Finley v. State, CR-19-15

2019 Ark. 336

587 S.W.3d 223

Shaniqua FINLEY, Appellant

v.STATE of Arkansas, Appellee

No. CR-19-15

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

Opinion Delivered: November 14, 2019

Rehearing Denied December 19, 2019

James Law Firm, by: Bobby R. Digby II, and Michael Kiel Kaiser, for appellant.

Leslie Rutledge, Att'y Gen., by: Adam Jackson, Ass't Att'y Gen., for appellee.

RHONDA K. WOOD, Associate Justice

Shaniqua Finley challenges her capital-murder and aggravated-robbery convictions. The circuit court sentenced her to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. She argues three points on appeal: (1) the State presented insufficient circumstantial evidence to support her convictions; (2) testimony about the businesses she called after the shooting should have been excluded as hearsay; and (3) the jury's verdicts were inconsistent and should have resulted in a mistrial. We affirm.

I. Background

On August 26, 2016, Niranjana Modi and Dilipkumar Patel were working at the Best Shot Liquor Store in North Little Rock. A woman entered the store and attempted to purchase a bottle of Evan Williams liquor without an identification. When Modi refused to the sell the woman the liquor, the woman shot Patel and Modi. The woman then grabbed a bottle of Evan Williams 1783 from the shelf and fled the store. Patel later died as a result of complications from the gunshot. Modi survived.

Finley was arrested and charged with capital murder, two counts of aggravated robbery, and one count of first-degree battery, each with a firearm enhancement. The jury convicted her of capital murder and two counts of aggravated robbery, but it acquitted her of first-degree battery and the firearm enhancements. Finley waived jury sentencing, and the circuit court sentenced her to life imprisonment without parole for capital murder and ten years' imprisonment for each count of aggravated robbery, all to run concurrently.

II. Directed-Verdict Motion

Finley first argues the circuit court erred in denying her motion for directed verdict on the capital-murder and aggravated-robbery charges. We treat a motion for directed verdict as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. McClendon v. State , 2019 Ark. 88, 570 S.W.3d 450. In reviewing this challenge, we view the evidence in a light most favorable to the State and consider only the evidence that supports the conviction. Id. We will affirm the verdict if substantial evidence supports it. Id. Substantial evidence is evidence of sufficient force and character that it will, with reasonable certainty, compel a conclusion one way or the other without resorting to speculation or conjecture. Id. Where the theory of accomplice liability is implicated, we will affirm if substantial evidence exists that the defendant acted as an accomplice in the commission of the alleged offense. Lawshea v. State , 2019 Ark. 68, 567 S.W.3d 853.

Circumstantial evidence may constitute substantial evidence to support a conviction. Jefferson v. State , 372 Ark. 307, 276 S.W.3d 214 (2008). The longstanding rule in the use of circumstantial evidence is that, to be substantial, the evidence must exclude every other reasonable hypothesis than that of the guilt of the accused. Id. Upon review, this court must determine whether the jury resorted to speculation and conjecture in reaching its verdict. Id.

The jury convicted Finley of capital felony murder and aggravated robbery. Finley committed capital felony murder if acting alone or with one or more other persons, she committed or attempted to commit aggravated robbery and "in the course of and furtherance of" aggravated robbery she or an accomplice caused the death of another person "under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life." Ark. Code Ann. § 5-10-101(a) (Repl. 2013). Aggravated robbery occurs if, with the purpose of committing a felony or misdemeanor theft, a person employs or threatens to employ physical force upon another person and is "armed with a deadly weapon" or inflicts death upon another person. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-12-103. In cases implicating a theory of accomplice liability, we affirm the sufficiency of the evidence if substantial evidence exists that the defendant acts as an accomplice in the commission of the alleged offense. Cook v. State , 350 Ark. 398, 86 S.W.3d 916 (2002).

Here, the State presented evidence that two people were involved in this crime. A witness, Dmmorryia Swift, testified that she saw one woman in a green, "beat up" vehicle with a mustard-colored top at the intersection behind the liquor store. It caught her attention because the woman driving the vehicle was stopped at an intersection that did not have a stop sign and appeared to be watching the liquor store. Swift continued watching from her driveway, and a few minutes later, she saw a second woman run from the store and toward the vehicle carrying something. The vehicle then sped away, and shortly afterward, the police appeared on the scene. Swift described this vehicle to police, who located it at a nearby apartment complex. Police determined that the vehicle belonged to Finley's girlfriend, Tamika Nelson. Police then obtained a search warrant for the apartment in that complex where Finley and Nelson were living. There they found a handgun and a near-empty bottle of Evan Williams 1783. The handgun, which had previously been confiscated by police and returned to Finley several months before the shooting, forensically matched the bullets and shell casings found at Best Shot Liquor. Moreover, the bottle of Evan Williams 1783 that was found in the apartment was numerically related to the batch of bottles found at the liquor store.

