Feliz v. City of New York

1

Robinson Feliz, Plaintiff, v. City of New York, et al., Defendants.

No. 19-cv-6305 (AJN)

United States District Court, S.D. New York

February 14, 2022

OPINION & ORDER

ALISON J. NATHAN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Plaintiff Robinson Feliz alleges that he was stopped, arrested searched, and detained in violation of the Constitution and New York state law. He named as Defendants the City of New York and individuals Alex Tegan, Ronnie Rodriguez, and Michael Grover, who are officers employed by the New York Police Department. Defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint in its entirety. For the reasons that follow Defendants' motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

I. Background

For purposes of resolving Defendants' motion to dismiss, the Court accepts all well-pled facts in the amended complaint as true and draws all inferences in Feliz's favor. See Kassner v. 2nd Ave. Delicatessen Inc., 496 F.3d 229, 237 (2d Cir. 2007). The following account is therefore taken from Feliz's factual allegations contained in the amended complaint.^[1]

A. Factual background

On the night of May 15, 2018, Feliz was driving his car in the vicinity of 164th Street and Fort Washington Avenue in New York City. Am. Compl. ¶ 19, Dkt. No. 38. Officers Tegan, Rodriguez, and Grove stopped Feliz's car, stating that Feliz had made an unlawful right turn on a red traffic light. Id. ¶¶ 21-23.^[2] Feliz denies that the light was red. Id. ¶ 22. After Feliz provided his license and registration, Defendants returned to a patrol car, apparently to verify Feliz's information. Id. ¶¶ 24-25. Defendants returned to Feliz's car and informed Feliz that his license was suspended. Id. ¶¶ 26, 28. Feliz responded that his license was not suspended and stated that he currently possessed documents to prove as much. Id. ¶¶ 27, 29-30. Defendants did not view these documents. Instead, Defendants arrested Feliz for driving without a valid license and placed him in handcuffs. Id. ¶¶ 28-32.

Feliz was transported to a police precinct where he was questioned by officers. Id. ¶¶ 38-44. During that questioning, Defendants allegedly “directed racially and ethnically discriminatory and derisive language toward plaintiff, namely insults and other derogatory remarks particular to individuals of Hispanic or Latino descent, national origin or ethnicity.” Id. ¶ 42. The New York District Attorney's Office ultimately declined to prosecute Feliz and he was released from custody within 23 hours of his arrest without being arraigned or charged. Id. ¶¶ 49-55.

Feliz further alleges that Defendants intentionally arrested Feliz without cause in order to elicit information about other, unrelated crimes of which Feliz had no knowledge. Id. ¶¶ 54, 5762. And, relying on a series of news articles, Feliz alleges that Defendants and other NYPD officers regularly arrest drivers of color without cause and that the NYPD does not adequately discipline officers that lie to justify arrests or when called as witnesses in court. Id. ¶¶ 63-76. Last, Feliz alleges that the personnel files for the individual Defendants will demonstrate a pattern of unconstitutional actions. Id. ¶¶ 77-78.

In total, Feliz raised 19 causes of action arising under federal and New York state and municipal law, including First Amendment retaliation, unlawful search and seizure, false arrest and imprisonment, assault and battery, malicious prosecution, malicious abuse of process, biasbased profiling, violation of equal protection, conspiracy to interfere with civil rights, failure to intervene to prevent unlawful conduct, negligent hiring and training by the City, and Monell liability for an unlawful policy or practice by the City. Id. ¶¶ 81-213.

