Office of the Inspector General, Putting Training Into Practice: A Review of NYPD's Approach to Handling Interactions with People in Mental Crisis ("NYPD-OIG Report") (2017).

To bolster claims that the NYPD failed to adequately train officers to deal with mentally ill and emotionally disturbed persons, the Plaintiffs point to an expert report by Dr. Grace Telesco, a retired NYPD Lieutenant and former Chairperson of the Behavior Science Department at the New York Police Academy. Expert Witness Report of Grace Telesco, Ph.D. ("Telesco Report"), Dkt. No. 143, Ex. 35. Dr. Telesco opined in her expert report that the training NYPD provided its officers "was inadequate and well below acceptable national standards," both because detectives did not receive retraining following promotion and because the training offered new officers did not include a CIT component. Id. at 5-6. She further opined that, had Carter and Matias received appropriate training, they would have called for backup and attempted to isolate and contain Felix rather than escalating the situation, and that, were it not for their missteps, Felix likely would have survived the encounter. Id. at 7-12.

II. Discussion

A. Summary Judgment

A court may grant summary judgment only "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. "An issue of fact is genuine if 'the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.' A fact is material if it 'might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.'" Roe v. City of Waterbury, 542 F.3d 31, 35 (2d Cir. 2008) (internal citations omitted) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). "In applying this standard, [courts] 'resolve all ambiguities, and credit all factual inferences that could rationally be drawn, in favor of the party opposing summary judgment.'" Brown v. Henderson, 257 F.3d 246, 251 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Cifra v. General Electric Co., 252 F.3d 205, 216 (2d Cir. 2001)).

1. Failure to Train

Under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), a municipality may not be held liable for constitutional violations by its employees on the basis of respondeat superior. Zahra v. Town of Southold, 48 F.3d 674, 685 (2d Cir. 1995). Instead, a plaintiff must establish that a municipal policy or custom caused the constitutional violation. Wray v. City of New York, 490 F.3d 189, 195 (2d Cir. 2007). "[T]he inadequacy of police training may serve as the basis for § 1983 liability only where the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact." City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989).

The Second Circuit has held that a plaintiff must satisfy three elements to show that a failure to train constitutes deliberate indifference. "First, the plaintiff must show that apolicymaker knows to a moral certainty that her employees will confront a given situation. Second, the plaintiff must show that the situation either presents the employee with a difficult choice of the sort that training or supervision will make less difficult or that there is a history of employees mishandling the situation. Finally, the plaintiff must show that the wrong choice by the city employee will frequently cause the deprivation of a citizen's constitutional rights." Jenkins v. City of New York, 478 F.3d 76, 94 (2d Cir. 2007) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). "In addition, at the summary judgment stage, plaintiffs must identify a specific deficiency in the city's training program and establish that that deficiency is closely related to the ultimate injury, such that it actually caused the constitutional deprivation." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

There is at least a genuine dispute of material fact as to each of these elements. Undisputed evidence shows that NYPD officers respond to over 100,000 calls involving emotionally disturbed persons each year, often hundreds each day. Def. Counter 56.1 ¶ 5. NYPD training materials reflect that the City was aware that officers regularly respond to emotionally disturbed person calls and that encounters with mentally ill or emotionally disturbed persons present unique risks. Def. Counter 56.1 ¶¶ 14-15. NYPD officers had shot and killed emotionally disturbed persons on a number of occasions prior to Felix's death. Def. Counter 56.1 ¶¶ 30-37. These incidents prompted the NYPD-OIG to undertake a review of the NYPD's CIT Program, which found a notable "failure to fully integrate and use [CIT] training within the totality of NYPD's everyday policing." NYPD-OIG Report at 1. The NYPD-OIG Report reiterated what was clear from the NYPD's policies and training materials: encounters with emotionally disturbed persons present "the potential for a lethal outcome" if handled improperly. Id.; see also Def. Counter 56.1 ¶ 15; Patrol Guide Procedure No. 216-05. The record containsample evidence from which a reasonable juror could find that the City knew that NYPD officers regularly encountered emotionally disturbed persons; that officers frequently mishandled these encounters; and that doing so often resulted in preventable uses of lethal force.

The City does not dispute its awareness of the need for training or the consequences that frequently flow from an officer's mishandling of an encounter with an emotionally disturbed person. However, the City contends that NYPD's history of responding to calls involving emotionally disturbed persons and prior civil rights suits related to fatal shootings...