Feliz-Acosta v. Russell Del Caribe, Inc., CIVIL NO. 17-2378 (GAG)

FELIZ-ACOSTA et al, Plaintiffs, v. RUSSELL DEL CARIBE INC. et al, Defendant.

CIVIL NO. 17-2378 (GAG)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

August 29, 2019

OPINION AND ORDER

Carmen Feliz Acosta, her husband Ricardo Negrón, and their conjugal partnership (collectively, "Plaintiffs") filed suit against Russell del Caribe, Inc. and Fruit of the Loom, Inc. ("Defendants") alleging unlawful discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. ("ADEA"), sex discrimination in violation of the Equal Pay Act ("EPA") and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), national origin discrimination in violation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and retaliation. (Docket No. 1). Plaintiffs also filed local state claims arising under Puerto Rico's Act No. 100 of June 30, 1959, P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 29, §146 et seq. ("Act 100"), Act No. 80 of May 30, 1976, P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 29, §185a et seq. ("Act 80"), and Article 1802 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 31 §5141.

Pending before the Court are Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgement and Plaintiff's cross-summary judgement. (Docket Nos. 52 and 62). For the reasons discussed below, Defendants' motion for summary judgement is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Additionally, Plaintiffs' cross summary judgment motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

I. Relevant Factual Background

Plaintiff, a female over the age of forty, began working for Defendants on January 7, 2003, until April 7, 2017, when she was terminated. (Docket No. 1 at 2). Defendants are engaged in the business of wholesale, distribution, and manufacturing of apparel. During Plaintiff's years working for Defendants, Plaintiff was promoted several times, reaching her highest position as Senior Business Manager in 2013.

A. ADEA

Plaintiff traveled in January 2016 to Defendants' Corporate Headquarters in Bowling Green, Kentucky. At the meeting, Plaintiff was notified of the new In-Charge of Puerto Rico's distribution center, Ms. Méndez. (Docket No. 1 ¶ 12, 13). Plaintiff was subsequently demoted to Finance Manager, position she occupied until her termination on April 7, 2017. (Docket No. 1 at 2). Plaintiff alleges that she was replaced by the younger Ms. Méndez. That same month, Plaintiff claims that the employer promised no additional adverse actions were to be taken regarding Plaintiff's job position. Id. ¶ 14. However, through October 2016 and January 2017, Plaintiff was demoted twice. Id. ¶ 17. At the time of her termination, Plaintiff occupied the Finance Manager position. Id. While Plaintiff alleges that she performed her job satisfactorily, Defendants terminated Plaintiff's employment on April 7, 2017. Id. ¶ 18, 19. At the time of the termination, Plaintiff was 52 years old. Id. ¶ 21. Plaintiff sustains that her former Finance Manager duties were given to a younger person, in willful violation of the ADEA and ACT 100. Id. ¶ 22.

B. Alleged Gender Discrimination

Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants have engaged in gender discrimination by limiting female employees to lower job positions and paying them unequal wages and fewer benefitscompared to male employees. Id. ¶ 43. The same year, Plaintiff began working for Defendants as a Junior Accountant and Office Manager. Id. ¶ 45. On 2013, Plaintiff was appointed to Senior Business Manager as In-Charge of Puerto Rico's operations and received no additional compensation. Id. ¶ 46, 51. Plaintiff posits that she was paid a lower salary and benefits then male employees holding an equal position. Id. ¶ 47. Plaintiff alleges she requested her salary to be increased to an amount parallel that of the male employees, but Defendants allegedly ignored her request. Id. ¶ 48. Plaintiff raised issues as to her compensation issue with Defendants' headquarters. Id. ¶ 52. She was allegedly promised future reviews, and an adjustment to compensation. Id. ¶ 52. Plaintiff claims she never received such additional compensation. Id. ¶ 53.

In late 2016, Plaintiff additionally claims that discriminatory remarks based upon gender were directed at her. Id. ¶ 60. Allegedly, Ms. Méndez repeatedly claimed she preferred to work with men rather than women as men were "less dramatic." Id.

