Figueroa v. Gannett Co.

ORDER

CINDY K. JORGENSON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Pending before the Court are the Request for an Order to Clerk to Maintain File Open to Allow Plaintiff to Move for Attorney's Fees and Costs (Doc. 294) and the Motion for Attorney's Fees (Docs. 295, 296, 298, 301) filed by Plaintiff Natalie Figueroa ("Figueroa"). Also pending before the Court is the Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law and Motion for New Trial (Doc. 306) filed by Defendants Gannett Co., Inc., and TNI Partners dba Arizona Daily Star ("Gannett"). Responses and replies have been filed. The Court declines to set this matter for oral argument. See LRCiv 7.2(f); 27A Fed.Proc., L.Ed. § 62:361 (March 2023) ("A district court generally is not required to hold a hearing or oral argument before ruling on a motion.").

Figueroa was awarded $275,000.00 in compensatory damages and $3,700,000.00 in punitive damages in this case. (Docs. 271-275). Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1981a(b)(3), the Court reduced the combined compensatory and punitive damages award is to the statutory cap of $300,000 cap. (Doc. 292). Additionally, the Court awarded back pay, along with pre-judgment interest, to Figueroa in the amount of $93,457.04. (Doc. 292).

I. Request for an Order to Clerk to Maintain File Open to Allow Plaintiff to Move for Attorney's Fees and Costs (Doc. 294)

Pursuant to this Court's August 17, 2022, Order, the Clerk of Court closed its file in this matter. Figueroa requests this order be modified to permit her to move for attorney's fees. However, the closing of the file after entry of judgment is an administrative process that does not affect the ability to request attorney's fees. Further, Figueroa has submitted her request for attorney's fees. The Court will deny this request.

II. Motion for Extension of Time (Doc. 310)

Figueroa requested additional time to file a reply to the Motion for Attorney's Fees.

The Court will grant this request and accepts Figueroa's reply.

III. Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law and Motion for New Trial (Doc. 306)

Gannett renews its motion for judgment or partial judgment as a matter of law ("JMOL") on three grounds. Gannett asserts Figueroa failed to introduce sufficient evidence establishing she is a qualified individual under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), Figueroa failed to mitigate her lost wages by looking for a new job, and Gannett did not act with malice or reckless disregard for Figueroa's rights.

The applicable rule states:

If the court does not grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law made under Rule 50(a), the court is considered to have submitted the action to the jury subject to the court's later deciding the legal questions raised by the motion. No later than 28 days after the entry of judgment--or if the motion addresses a jury issue not decided by a verdict, no later than 28 days after the jury was discharged--the movant may file a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law and may include an alternative or joint request for a new trial under Rule 59. In ruling on the renewed motion, the court may

(1) allow judgment on the verdict, if the jury returned a verdict

(2) order a new trial; or

(3) direct the entry of judgment as a matter of law

Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b).

If a jury verdict is supported by substantial evidence it must be upheld. See Wallace v. City of San Diego, 479 F.3d 616, 624 (9th Cir. 2007), citation omitted. "Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as reasonable minds might accept as adequate to support a conclusion even if it is possible to draw two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence." Weaving v. City of Hillsboro, 763 F.3d 1106, 1111 (9th Cir. 2014), citation and quotations omitted.

Judgment as a matter of law is appropriate if "the evidence, construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, 'permits only one reasonable conclusion, and that conclusion is contrary to the jury's verdict.'" Keates v. Koile, 846 Fed.Appx. 628, 630 (9th Cir. 2021), quoting Josephs v. Pac. Bell, 443 F.3d 1050, 1062 (9th Cir. 2006).

