Figueroa v. Garland

1

LUIS RAFAEL FIGUEROA, JR., Plaintiff, v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, in his official capacity as the Attorney General of the United States and Head of United States Department of Justice, et al., Defendants.

No. 1:21-cv-7849-GHW

United States District Court, S.D. New York

July 31, 2023

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

GREGORY H. WOODS UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

Luis Rafael Figueroa, Jr. worked for the United States Marshals Service as a Detention Enforcement Officer from February 2001 until his retirement in October 2017. After working as a first responder to the September 11 terrorist attack, Mr Figueroa developed asthma, sinus, and respiratory problems for which he required ongoing accommodations in the form of regular leave to attend medical appointments. In the latter part of his tenure with the Marshals Service, from 2013 until his retirement in 2017, Mr. Figueroa was placed on two restrictions regarding his use of leave. He alleges that these restrictions as well as other alleged hostile actions taken by his supervisors constituted discrimination and retaliation under two federal statutes.

Previously, the Court dismissed Mr. Figueroa's first amended complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted. But in his now-operative second amended complaint, Mr. Figueroa has added allegations about the timing and circumstances surrounding the issuance of the second leave restriction that raises a plausible inference that this restriction could have been retaliatory. And in light of the Court's conclusion on the viability of Mr. Figueroa's retaliation claims and the Second Circuit's recent reemphasis that factual determinations about the hostility and discriminatory nature of a work environment are usually best left to the finder of fact, the Court further concludes that Mr. Figueroa's active complaint (narrowly) states a plausible hostile-workenvironment discrimination claim. As a result, the motion to dismiss filed by Defendants the Marshals Service and the United States Attorney General is DENIED.

II. BACKGROUND^[1]

A. Mr. Figueroa's Employment as a Detention Enforcement Officer

Plaintiff began work as a Detention Enforcement Officer (“DEO”) with the United States Marshals Service (“USMS”) in February 2001. Dkt. No. 31 (Second Amended Complaint, or the “SAC”) ¶¶ 6, 28. He worked for the United States District Court in the Southern District of New York. Id. Mr. Figueroa's role as a DEO “was to assist with transport and housing of federal prisoners in the SDNY.” Id. ¶ 13. The USMS is an agency within the Department of Justice. Id. ¶ 12.

Mr. Figueroa “was one of many USMS officer first responders who assisted at the site of . . . the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001,” and he continued working at the World Trade Center site “in the days and months following” the September 11 attacks. Id. ¶ 7. Because of the time he spent at the World Trade Center following September 11, Mr. Figueroa developed “disabling severe asthma and respiratory problems” as well as sinus problems. Id. ¶¶ 8, 31. Mr. Figueroa required accommodations from the USMS so he could take regular leave to attend medical appointments and receive treatment. Id. ¶¶ 8, 33.^[2]

In 2010, Mr. Figueroa gave a letter from his physician to his then-supervisors. Id. ¶ 35. The letter described Mr. Figueroa's asthma, sinus, and respiratory problems for which he required intermittent leave to receive treatment and to pursue a workers' compensation benefits claim. Id. Sometime after he submitted his letter, he was informed by one of his supervisors that another supervisor, CDUSM John Csakany, had stated “I was there [on 9/11], and nothing happened to me.” Id. ¶ 36. Plaintiff understood this comment to mean that CDUSM Csakany was questioning the authenticity of his 9/11-related injuries and was expressing opposition to Mr. Figueroa's need to take medical leave to treat those injuries. Id. ¶ 37.

B. 2011 to September 2016

In 2011 and 2012, Plaintiff filed numerous complaints based on race and disability discrimination through the Federal Sector EEO administrative process. Id. ¶ 14. During this period, he also began participating in class-action litigation concerning race-based employment discrimination against Detention Employment Officers (“DEOs”) nationwide. Id. ¶ 16. Plaintiff's administrative complaints were settled in May 2013. Id. ¶ 15. But in September 2013, just after those complaints had been settled, the USMS and Plaintiff's supervisor SDUMS Joel Blackman issued Mr. Figueroa a “Letter of Leave Restriction” (the “2013 Letter”) due to his purportedly excessive use of leave for “workers' compensation related medical appointments and for care of his infant daughter.” Id. ¶¶ 15, 39. In response, Mr. Figueroa took two actions. First, he filed an administrative complaint claiming that the 2013 Letter was discriminatory because of his asthma, sinus, and respiratory disabilities and retaliatory because of his prior EEO activity and class-action participation. Id. ¶¶ 16, 41. Second, in an attempt to have the restrictions imposed by the 2013 Letter lifted, Plaintiff filed a grievance through his union to contest it. Id. ¶¶ 17, 42.

