Fingers v. Basinger

1

Derek D. Fingers, Appellant-Defendant v. James Basinger, et al., Appellee-Plaintiff

No. 23A-CT-1749

Court of Appeals of Indiana

June 25, 2024

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.

Appeal from the Sullivan Circuit Court The Honorable Robert E Hunley, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 77C01-2209-CT-516

Attorneys for Appellees Basinger, Carter, Vanihel, Allen Smith and Holcomb Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana

Abigail R. Recker Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

Attorneys for Appellees Byrd and Riggs Jeb A. Crandall Travis W. Montgomery Bleeke Dillon Crandall, P.C. Indianapolis, Indiana

MEMORANDUM DECISION

PYLE, JUDGE

Statement of the Case

[¶1] Derek D. Fingers ("Fingers"), an inmate in the Indiana Department of Correction ("DOC"), appeals pro se the trial court's dismissal of his prisoner complaint raising a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983") against various prison employees and prison medical providers. ^[1] Fingers argues that the trial court erred by dismissing his complaint pursuant to INDIANA CODE § 34-58-1-2, which provides a screening procedure for prisoner's complaints. Concluding that there was no error, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

[¶2] We affirm.

Issue

Whether the trial court erred by dismissing Fingers' complaint.

Facts

[¶3] This appeal stems from the trial court's order dismissing Fingers' complaint pursuant to INDIANA CODE § 34-58-1-2. Therefore, we set forth the underlying facts as contained in Fingers' complaint, which our standard of review requires us to accept as true.

[¶4] In August 2022, Fingers was an inmate in the DOC's Wabash Valley Correctional Facility ("WVCF") and was housed in a restrictive housing unit. From August 4 to August 11, 2022, Fingers refused to eat any food or drink any liquids. On August 10, 2022, at 12:20 p.m., Fingers fainted while he was in the shower. Officers Smith and Allen took Fingers back to his cell. That same day, around 4:30 p.m., Fingers was taken to have his vitals checked. Nurse Jenifer took Fingers' vitals and saw that Fingers' heart rate was "around 160" and his oxygen level was "low[.]" (App. Vol. 2 at 21). Nurse Jenifer called Dr. Byrd, and they decided to send Fingers to the WVCF infirmary. When Fingers was at the infirmary, Nurse Leann offered fluids to Fingers. However, Fingers refused treatment because he believed he would be poisoned by DOC staff in retaliation for previous complaints he had made.

[¶5] The following day, Fingers was taken to a Terre Haute hospital ("the Terre Haute hospital") after it "was discovered" that Fingers' heart rate and oxygen level put him "on the verge of cardiac arrest." (App. Vol. 2 at 25). As soon as Fingers arrived at the Terre Haute hospital, Fingers asked to be transferred to a hospital in Indianapolis. A nurse at the Terre Haute hospital read the hospital's policy for inmates from the WVCF, and Fingers was placed in restraints. Thereafter, upon Fingers' request, he was discharged from the Terre Haute hospital without being seen by a doctor.

[¶6] In September 2022, Fingers filed a "Prisoner's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Civil Rights Complaint" against the Defendants. (App. Vol. 2 at 13). Fingers alleged that the Defendants had violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment by being deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. Fingers sought compensatory and punitive damages against the Defendants in their official and individual capacities.

[¶7] In Fingers' complaint, he separated his deliberate indifference claim into two parts. In the first part, he alleged that two of the State Defendants, Officers Allen and Smith, had shown deliberate indifference to Fingers' medical needs when they returned him to his cell after he had fainted instead of calling for a "medical emergency signal[.]" (App. Vol. 2 at 19). Fingers alleged that the two officers were "aware of [Fingers'] medical issue of his insides eating its self [sic] due to not having eaten, or drinked [sic] any liquids" and that they "knew that [Fingers] was at risk of cardiac arrest." (App. Vol. 2 at 18).

