Feria v. Cornfield

ELIZABETH FERIA v. ALAN CORNFIELD

No. 1882

COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND

September Term, 2015

November 8, 2017

Circuit Court for Montgomery County

Case No. 404769-V

UNREPORTED

Eyler, Deborah S., Wright, Sharer, J. Frederick (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ.

Opinion by Sharer, J.

*This is an unreported opinion, and it may not be cited in any paper, brief, motion, or other document filed in this Court or any other Maryland Court as either precedent within the rule of stare decisis or as persuasive authority. Md. Rule 1-104.

This appeal comes before us from the grant of summary judgment in a civil action for damages in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County that was based solely on issue preclusion of the factual findings made during a prior unrelated custody hearing. Appellant, Elizabeth Feria ("Feria"), appeals from the entry of summary judgment against her, in favor of appellee, Alan Cornfield ("Cornfield"), arguing that collateral estoppel was not applicable and should not have been applied.

Feria presents for our review two questions, which for clarity we reduce to one and rephrase:¹

Did the court err in granting summary judgment?

For the following reasons, we find that the circuit court did err in granting summary judgment and shall reverse.

FACTS and PROCEEDINGS

Although this appeal stems from the entry of summary judgment in a non-domestic civil action for damages, the basis of the judgment below was founded on factual determinations made in a prior and separate custody case. Therefore, we provide the following relevant factual and procedural background from both the custody case and the instant civil action.

Feria and Cornfield are the parents of their minor child, C., who was born in August 2002. Feria had sole legal and physical custody of C. until September 24, 2014, when the court modified custody, awarding primary residential custody to Cornfield with joint legal custody to be shared between Cornfield and Feria, but giving tie-breaking authority to Cornfield.²

On October 3, 2014, C. was discovered by officials of his school to be in possession of a large sum of cash - $25,000 to $30,000. Unaware of the change in custody order, the school's principal called Feria, who arrived at the school and took possession of the money. The following week, C. again went to school with an additional large sum of cash. This time, the principal, having been made aware of the change in custody, notified Cornfield, who came to the school and retrieved the money, which he asserted was taken from his home safe.

Shortly after the two incidents at the school, C.'s Best Interest Attorney filed a motion requesting further modification of custody.³ At a hearing on the motion, the parties called a total of six witnesses, including Dr. Paul C. Berman, C.'s therapist. At the close of the evidence, the court "found by a preponderance of the evidence that" the money "came from [Cornfield's] safe" and "was not [Feria's] money." The court further found that Feria "received that money knowing it wasn't hers and then ... determined later where it came from."

Having made that finding, the custody court then explained its analysis and rationale, stating:

Now what do I do with that? This little boy has lived with his mother for almost the first 12 years of his life. No one is disputing he loves his mother and his mother loves him. And that she does a lot of good motherly things. And she's got from where Judge Johnson ruled he gave her a significant amount of overnights.

So he felt and he also gave her joint legal custody. So even that was a major change with this little boy age 12....

And she had to play for better or worse a significant role in this little guy's life.

* * *

So I'm also, I am moved, by so in other words what I have is 12 years of the boy with his mother and now we've got a dramatic change basically a couple months ago at the most and he's adjusting to it. He's adjusting to it pretty well according to Dr. Berman, according to my notes when he, and he does a really nice job interviewing everybody and getting facts. I appreciate him being here.

[H]e thought C[.] had improved. He was more verbal. He was willing to disagree with his mother. He was starting to gain some independence.

And in fact an example of that he told his mother to give the money back and he was seeing he could influence his future. He said he had more friends at Mom's but he could get more at Dad's, a sign of strength.

I don't want to undo that....

* * *

But he's now 12. He's got to see what his mother for better or for worse.

* * *

It's a balancing. The boy needs his mother. He doesn't look at her all day long like the Dad does and say, you know, I don't trust this woman. I have all kinds of other problems with her. This is his Mom. He hugs her. He loves her. He kisses her. She makes meals for him when she's with him.

So children don't get fixated on the negatives with their parents unless they are getting punished.

* * *

So I don't condone her actions at all. I don't want anybody to misunderstand but I am trying to balance it that this little guy basically I think I would in effect be taking this child away from his mother....

