Fields v. Mellinger

851 S.E.2d 789

Cody Ryan FIELDS, Petitioner

v.Ross H. MELLINGER, Individually and in His Capacity as a Deputy with the Jackson County, West Virginia, Sheriff's Department; Tony Boggs, Individually and in His Capacity as the Sheriff of Jackson County, West Virginia; and the Jackson County Commission d/b/a the Jackson County Sheriff's Department, Respondents

No. 20-0183

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted: October 27, 2020

Filed: November 18, 2020

Lonnie C. Simmons, Luca D. DiPiero, DiPiero Simmons McGinley & Bastress, PLLC, Charleston, West Virginia, Michael T. Clifford, Charleston, West Virginia, Attorneys for the Petitioner.

Wendy E. Greve, Drannon L. Adkins, Pullin, Fowler, Flanagan, Brown & Poe, PLLC, Charleston, West Virginia, Attorneys for the Respondents.

Jenkins, Justice:

The United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia presents the following certified question for resolution by this Court: "Does West Virginia recognize a private right of action for monetary damages for violations of Article III, Section 6 of the West Virginia Constitution ?" We have considered the parties briefs and oral arguments, the appendix record submitted, and extensive legal authority on this issue. We conclude that there is no private right of action for monetary damages for a violation of Article III, Section 6 of the West Virginia Constitution. Accordingly, we answer the certified question in the negative.

I.FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On July 2, 2019, Cody Ryan Fields ("Mr. Fields") filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia ("district court") against Ross H. Mellinger, individually and in his capacity as a Deputy with the Jackson County, West Virginia, Sheriff's Department ("Deputy Mellinger"); Tony Boggs, individually and in his capacity as the Sheriff of Jackson County, West Virginia; and the Jackson County Commission d/b/a the Jackson County Sheriff's Department ("Sheriff's Department") (collectively "the Defendants"). The following state law claims are asserted by Mr. Fields in his complaint: constitutional tort, for violations of Article III, Sections 6, 10, and 17 of the West Virginia Constitution ; negligence in the hiring, retention, and/or supervision of employees; battery; and outrageous conduct/intentional infliction of mental, physical, and emotional distress. Additionally, the following federal law claims are asserted in the complaint by Mr. Fields: excessive force under United States Code title 42 section 1983 ; Monell¹ and supervisory liability under United States Code title 42 section 1983 ; and unlawful conspiracy under United States Code title 42 sections 1983 & 1985.

In his complaint, Mr. Fields alleged the following facts:

5. On or about the 20th day of September[ ] 2017, defendant [Deputy] Mellinger, under the auspices of executing a search warrant upon the residence of Joseph Farrel ... near Ripley, Jackson County, West Virginia, confronted [Mr. Fields] in a detached garage with the front bay door open and told [Mr. Fields] to get on the ground. [Mr. Fields] was standing with his hands in the air and bending at the waist to get down when [Deputy] Mellinger, using deadly and excessive force, and not utilizing lesser means of command such as pepper spray, viciously struck [Mr. Fields] in the face with the butt end of a shotgun, all of which was without probable cause or provocation, and without any resistance whatsoever, causing facial injuries and knocking out several of [Mr. Fields’] teeth .... Thereafter, [Deputy] Mellinger told [Mr. Fields] that his teeth needed to come out anyway.

6. At the time of the attack by [Deputy] Mellinger, [Mr. Fields] was not under arrest, having committed no crime, he was being compliant, he was not attempting to flee, he was not attempting to assault or strike [Deputy] Mellinger[,] and he was not threatening to do so.

7. At the time [of the attack, Deputy] Mellinger had no reason to believe that [Mr. Fields] had committed or was committing any crime, in that [Mr. Fields] was situate in an open garage, detached from the residence [that] the defendant had a warrant to search and, apparently, did not search at that date and time. [Deputy Mellinger] had no reason to believe [Mr. Fields] was in possession of any weapons and never inquired of [Mr. Fields] whether he was in possession of any weapons prior to attacking him. Indeed [Deputy] Mellinger never inquired of [Mr. Fields] who he was and what he was doing in the garage.

According to the complaint, Mr. Fields was then placed under arrest for obstruction and simple possession. Mr. Fields repeatedly attempted to have a suppression hearing related to the charges, but the State's witnesses were continually unavailable. Accordingly, the charges were dismissed by the Jackson County Magistrate Court.

