Fields v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons

109 F.4th 264

Andrew FIELDS, III, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS; Warden Streeval;A. W. Goldey; Captain Baker; Mitchell; Mullins; Neff;Ewing; Gayheart; Sessons; Fields; Sloan; Nurse Scott;J. Robbins; Bolling; Garrett; Scholl; Gilbert; Baker;Barker; Farmer; Dickenson; Lieutenant Laffin;Lieutenant Nicholous; Lieutenant Hamilton;Lieutenant Mullins; Hughes; Laster, Defendants - Appellees.

No. 23-6246

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit

Argued: January 26, 2024

Decided: July 25, 2024

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at Roanoke. Elizabeth Kay Dillon, District Judge. (7:22-cv-00021-EKD-JCH)

ARGUED: Daniel Zemel, THE KRUDYS LAW FIRM, PLC, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. Krista Consiglio Frith, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: John F. Preis, Professor of Law, THE UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND SCHOOL OF LAW, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. Christopher R. Kavanaugh, United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellee.

Before GREGORY, THACKER, and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded by published opinion. Judge Gregory wrote the opinion, in which Judge Thacker joined. Judge Richardson wrote a dissenting opinion.

GREGORY, Circuit Judge:

While incarcerated at U.S. Penitentiary (USP) Lee, Andrew Fields was the target of egregious physical abuse. There is little doubt that Fields would have a viable § 1983 claim against prison officials if he had been incarcerated at a state prison. But Fields was at a federal facility, and claims against federal officials for constitutional violations are severely limited under established precedent. Thus, the district court concluded that Fields cannot obtain relief and that his claim must be dismissed pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act's prescreening procedure. Though we acknowledge the limited availability of claims under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Narcotics Bureau against federal officials, including officers in federal prisons, we conclude that Fields can overcome those limitations and successfully state a claim against the officers. Accordingly, we reverse.

I.

We review de novo a district court's dismissal through PLRA prescreening for failure to state a claim. Moore v. Bennette, 517 F.3d 717, 728 (4th Cir. 2008). In so doing, we apply the same standard as under Rule 12(b)(6). Veney v. Wyche, 293 F.3d 726, 730 (4th Cir. 2002). We accept all facts pled in the Complaint as true and "draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff." Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 253 (4th Cir. 2009). Because the complaint in this case was filed pro se, we construe the allegations "liberally" in the plaintiff's favor. Shaw v. Foreman, 59 F.4th 121, 126 (4th Cir. 2023).

II.

Fields alleges that he was the victim of excessive force, inflicted by several prison officials at USP Lee in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Specifically, he alleges that on November 10, 2021, he went to lunch without his inmate movement pass, which he was required to carry with him whenever he left his housing unit. J.A. 9. Upon his return, he was escorted to USP Lee's lieutenants' office, where he was berated for failing to carry his inmate movement pass with him at all times. J.A. 10-11. He was then ordered to be taken to the special housing unit (SHU), colloquially known as "the hole," and placed in administrative segregation. J.A. 11. Before he was taken to the SHU, an officer conducted a pat down search and seized several legal documents Fields had on his person and Fields's prescription eyeglasses. J.A. 12. To date, neither the documents nor the eyeglasses have been returned. Id.

On the way to the SHU, a scuffle erupted. J.A. 13. According to an incident report appended to the complaint, Fields allegedly tried to assault the officers escorting him. J.A. 29. As a result of this incident, Fields was placed in ambulatory restraints and taken the rest of the way to the SHU in a wheelchair. J.A. 13. This is the first alleged incident of excessive force, though Appellees argue that the officers' actions were justified because Fields initiated the scuffle.

Once at the SHU, Fields was placed in an observation cell. J.A. 14. At regular intervals, prison staff were required to check on Fields. Despite the fact that Fields was still in restraints with both his hands and feet cuffed, the officers used each check as another opportunity to physically abuse Fields, including by ramming his head into the concrete cell wall and hitting Fields with a fiberglass security shield. J.A. 14. There is no allegation that Fields posed a physical threat to the officers during any of these checks. J.A. 14-23. Fields alleges that this entire sequence of events was retaliation for his involvement in an unrelated proceeding concerning events that occurred at a different federal prison. J.A. 9.

