Fernandez v. Badami

1

JESUS FERNANDEZ, Plaintiff, v. MARIA BADAMI, Physician's Assistant, Dpfpndant

No. 20 CV 10287 (VB)

United States District Court, S.D. New York

April 17, 2023

OPINION AND ORDER

Vincent L. Briccetti, United States District Judge.

Plaintiff Jesus Fernandez, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983 against Maria Badami (“P.A. Badami”) a physician's assistant employed by the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (“DOCCS”) at Downstate Correctional Facility (“Downstate”).^[1]Liberally construed, the amended complaint alleges plaintiff was forced to undergo a medical examination that violated his right to free exercise of his religion under the First Amendment, his privacy rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, and his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.

Now pending is P.A. Badami's motion to dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). (Doc. #42).

For the following reasons, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

The Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C §§ 1331.

BACKGROUND

For the purpose of ruling on the motion to dismiss, the Court accepts as true all well-pleaded factual allegations in the amended complaint and draws all reasonable inferences in plaintiff's favor, as summarized below. Because plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court may also consider allegations made for the first time in plaintiff's opposition to the motion, to the extent they are consistent with those contained in the amended complaint. See, e.g., Vlad-Berindan v. MTA N.Y.C. Transit, 2014 WL 6982929, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 2014).^[2]

During the complained-of events, plaintiff, who alleges he is a practicing Muslim, was incarcerated at Downstate.

As part of Downstate's intake process, plaintiff was allegedly required to “undergo a health screening and physical examination.” (Doc. #5 (“AC”) ¶ 2).^[3]Plaintiff claims he was escorted by a correction officer to a curtained examination room and directed to strip down to his underwear and socks. According to plaintiff, the officer did not close the curtain, which enabled passing staff members and inmates to see plaintiff while he undressed.

Plaintiff alleges a “female doctor,” later identified as P.A. Badami, entered the examination room after he undressed. (AC ¶ 7). Plaintiff allegedly attempted to refuse the examination, and requested, in the alternative, that he be examined by a male physician. Plaintiff alleges P.A. Badami ignored his request, even though plaintiff informed her that his religious beliefs prohibited him “from exposing [his] body, or having any physical contact” with a member of the opposite sex other than a spouse. (Id.). In addition, plaintiff alleges DOCCS policy prohibits compelling an inmate “to undress for the physical examination, unless a determination is made that [it] is medically required.” (Id. ¶ 10). Plaintiff contends there was no such justification here.

According to plaintiff, P.A. Badami began the intake examination by orally reviewing plaintiff's medical history, with the “curtain door” open and within earshot of passing staff members and inmates. (AC ¶ 7). Next, she physically examined plaintiff's eyes, ears, throat, and chest. P.A. Badami then allegedly directed plaintiff to stand and lower his boxers, after which she “examine[d] the plaintiff's testicles, while having the plaintiff turn his head and cough.” (Id. ¶ 9). After the physical examination, P.A. Badami told plaintiff to get dressed.

Plaintiff does not allege he was examined by P.A. Badami on any other occasion, or that he had any interactions with her beyond the intake examination.

Plaintiff seeks damages in the amount of $125,000. (AC at ECF 4).

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

“A case is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) when the district court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate it.” Nike, Inc. v. Already, LLC, 663 F.3d 89, 94 (2d Cir. 2011).^[4] “[F]ederal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and lack the power to disregard such limits as have been imposed by the Constitution or Congress.” Durant, Nichols, Houston, Hodgson, & Cortese-Costa, P.C. v. Dupont, 565 F.3d 56, 62 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 374 (1978)). The party invoking the Court's jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction exists. Conyers v. Rossides, 558 F.3d 137, 143 (2d Cir. 2009).

In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court evaluates the sufficiency of the complaint under the “two-pronged approach” articulated by the Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). First, a plaintiff's legal conclusions and “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,” are not entitled to the assumption of truth and thus are not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. Id. at 678; Hayden v. Paterson, 594 F.3d 150, 161 (2d Cir. 2010). Second, “[w]hen there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.

The Court must liberally construe submissions of pro se litigants and interpret them “to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Applying the pleading rules permissively is particularly appropriate when, as here, a pro se plaintiff alleges civil rights violations. Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 2008). “Even in a pro se case, however . . . threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Chavis v. Chappius, 618 F.3d 162, 170 (2d Cir. 2010). Nor may the Court “invent factual allegations” plaintiff has not pleaded. Id.

II. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

P.A. Badami argues plaintiff's claims against her in her official capacity are barred by the Eleventh Amendment, and thus, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over these claims.

The Court agrees.

State officers sued in their official capacities are immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment absent a state's consent or a congressional abrogation of state sovereign immunity. Clark v. Schroeder, 847 Fed.Appx. 92, 93-94 (2d Cir. 2021) (summary order), cert. denied, 142 S.Ct. 341 (2021). “New York has not waived its immunity, nor has Congress abrogated it.” Li v. Lorenzo, 712 Fed.Appx. 21, 22 (2d Cir. 2017) (summary order). Further, the Eleventh Amendment bars claims for monetary damages against defendants acting in their official capacities. See Gan v. City of New York, 996 F.2d 522, 529 (2d Cir. 1993).

Here, P.A. Badami is a DOCCS employee and, thus, a state official. Claims against her in her official capacity are therefore barred by the Eleventh Amendment and dismissed. See Robinson v. Tillotson, 2018 WL 4682226, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2018).

III. Failure to State a Claim

In the amended complaint, plaintiff asserts violations of his “Federally protected Constitutional Rights” (AC ¶ 2), which he lists as “Cruel and Unusual Punishment,” “Invasion of Privacy,” and “Deliberate Medical Indifference” in “Violation [of the] 8th Amendment,” and “Disclosure of Medical Information [in] Violation [of the] 14th Amendment.” (Id. at ECF 3). P.A. Badami's briefs specifically refer to the First, Fourth, and Eighth Amendments, as well as the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. (See Doc. #43 (“Def. Mem.”) at 3-6; Doc. #45 (“Def. Reply”) at 1-2). Thus, in ruling on P.A. Badami's motion to dismiss, the Court construes the amended complaint as bringing claims under all four Amendments.^[5]

A. First Amendment Claim

P.A. Badami argues plaintiff's First Amendment free exercise claim must be dismissed because he does not plausibly allege the examination substantially burdened his religious beliefs and because her conduct was motivated by a legitimate penological interest.^[6]

The Court disagrees.

1. Applicable Law

“Inmates clearly retain protections afforded by the First Amendment . . . including its directive that no law shall prohibit the free exercise of religion.” See O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987). To state a free exercise claim, a plaintiff “must show at the threshold” that the complained-of conduct “burdens his sincerely held religious beliefs,” Brandon v. Kinter, 938 F.3d 21, 32 (2d Cir. 2019), by “put[ting] substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs.'” Jolly v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 468, 477 (2d Cir. 1996) (citing Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Emp't Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981)).^[7]

An inmate's “right to practice his religion is, however, not absolute.” Salahuddin v. Coughlin, 993 F.2d 306, 308 (2d Cir. 1993). Prisons may restrict religious exercise so long as such restrictions are “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. at 349. Thus, even if a plaintiff can establish a defendant burdened his religious beliefs, he cannot state a free exercise claim if the defendant had “legitimate penological justifications” for burdening the plaintiff's free exercise. Salahuddin v. Goord, 467 F.3d 263, 275 (2d Cir. 2006). In evaluating whether the disputed conduct was motivated by legitimate penological interests, courts consider:

[i] whether the challenged regulation or official action has a valid, rational connection to a legitimate governmental objective; [ii] whether

...