The Defendants ultimately filed a partial motion to dismiss, which, relevant to this certified question, sought dismissal of Mr. Fields’ claim for relief under the West Virginia Constitution, asserting that state constitutional claims are not supported by the law. Following Mr. Fields’ response to the motion, the Defendants’ reply, and a telephonic conference, the district court took the Defendants’ partial motion to dismiss under advisement and directed the parties to submit a proposal for certified question. By "Order of Certification" filed on March 4, 2020, the district court submitted its certified question to this Court. We accepted the certified question and placed this matter on the docket for argument under Rule 20 of the West Virginia Rules of Appellate Procedure.

II.STANDARD OF REVIEW

We exercise plenary review of a question certified by a federal district court: " ‘A de novo standard is applied by this Court in addressing the legal issues presented by a certified question from a federal district or appellate court.’ Syllabus Point 1, Light v. Allstate Ins. Co. , 203 W. Va. 27, 506 S.E.2d 64 (1998)." Syl. pt. 1, Martinez v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co. , 239 W. Va. 612, 803 S.E.2d 582 (2017). See also Syl. pt. 1, Bower v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. , 206 W. Va. 133, 522 S.E.2d 424 (1999) ("This Court undertakes plenary review of legal issues presented by certified question from a federal district or appellate court."). Applying this standard, we proceed to answer the question herein certified.

III.DISCUSSION

In this proceeding, we are presented with the following question certified by the district court:

Does West Virginia recognize a private right of action for monetary damages for violations of Article III, Section 6 of the West Virginia Constitution ?

Because our answer to this question requires constitutional analysis, we begin by reviewing this Court's role as it relates to matters of constitutional interpretation.

This Court previously has recognized that

[a] constitution is the fundamental law by which all people of the state are governed. It is the very genesis of government. Unlike ordinary legislation, a constitution is enacted by the people themselves in their sovereign capacity and is therefore the paramount law. This basic organic law can be altered or rewritten only in the manner provided for therein.

State ex rel. Smith v. Gore , 150 W. Va. 71, 77, 143 S.E.2d 791, 795 (1965). For this reason, "[c]ourts are not concerned with the wisdom or expediencies of constitutional provisions, and the duty of the judiciary is merely to carry out the provisions of the plain language stated in the constitution." Syl. pt. 3, State ex rel. Casey v. Pauley , 158 W. Va. 298, 210 S.E.2d 649 (1975). See also Syl. pt. 3, Diamond v. Parkersburg-Aetna Corp. , 146 W. Va. 543, 122 S.E.2d 436 (1961) ("The object of construction, as applied to a written constitution, is to give effect to the intent of the people in adopting it."). Thus, as we recently acknowledged, the Court bears the " ‘task of interpreting the Constitution and the laws of this State as they exist.’ " State v. Smith , 243 W.Va. 470, ––––, 844 S.E.2d 711, 719 (2020) (quoting W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Bd. of Educ. of the Cty. of Nicholas , 239 W. Va. 705, 721, 806 S.E.2d 136, 152 (2017) (additional quotations and citation omitted)). In other words,

[a]lthough this Court is vested with the authority "to construe, interpret and apply provisions of the Constitution, ... [we] may not add to, distort or ignore the plain mandates thereof." State ex rel. Bagley v. Blankenship , 161 W. Va. 630, 643, 246 S.E.2d 99, 107 (1978). Thus, "[i]f a constitutional provision is clear in its terms, and the intention of the electorate is clearly embraced in the language of the provision itself, this Court must apply and not interpret the provision." Syl. pt. 1, State ex rel. Trent v. Sims , 138 W. Va. 244, 77 S.E.2d 122 (1953). On the other hand, "if the language of the constitutional provision is ambiguous, then the ordinary principles employed in statutory construction must be applied to ascertain such intent." State ex rel. Forbes v. Caperton , 198 W. Va. 474, 480, 481 S.E.2d 780, 786 (1996) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

State ex rel. Morrisey v. W. Va. Office of Disc. Counsel , 234 W. Va. 238, 255, 764 S.E.2d 769, 786 (2014). See also Syl. pt. 1, Winkler v. State Sch. Bldg. Auth. , 189 W. Va. 748, 434 S.E.2d 420 (1993) ("Questions of constitutional construction are in the main governed by the same general rules applied in statutory construction."). Even where a provision is found to be ambiguous, it "requires interpretation consistent with the intent of both the drafters and the electorate." State ex rel. Brotherton v. Blankenship , 157 W. Va. 100, 127, 207 S.E.2d 421, 436-37 (1973) (Neely, J., dissenting).

Turning to the question at hand, "[a]s in every case involving the application or interpretation of a constitutional provision, analysis must begin with the language of the constitutional provision itself." State ex rel. Mountaineer Park, Inc. v. Polan , 190 W. Va. 276, 283, 438 S.E.2d 308,...