Because the standards for granting summary judgment and judgment as a matter of law mirror one another, courts must "review all of the evidence in the record." See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000), citations omitted. Although "the court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party . . . it may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence." Id., citations omitted; E.E.O.C. v. Go Daddy Software, Inc., 581 F.3d 951, 961 (9th Cir. 2009). "[T]he court should give credence to the evidence favoring the nonmovant as well as that 'evidence supporting the moving party that is uncontradicted and unimpeached, at least to the extent that that evidence comes from disinterested witnesses.'" Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 151 (2000), citation omitted. The Ninth Circuit has stated, "'It is error to deny a judgment [as a matter of law] when it is clear that the evidence and its inferences cannot reasonably support a judgment in favor of the opposing party.'" Weaving v. City of Hillsboro, 763 F.3d 1106, 1111 (9th Cir. 2014), citation omitted.

Alternatively, Gannett seeks a new trial on these issues because the judgment is against the weight of the evidence. The Court "can grant a new trial 'for any of the reasons for which new trials have heretofore been granted in actions at law in the courts of the

United States,' including where 'the verdict is against the weight of the evidence' and where 'the trial was not fair to the party moving[.]'" Stop StaringA Designs v. Tatyana, LLC, 625 Fed.Appx. 328, 329 (9th Cir. 2015), citations omitted. Indeed, the Court can grant a new trial on "any ground necessary to prevent a miscarriage of justice." Experience Hendrix L.L.C. v. Hendrixlicensing.com Ltd, 762 F.3d 829, 842 (9th Cir. 2014).

Further, the Court "is not limited to the grounds a party asserts to justify a new trial, but may sua sponte raise its own concerns about the damages verdict." Id. at 842. In considering a motion for new trial, the Court "is not required to view the trial evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. Instead, the district court can weigh the evidence and assess the credibility of the witnesses." Id. As summarized by a treatise:

It may be doubted whether there is any verbal formula that will be of much use to trial courts in passing on motions of the type now being considered. Necessarily all formulations are couched in broad and general terms that furnish no unerring litmus for a particular case. On the one hand, the trial judge does not sit to approve miscarriages of justice. The judge's power to set aside the verdict is supported by clear precedent at common law and, far from being a denigration or a usurpation of jury trial, has long been regarded as an integral part of trial by jury as we know it. On the other hand, a decent respect for the collective wisdom of the jury, and for the function entrusted to it in our system, certainly suggests that in most cases the judge should accept the findings of the jury, regardless of the judge's own doubts in the matter. Probably all that the judge can do is to balance these conflicting principles in the light of the facts of the particular case. If, having given full respect to the jury's findings, the judge on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed, it is to be expected that the judge will grant a new trial.

11 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2806 Grounds for New Trial-Weight of the Evidence (3d ed. Apr. 2022), footnotes omitted.

A. Qualified Individual

Gannett moved for JMOL on the basis Figueroa had failed to provide sufficient evidence she was a qualified individual under the ADA. This Court denied that request. On June 6, 2022, the jury returned verdicts as to the liability phase, including a finding Figueroa had proven she was a qualified individual with a disability.

A qualified individual is someone who, with or without a reasonable accommodation,

can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). The Ninth Circuit has stated:

The EEOC promulgated 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m) to further elaborate upon the meaning of the term "qualified." That subsection sets forth a two-step inquiry for determining whether the individual is qualified. We first determine whether the individual satisfies the prerequisites of the job; more specifically, whether "the individual satisfies the requisite skill, experience, education and other job-related requirements of the employment position such individual holds or desires." At step two, we determine whether, "with or without reasonable accommodation," the individual is able to "perform the essential functions of such position." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m).

Anthony v. Trax Int'l Corp., 955 F.3d 1123, 1127-28 (9th Cir. 2020). Further, "a person who is totally disabled and therefore unable to perform her job, even with accommodation, is not a 'qualified individual' under the ADA." Jett v. Longs Drug Stores Corp., 166 F.3d 1217 (9th Cir. 1999).^[1]

Evidence presented at trial included Figueroa's testimony, doctor's evaluations, and disability benefits applications. Figueroa testified, when she went on leave in March, she was unable to work because of medication she took. She also testified her physical condition did not allow her to work. Additionally, Figueroa repeatedly represented that she is unable to work due to her physical condition, remained out of work for several...