Following his time in the SHU, Fields attempted to utilize the Bureau of Prisons' (BOP's) administrative grievance procedure, but prison staff denied him access to the necessary forms. J.A. 24, 26. He was thus unable to pursue any alternative remedies. J.A. 26. After unsuccessfully attempting to access the available administrative remedies, Fields filed a pro se civil rights complaint in the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia. The suit named the BOP, the prison warden, and several other officers, both supervisory and those who directly interacted with Fields during the events giving rise to this case.

The district court prescreened the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). That provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) requires courts "as soon as practicable after docketing" to review civil cases "in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer" and "dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint" that "is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." § 1915A(b). The district court dismissed the complaint in full because, it said, many of its allegations failed to state a constitutional violation and even those that did were not cognizable because "there is no damages remedy under Bivens" for those claims. J.A. 96.

Fields appealed the dismissal and has since retained counsel. On appeal, he challenges only the dismissal of his Eighth Amendment excessive force claim. He concedes that this case arises in a new context under our Bivens analysis but argues that Bivens should nonetheless be extended to permit him to pursue this claim. He does not challenge the dismissal of any of the other claims originally brought in his complaint.

III.

"Although § 1983 gives plaintiffs the statutory authority to sue state officials for money damages for constitutional violations, there is no statutory counterpart to sue federal officials." Mays v. Smith, 70 F.4th 198, 201 (4th Cir. 2023). If they are to proceed at all, plaintiffs suing federal-officer defendants must proceed under an implied cause of action first established by the Supreme Court in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics. 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971). To date, the Supreme Court has recognized a Bivens cause of action in only three circumstances. In Bivens itself, the Supreme Court recognized an implied cause of action against six Federal Bureau of Narcotics agents in their individual capacities. See generally id. The agents had shackled the defendant in front of his family, threatened to arrest his entire family, searched his apartment without a search warrant, and arrested him for alleged narcotics violations without a warrant or probable cause. Id. at 389, 91 S.Ct. 1999. The Supreme Court found an implied cause of action for damages for the alleged Fourth Amendment violation. Id. at 390-98, 91 S.Ct. 1999. In Davis v. Passman, the Supreme Court extended Bivens to create an implied cause of action under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, which prohibits the federal government from denying anyone the equal protection of the law. 442 U.S. 228, 236, 99 S.Ct. 2264, 60 L.Ed.2d 846 (1979). Specifically, it found a cause of action against a congressman for firing his female secretary. Id. at 234, 99 S.Ct. 2264. Finally, in Carlson v. Green, the Supreme Court allowed a prisoner's estate to sue BOP officials for violating the inmate's Eighth Amendment rights by failing to treat the prisoner's asthma. 446 U.S. 14, 100 S.Ct. 1468, 64 L.Ed.2d 15 (1980). The latter is akin to a § 1983 claim for Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to medical needs.

Since these decisions were handed down, the tide has turned against Bivens. "The [Supreme] Court has made clear that expanding the Bivens remedy to a new context is an extraordinary act that will be unavailable in most every case." Mays, 70 F.4th at 202. And in the Supreme Court's most recent Bivens decision, Egbert v. Boule, 596 U.S. 482, 142 S.Ct. 1793, 213 L.Ed.2d 54 (2022), "the Supreme Court all but closed the door on Bivens remedies." Dyer v. Smith, 56 F.4th 271, 277 (4th Cir. 2022). It emphasized that "we have come 'to appreciate more fully the tension between' judicially created causes of action and 'the Constitution's separation of legislative and judicial power.' " Egbert, 596 U.S. at 491, 142 S.Ct. 1793 (quoting Hernandez v. Mesa, 589 U.S. 93, 140 S. Ct. 735, 741, 206 L.Ed.2d 29 (2020)). Thus, the Egbert court asserted that "recognizing a cause of action under Bivens is 'a disfavored judicial activity,' " but chose not to dispense with Bivens altogether. Id. (quoting Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120, 121, 137 S.Ct. 1843, 198 L.Ed.2d 290 (2017)).

A.

To determine whether a plaintiff's claim may proceed under Bivens, we conduct a two-step analysis:

First, we ask whether the case presents a new Bivens context—i.e., is it meaningfully

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