[¶8] In the second part of his claim, Fingers generally alleged that the remaining State Defendants and the Medical Defendants had shown deliberate indifference to Fingers' medical needs. Fingers specifically alleged that Lieutenant Holcomb, who was the supervisor of Fingers' housing unit, was required to document Fingers' refusal to eat and drink and that it was the lieutenant's responsibility "to assure that [Fingers] was receiving the necessary medical treatment[,] which was [to] be[] force fed at a hospital, and actually being sent to a hospital" after it "was discovered" that Fingers had had a heart rate of 160 and a low oxygen level. (App. Vol. 2 at 21). Fingers also alleged that Nurse Jenifer knew of Fingers' heart rate and oxygen level and had consulted Dr. Byrd. He also alleged that Nurse Jenifer and Dr. Byrd showed deliberate indifference when they transferred Fingers to the infirmary instead of transferring him to an outside hospital. Fingers also alleged that Nurse Leann, who had offered fluids to Fingers while in the infirmary, "knew that . . . Fingers['] insides were eating its self [sic], and his heart rate was at risk of cardiac arrest[.]" (App. Vol. 2 at 23). Additionally, Fingers alleged that Warden Vanihel, Commissioner Carter, Deputy Commissioner Basinger, Dr. Byrd, and Nurse Riggs had been "kept up dated [sic] as to [Fingers'] worsening serious medical condition" and that they knew that Fingers should have been taken to an outside hospital "to be force fed because his insides were already eating its self [sic][.]" (App. Vol. 2 at 24).

[¶9] In January 2023, State Defendants filed a motion to screen and stay the matter ("motion to screen"). State Defendants sought to have the trial court screen Fingers' complaint under INDIANA CODE § 34-58-1-2, which provides a screening mechanism for a complaint filed by an offender. ^[2] Medical Defendants filed a motion to join in State Defendants' motion to screen. The trial court granted the joint motion to screen Fingers' complaint.

[¶10] Thereafter, in July 2023, the trial court screened Fingers' complaint and issued an order dismissing it. The trial court's order provided, in relevant part, that "[t]he claims set forth in [Fingers'] Complaint are determined to be frivolous, fail to state a claim[,] and seek[] relief from a defendant who is immune" and that Fingers' complaint "fail[ed] to set forth sufficient factual detail to notify [the] Defendants of the claims against them." (App. Vol. 2 at 12).

[¶11] Fingers now appeals.

Decision

[¶12] Fingers contends that the trial court erred by dismissing his complaint under INDIANA CODE § 34-58-1-2. We disagree. We note that the trial court identified various reasons for the dismissal of Fingers' complaint; however, we will focus on the trial court's conclusion that Fingers had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and that his claim was frivolous because it lacked an arguable basis in fact or law. See Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores E., LP, 853 N.E.2d 478, 483 (Ind.Ct.App. 2006) (explaining that our Court may affirm the trial court's dismissal of an offender's complaint on any theory or basis supported by the record), trans. denied.

[¶13] At the outset, we note that Fingers has chosen to proceed pro se. "[A] pro se litigant is held to the same standards as a trained attorney and is afforded no inherent leniency simply by virtue of being self-represented." Zavodnik v. Harper, 17 N.E.3d 259, 266 (Ind. 2014). "[O]ne acting pro se has no license to harass others clog the judicial machinery with meritless litigation, and abuse already overloaded court dockets." Id. (cleaned up). Pro se litigants are bound to follow the established rules of procedure and must be prepared to accept the consequences of their failure to do so. Basic v. Amouri, 58 N.E.3d 980, 983 (Ind.Ct.App. 2016), reh'g denied. We will not become a party's advocate, nor will we address arguments that are inappropriate, improperly expressed, or too poorly developed to be understood. Id. at 984.

[¶14] We now turn to Fingers' argument that the trial court erred by dismissing his Section 1983 complaint under INDIANA CODE § 34-58-1-2. Our legislature enacted the offender complaint screening procedure in INDIANA CODE § 34-581-2 "to prevent 'abusive and prolific offender litigation in Indiana.'" Taylor v. Antisdel, 185 N.E.3d 867, 873 (Ind.Ct.App. 2022) (quoting Smith v. Indiana Dep't of Correction, 883 N.E.2d 802, 804 (Ind. 2008)), trans. denied. Our Indiana Supreme Court has referred to INDIANA CODE § 34-58-1-2 as "the Frivolous Claim Law[.]" See Smith, 883 N.E.2d at 803-04.

[¶15] INDIANA CODE § 34-58-1-2 provides, in relevant part, as follows:

(a) A court shall review a complaint or petition filed by an offender and shall determine if the claim may proceed. A claim may not proceed if the court determines that the claim:

(1) is frivolous;

(2) is not a claim upon which relief may be granted; or

(3) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from liability for such relief.

(b) A claim is frivolous under subsection (a)(1) if the claim:

(1) is made primarily to harass a person; or

(2) lacks an arguable basis either in:

(A) law; or

(B) fact.

I.C. § 34-58-1-2.

[¶16] When reviewing the dismissal of an offender's complaint pursuant to INDIANA CODE § 34-58-1-2, we employ a de novo standard of review. Smith v. Donahue, 907 N.E.2d 553, 555 (Ind.Ct.App. 2009), trans. denied cert. dismissed. "Like the...