Finley argues there was insufficient circumstantial evidence to support the State's theory that she was the shooter. But the State does not have to prove that Finley shot Patel or stole the liquor if she acted as an accomplice to the felony murder. Lawshea , 2019 Ark. 68, at 5, 567 S.W.3d at 856. "When two or more persons assist one another in the commission of a crime, each is criminally liable for the conduct of all." Id. (citing Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-403(a) ). Therefore, the jury was free to conclude that Finley was the shooter or the shooter's accomplice. Because the jury heard sufficient evidence to make either finding, we hold that the circuit court did not err in denying Finley's motion for directed verdict.

Finley also claims her convictions cannot stand because no witnesses at trial identified her as the perpetrator. This is incorrect. Although the State must prove that the person standing as the defendant is the one whom the indictment or information accuses and to whom the evidence relates, "[i]dentification of a defendant can be inferred from all the facts and circumstances that are in evidence." Womack v. State , 301 Ark. 193, 198–99, 783 S.W.2d 33, 36 (1990) (citing Becker v. State , 298 Ark. 438, 768 S.W.2d 527 (1989) ).

III. Hearsay

Next, Finley argues that the circuit court abused its discretion by denying her motion to exclude Detective Jones's testimony about the businesses Finley called after the robbery because it was hearsay. We disagree. At trial, Detective Jones testified that he obtained Finley's phone records through her wireless communications provider, T-Mobile.¹ He identified the phone calls that were placed from her phone in the hours after the robbery and the businesses that corresponded with those numbers. Specifically, he testified that Finley's phone was used to call called Don's Weaponry, Walmart, Boll Weevil Pawn, Papa John's Pizza, and Academy Sports in the hours after the robbery and shooting.

Finley asserts that this testimony was inadmissible hearsay. Hearsay is "a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." Ark. R. Evid. 801(c). We leave evidentiary matters, like hearsay, to the sound discretion of the circuit court, and we will not reverse a circuit court's ruling on a hearsay question unless the appellant can show an abuse of discretion. Thompson v. State , 306 Ark. 193, 813 S.W.2d 249 (1991).

Detective Jones's testimony was not a statement by one other than the declarant; however, the issue is whether the information was a statement from someone other than him to prove the truth of the calls. Although the record reflects Detective Jones obtained the call log, it does not indicate how he determined the phone numbers from Finley's call log related to those businesses.

ATTORNEY : ... At North Little Rock 24-hour time, 1732, 934-2324 was called. What business belongs to that number?

DET. JONES : Don's Weaponry in North Little Rock.

ATTORNEY : At 1734, 24-hour time, 945-2700 was called. What business –

DET. JONES : That is Walmart on McCain in North Little Rock.

ATTORNEY : Okay. And I see several very common numbers that were dialed, 777-2199?

DET. JONES : That is correct.

ATTORNEY : And after we go past those numbers, at 24-hour time 1814, I see that 833-0927 was dialed several times in a row; is that correct?

DET. JONES : That is correct.

ATTORNEY : And what business is at that number?

DET. JONES : That is the Sherwood Walmart.

ATTORNEY : All right. And at North Little Rock 24-hour time 1826, I see that 565-1373 was called. What business is that?

DET. JONES : That is Bo[ll] Weevil Pawn, it's in Little Rock.

ATTORNEY : And then I see at North Little Rock 24-hour time 1859, 791-0505 was called. What business is that?

....

DET. JONES : That is Papa John[']s, which is located on JFK in North Little Rock.

....

ATTORNEY : Was phone number 210-6030 dialed?

DET. JONES : That is correct.

ATTORNEY : And what is the business at that number?

DET. JONES : That is Academy Sports in Sherwood.

If Detective Jones's testimony was based on his personal knowledge or observations, it was not hearsay. See Embry v. State , 302 Ark. 608, 792 S.W.2d 318 (1990). At trial, Finley did not question Detective Jones's basis for this...