Fields v. Cnty. of Nassau

219 A.D.3d 882

195 N.Y.S.3d 294

Jakiel FIELDS, respondent,

v.COUNTY OF NASSAU, et al., appellants.

2020–05113

Index No. 605032/18

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

Argued—March 3, 2023

August 30, 2023

Thomas A. Adams, County Attorney, Mineola, NY (Robert F. Van der Waag, Jackie L. Gross, and Samantha A. Goetz of counsel), for appellants.

Kaplan & Kaplan, Brooklyn, NY (Cary H. Kaplan of counsel), for respondent.

BETSY BARROS, J.P., VALERIE BRATHWAITE NELSON, ROBERT J. MILLER, JOSEPH J. MALTESE, JJ.

DECISION & ORDER

In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for false arrest and malicious prosecution, the defendants appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Randy Sue Marber, J.), entered April 23, 2020. The order, insofar as appealed from, denied those branches of the defendants’ motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the first, second, and third causes of action insofar as asserted against the defendant County of Nassau.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

On April 21, 2017, the plaintiff was arrested by several plainclothes police officers in West Hempstead. The plaintiff subsequently was charged in a felony complaint with criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree and criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree. The complaint alleged that the plaintiff committed those crimes in Nassau County on March 15, 2017. However, it subsequently was determined that on that date the plaintiff was in the state of Georgia, where he resided at the time. The plaintiff was released from jail on or about July 7, 2017, approximately 77 days after his arrest. In August 2017, a grand jury dismissed the felony complaint against the plaintiff.

The plaintiff subsequently commenced this action against the defendant County of Nassau, among others, asserting causes of action alleging, inter alia, deprivation of certain federal constitutional rights pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 (first cause of action), false arrest (second cause of action), and malicious prosecution (third cause of action). The defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, contending, among other things, that there was probable cause to arrest and prosecute the plaintiff. In support of their motion they submitted, inter alia, a transcript of the deposition testimony of one of the arresting officers, the defendant Detective Harold Horch. Detective Horch testified that, on March 15, 2017, he and two other detectives watched from their unmarked vehicle as a confidential informant entered a vehicle that was approximately eight to ten car lengths away. A few minutes later, the confidential informant returned to the detectives’ vehicle and told the detectives that "Jay" and another person sold him a controlled substance while he was in the vehicle. A cell phone that the detectives had given the confidential informant to record the transaction did not work, and the detectives did not see the plaintiff or take any photographs of him that day. At a March 29, 2017 photo array identification, the confidential informant identified the plaintiff as the "Jay" who had sold him the controlled substance two weeks earlier.

In an order entered April 23, 2020, the Supreme Court, among other things, denied those branches of the defendants’ motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the first, second, and third causes of action insofar as asserted against the County. The defendants appeal.

" ‘The existence of probable cause constitutes a complete defense to causes of action alleging false arrest ... and malicious prosecution, and this includes causes of action asserted pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 to recover damages for the deprivation of Fourth Amendment rights under color of state law that are the federal-law equivalents of state common-law false arrest and malicious prosecution causes of action’ " ( Elie v. City of New York, 183 A.D.3d 867, 870, 123 N.Y.S.3d 672, quoting Williams v. City of New York, 153 A.D.3d 1301, 1302–1303, 62 N.Y.S.3d 401 ). " ‘Probable cause does not require proof sufficient to warrant a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt but merely information sufficient to support a reasonable belief that an offense has been or is being committed’ by the suspected individual, and probable cause must be judged under the totality of the circumstances" ( De Lourdes Torres v. Jones, 26 N.Y.3d 742, 759, 27 N.Y.S.3d 468, 47 N.E.3d 747, quoting People v. Bigelow, 66 N.Y.2d 417, 423, 497 N.Y.S.2d 630, 488 N.E.2d 451 ). "Whenever there has been an arrest and imprisonment without a warrant, the officer[s] ha[ve] acted extrajudicially and the presumption arises that such an arrest and imprisonment are unlawful" ( Broughton v. State of New York, 37 N.Y.2d 451, 458, 373 N.Y.S.2d 87, 335 N.E.2d 310 ).

Here, the defendants failed to establish, prima facie, the existence of probable cause to arrest the plaintiff (see Cayruth v. City of Mount Vernon, 188 A.D.3d 1139, 1141, 132 N.Y.S.3d 851 ; Elie v. City of New York, 183 A.D.3d at 870, 123 N.Y.S.3d 672 ; Fortunato v. City of New York, 63 A.D.3d 880, 880–881, 882 N.Y.S.2d 195 ). Detective Horch's...