On November 6, 2014, Plaintiff's grievance was resolved and the restrictions imposed by the 2013 Letter were lifted. Id. ¶¶ 17, 44. Nonetheless, both before and after the restrictions imposed by the 2013 Letter were revoked, Plaintiff was experiencing “escalat[ing] harassment and discrimination from his supervisors related to his use of leave for ongoing medical treatment related to his 9/11 injuries.” Id. ¶ 47. According to Plaintiff, “[i]t was so difficult for Plaintiff to request and use his accrued sick and annual leave, that Plaintiff often could not attend his medical appointments in a timely manner.” Id. ¶ 48. The harassment that Mr. Figueroa faced led him to “not make a request or try to bundle appointments on one day to avoid the harassment he would inevitably experience if he made multiple requests for leave in any given time period.” Id. ¶ 49.

Plaintiff's administrative complaint about the imposition of the 2013 Letter was finally resolved when the DOJ's Office of Complaint Adjudication issued a Final Order on that complaint on September 6, 2016. Id. ¶¶ 20, 45.^[3] After that decision was issued, and in light of the “continued harassment” that he was enduring because of his need to take medical leave, “Plaintiff finally decided that he had no other choice but to seek a disability retirement from the agency.” Id. ¶ 51; see also id. ¶¶ 146-147 (a sign-in sheet was implemented on September 16, 2016, and Plaintiff observed that only his use of the sheet was monitored by management). From September 22 through September 28, 2016, Plaintiff inquired about and then submitted his initial application for disability retirement to one of his then-supervisors, SDUSM Smith. Id. ¶¶ 52-54. Later in the day on September 28, 2016, and still only weeks following the final adjudication of Plaintiff's administrative complaint concerning the 2013 Letter, USMS (though SDUSM Blackman) issued another Letter of Leave Restriction to Plaintiff. Id. ¶¶ 21, 55; see Dkt. No. 19-1 (the “2016 Letter”).

That letter, Plaintiff states, “was nearly identical to the 2013 Letter” that had been rescinded in 2014. Id. ¶ 21. It stated that it was issued to address “excessive absenteeism” and “a possible abuse of leave.” 2016 Letter at 1. The letter imposed numerous requirements. It required Mr. Figueroa to request all sick leave for “prearranged medical appointments or care of a family member” in advance while reserving the right to deny the request if the USMS needed Mr. Figueroa's services. Id. at 1. If Mr. Figueroa did not receive approval of a request and failed to show up for his shift, his supervisor could report him as “absent without approved leave (AWOL).” Id. Requests would be denied if Mr. Figueroa did not have sufficient accrued leave to cover the requested absence. Id. at 1-2. The 2016 Letter also reminded Mr. Figueroa that emergency requests must be rare and required him, when making any such request, to notify his supervisor “no later than 30 minutes prior to the start of [his] shift” and to provide “the exact nature of the emergency and how long [Mr. Figueroa] expect[ed] to be away from the office.” Id. at 2. It also required that Mr. Figueroa provide medical documentation for emergency leave before the end of the pay period when he took the leave. Id. If Mr. Figueroa failed to provide this documentation, his supervisors reserved the right to mark him as AWOL for his absence. Id.

Finally, the 2016 Letter required Mr. Figueroa to request annual leave at least twenty-four hours in advance and noted that the request would be denied if he had not accrued sufficient annual leave to cover the absence. Id. Mr. Figueroa was prohibited from using leave requests to cover any tardiness, except in the case of an emergency. Id. at 3. Similarly, the letter disallowed the use of leave without pay (“LWOP”) except in cases of emergency or if Mr. Figueroa invoked the Family Medical Leave Act (the “FMLA”). Id. Mr. Figueroa also had to provide “supporting medical documentation for the request.” Id. When Mr. Figueroa planned to use FMLA leave, he had to notify his supervisor and provide “acceptable medical documentation.” Id. The letter had no end date, SAC ¶ 70, except that it was to remain in his file until Plaintiff showed he could consistently abide by leave requirements. 2016 Letter at 3. The letter also stated that it was not itself a disciplinary action and that it was not to be placed in Mr. Figueroa's official file. Id. at 4.

C. September 2016 to June 2017

After the issuance of the 2016 Letter and Plaintiff's...