B. Procedural history

Feliz filed this action on July 8, 2019. Dkt. No. 1. Prior to filing the initial complaint, Feliz filed a written notice of claim to the New York City Office of the Comptroller, as required by New York General Municipal Law § 50-e. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 15-17. The action was subsequently referred to mediation pursuant to the Southern District of New York's Section 1983 Plan, Dkt. No. 10, and then stayed at the parties' request in light of the COVID-19 pandemic, Dkt. No. 17. Defendants on August 7, 2020, moved for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c). Dkt. No. 29. Along with its briefing, Defendants provided footage from an officer's body camera worn on the night of May 15, 2018. Dkt. No. 28. Feliz requested, and the Court granted, leave to amend his complaint in light of Defendants' motion. Dkt. Nos. 33-35. Feliz filed his amended complaint on September 24, 2020. Dkt. No. 38. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the entirety of Feliz's amended complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). Dkt. No. 43; Defs. Br., Dkt. No. 45; Iheanachor Decl., Dkt. No. 44.^[3] In his opposition, Feliz both responded to Defendants' motion to dismiss and requested (1) that the Court grant Feliz summary judgment on his claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, and illegal search and seizure, and (2) award Feliz attorneys' fees and costs because Defendants' motion to dismiss is “frivolous.” Pl. Br. at 27, Dkt. No. 54; DePaolo Decl., Dkt. No. 55. Defendants filed a reply. Defs. Reply, Dkt. No. 63.

II. Legal standard

When considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, courts “construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accepting the complaint's allegations as true.” York v. Ass 'n of Bar of City of N.Y., 286 F.3d 122, 125 (2d Cir. 2002). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 requires “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). But “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” BellAtl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The complaint's factual allegations must be sufficient to “nudge[ ]” the plaintiff's claims “from conceivable to plausible.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678.

At the pleading stage, a court generally “must limit its analysis to the four comers of the complaint.” Vassilatos v. Ceram Tech. Int'l, Ltd., 92-cv-4574, 1993 WL 177780, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 19, 1993) (citing Kopec v. Coughlin, 922 F.2d 152, 154-55 (2d Cir. 1991)). A court may, however, “consider ‘documents attached to the complaint as an exhibit or incorporated in it by reference, matters of which judicial notice may be taken, or documents either in plaintiffs' possession or of which plaintiffs had knowledge and relied on in bringing suit.'” Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir. 2002) (internal alterations omitted) (quoting Brass v. Am. Film Techs., Inc., 987 F.2d 142, 150 (2d Cir. 1993)); see also ACE Sec. Corp. Home Equity Loan Tr. v. DB Structured Prods., 5 F.Supp.3d 543, 551 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“In addition to the allegations in the complaint itself, a court may consider documents attached as exhibits, incorporated by reference, or relied upon by the plaintiff in bringing suit, as well as any judicially noticeable matters.”). With respect to the last category of materials, the Second Circuit has emphasized that the “plaintiff's reliance on the terms and effect of a document in drafting the complaint is a necessary prerequisite to the court's consideration” thereof-“mere notice or possession is not enough.” Chambers, 282 F.2d at 153.

A court may consider “material outside the complaint” only if it converts the motion to one for summary judgment, as opposed to a motion to dismiss. Id. at 152. Whether to convert a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment is left to the sound discretion of the district court. See Kouakou v. Fideliscare New York, 920 F.Supp.2d 391, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). Rule 12(d) requires that the court or the moving party give “sufficient notice to an opposing party and an opportunity for that party to respond.” Groden v. Random House, Inc., 61 F.3d 1045, 1052 (2d Cir. 1995).

III. Discussion

Defendants seek to dismiss all 19 of Feliz's claims. In support of their motion, Defendants submitted three exhibits attached to the Iheanachor Declaration, including 20 minutes of footage from an officer's body camera, Iheanachor Decl., Ex. B (“the footage”), the New York District Attorney Office's decline-prosecution form, Ex. C, and Feliz's written notice of claim filed to the New York City Comptroller's Office on August 10, 2018, Ex. D (“Notice of Claim”). Feliz also filed a transcript of Feliz's testimony regarding his claim given at a hearing pursuant to New York Municipal Law § 50-h. DePaolo Decl., Ex. 1. The Court will determine first which materials it considers in resolving Defendants' motion and then address the arguments for dismissal.

A. Materials considered by the Court

As explained, a document may be considered at the motion to dismiss stage if it is attached to the complaint, if the complaint incorporates it by reference, if the plaintiff relied on the document in bringing the suit, or if it is a document of which the Court may take judicial notice. Chambers, 282 F.3d at 153; ACE Sec., 5 F.Supp.3d at 551.

The Court will therefore consider both Feliz's notice of claim and the District Attorney's decline-prosecution form because both are expressly referenced in the amended complaint. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 15-17, 49, 133. But under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court will not consider Feliz's...