* * *

And as he gets a little bit older into his teen years there might be a mixer at his high school and all the things, neat things that moms and dads do with their children. I think I would be choking that. I think I would be cutting it off and I got to balance it.

* * *

I think the best interest of this little boy is to keep the status quo that Judge Johnson had put in place.

The custody court subsequently issued a written order which stated:

THIS MATTER HAVING COME BEFORE THE COURT on the Best Interest Attorney's Emergency Motion to Temporarily Modify Access and for Clarification of Custody Order and the Order of this Court of October23, 2014, and the Court having considered the testimony of the parties, their witnesses, documentary evidence, and the testimony of the expert called by the Best Interest Attorney, and having considered the arguments and having made oral findings on the record in this matter, it is by this Court, this 10^thday of December, 2014,

ORDERED that the Best Interest Attorney's Emergency Motion to Temporarily Modify is hereby denied.

On May 8, 2015, Cornfield filed in the circuit court a "Complaint for Unjust Enrichment, Monies Owed, Theft and Conversion." In the complaint, Cornfield requested damages on the following grounds:

• "Allowing [Feria] to retain the benefit of the funds [that C. took to his school] would be inequitable as [she] was not entitled to [the] funds."

• Feria "owes the funds to" Cornfield.

• "By taking possession of the money and dissipating the funds, [Feria] stole [Cornfield's] money."

• "The monies were in the possession of [Cornfield] as they were in his safe and he is entitled to possession of the monies."

Cornfield simultaneously filed a "Motion for Summary Judgment," in which he contended that "a court of competent jurisdiction has already determined that the money was [Cornfield's] property." Cornfield further contended that Feria "is bound by the prior decision and is estopped from arguing that the money was not [Cornfield's] and judgment may be entered against her." Feria subsequently filed a Response to the motion, in which she averred that "the money that [C.] took was [Feria's] money" and that C. "took the envelope containing the money from her purse and brought it to school with him."

The circuit court held a hearing on the motion for summary judgment, finding that:

The fact at issue, the ownership of that money, has been adjudicated by this [c]ourt. It was adjudicated by [the court] in November. It was the exact same issue. It was presented to the [c]ourt. There was a final decision, and [the court] was pretty clear that [it] didn't believe [Feria's] version of where that money came from and who it belonged to.

[Feria] was a party to the action, and she was represented by counsel, at the time, well known to the [c]ourt, with a stellar reputation as a Family Law attorney. He called witnesses. He cross-examined witnesses. There was a full hearing, and [the court] determined that that money belonged to [Cornfield], that she knew it, and that she retained it after being given it by the school.

So, I don't think that, with respect to the ownership of the money, there is any genuine dispute at this point. I think issue preclusion applies.

The court subsequently issued a written order reflecting the oral ruling in which it concluded that "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact," ordered that judgment be entered in favor of Cornfield, and awarded him compensatory damages in the amount of $23,500.

DISCUSSION

Standard of Review

It is well established that "[t]he purpose of the summary judgment procedure is not to try the case or to resolve factual disputes; rather it is to decide whether there is an issue of fact sufficiently material to be tried." Gross v. Sussex Inc., 332 Md. 247, 255 (1993). Generally, "[w]hen reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we determine 'whether the parties properly generated a dispute of material fact and, if not, whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'" Blackburn Ltd. P'ship v. Paul, 438 Md. 100, 107 (2014) (quoting Myers v. Kayhoe, 391 Md. 188, 203 (2006)). When a party is contending that there is a dispute as to material fact, "[t]hose facts in dispute must bepresented in detail and with precision, general allegations are insufficient." Clark v. O'Malley, 434 Md. 171, 195 (2013) (internal quotation and citation omitted).

However, "[i]f the case presents a clear legal issue, which does not require the trial court to resolve motive, intent, credibility, or disputed facts and inferences, then the court may determine liability as a matter of law on a motion for summary judgment." Fagerhus v. Host Marriott Corp., 143 Md. App. 525, 535 (2002). When a "circuit court's decision turns on a question of law, not a dispute of fact, an...