C. Alleged Discrimination Based on National Origin

Plaintiff also seeks redress for alleged employment discrimination on the basis of national origin at the hands of Defendants. (Docket No. 1 ¶ 65). Plaintiff claims Defendants stated that "Puerto Ricans are pigs" when referring to Puerto Ricans at the job site, thus interfering with Plaintiff's equal employment opportunity because of her race. Id. ¶ 68, 69.

D. Alleged Wrongful Termination

Plaintiff further argues that upon her termination on April 7, 2017 Defendants provided an agreement offering 50% less compensation then that ordered by Act 80. (Docket No. 1 ¶ 76). Plaintiff also avers that the agreement contains no reference to a just cause for termination, thus violating Act 80's requirement for a mandatory compensation for termination without just cause. Id.

E. Puerto Rico General Tort Statute

Plaintiff sustains that she has suffered mental anguish, damages, loss of income, and value as a direct result of actions taken by Defendants. (Docket No. 1 ¶ 83). Plaintiff further claims she has faced serious and continuing injury, damage to her reputation, and emotional pain and suffering due to Defendants' willful and malicious actions. Id.

II. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); see FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). "An issue is genuine if 'it may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party' at trial, . . . and material if it 'possess[es] the capacity to sway the outcome of the litigation under the applicable law.'" Iverson v. City of Boston, 452 F.3d 94, 98 (1st Cir. 2006) (alteration in original) (internal citations omitted).

The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the lack of evidence to support the non-moving party's case. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. "The burden then shifts to the nonmovant to establish the existence of at least one fact issue which is both genuine and material." Maldonado-Denis v. Castillo-Rodriguez, 23 F.3d 576, 581 (1st Cir. 1994). The nonmovant may establish a fact is genuinely in dispute by citing evidence in the record or showing that either the materials cited by the movant "do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(1)(B). If the Court finds that a genuine issue of material fact remains, the resolution of which could affect the outcome of the case, then the Court must deny summary judgment. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

When considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and give that party the benefit of any and all reasonable inferences. Id. at 255. Moreover, at the summary judgment stage, the Court does not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence. Id. Summary judgment may be appropriate, however, if the nonmoving party's case rests merely upon "conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation." Forestier Fradera v. Municipality of Mayaguez, 440 F.3d 17, 21 (1st Cir. 2006) (quoting Benoit v. Tech. Mfg. Corp., 331 F.3d 166, 173 (1st Cir. 2003)).

III. Discussion

A. Title VII National Origin Discrimination

Plaintiff alleges that she suffered national origin discrimination when Ms. Méndez stated that Puerto Ricans were pigs. (Docket No. 62 at 9; 69 at 18). Plaintiff posits that the discriminatory remarks externalized a strong prejudice and bias against Puerto Ricans. (Docket Nos. 62 at 9; 69 at 18). In McDonnel Douglas, the Supreme Court established that the plaintiff carries the initial burden under the statute of establishing a prima facie case of [national origin] discrimination." McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). In an employment termination case, the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case by showing that: (1) the plaintiff is within a protected class; (2) [they] were performing his job at a level that met the employer's legitimate expectations; (3) [they] were nevertheless dismissed; and (4) the employer sought someone of roughly equivalent qualifications to perform substantially the same work after his departure. Mulero-Rodriguez v. Ponte, Inc., 98 F.3d 670, 673 (1st Cir. 1996). In this case, however, Plaintiff is Dominican and thus, not part of the protected class (Puerto Ricans).

Furthermore, Plaintiff's discrimination claims on basis on National Origin found in her Complaint (Docket No. 1) failed to comply with Iqbal standards. Plaintiff merely presented aconclusion of law that she was discriminated due to her National Origin yet presented no supporting facts. Plaintiff additionally failed to amend the Complaint to appropriately support such claims. A complaint does not need detailed factual allegations, but "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 at 678-79 (2009).

Plaintiff fails to present prima facie case of discrimination based on National Origin. As such, the Court GRANTS Defendants' motion for summary judgment on the counts based on national origin discrimination.

B. Title VII Gender Discrimination and ADEA Age Discrimination

Plaintiff alleges that she suffered discrimination based on gender and age at the hands of Defendants. For the reasons stated below, the Court holds that Plaintiff cannot prove that Defendants'...