Finnegan v. Berben

1

TIMOTHY A. FINNEGAN, Plaintiff, v. STATE TROOPER LAWRENCE M. BERBEN, et al., Defendants.

No. 20-CV-10231 (KMK)

United States District Court, S.D. New York

March 22, 2024

Cary London, Esq. Shulman & Hill, PLLC New York, NY Counsel for Plaintiff

Ellie Amanda Silverman, Esq. Ellie Silverman Law P.C. New York, NY Counsel for Plaintiff

Caitlin Anne Robin, Esq. Caitlin Robin & Associates PLLC New York, NY Counsel for Plaintiff

Kevin Scott Volkommer, Esq. Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani, LLP New York, NY Counsel for Plaintiff

Gee Won Cha, Esq. Neil Shevlin, Esq. New York State Office of the Attorney General New York, NY Counsel for Defendant Berben

OPINION & ORDER

KENNETH M. KARAS, DISTRICT JUDGE:

Timothy Finnegan (“Plaintiff”) brings this Action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“§ 1983”), against New York State Trooper Lawrence Berben (“Defendant”) and New York State Troopers John and Jane Does Numbers 1-10, alleging that he was subjected to an unlawful stop and search, false arrest and false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and the denial of his right to a fair trial. (See generally Compl. (Dkt. No. 5).) Plaintiff also asserts a failure to intervene claim pursuant to § 1983, presumably against the Doe Defendants. (See Id. ¶¶ 82-85.)^[1]

Before the Court is Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (the “Motion”). (See Not. of Mot. (Dkt. No. 83).) For the reasons explained below, Defendant's Motion is granted in part and denied in part.

I. Background

A. Factual Background

The following facts are taken from the Parties' statements pursuant to Local Civil Rule 56.1. (See Def's Rule 56.1 Statement (“Def's 56.1”) (Dkt. No. 85); Pl's Rule 56.1 Statement (“Pl's 56.1”) (Dkt. No. 94); Def's Resp. to Pl's Counterstatement of Facts (“Resp. to Pl's Counterstatement”) (Dkt. No. 98).)^[2] Additionally, where necessary, the Court cites directly to the admissible evidence submitted by the Parties.

The facts are recounted “in the light most favorable to” Plaintiff, the non-movant. Torcivia v. Suffolk County, 17 F.4th 342, 354 (2d Cir. 2021). The facts as described below are undisputed unless otherwise noted.

1. The Parties

During the time period relevant to the instant Motion-specifically, February 2019- Plaintiff resided in Middletown, New York. (See Decl. of Neil Shevlin, Esq. in Supp. of Mot. (“Shevlin Decl”) Ex. A (“Pl. Dep. Tr.”) at 18:23-19:4, 21:16-22 (Dkt. No. 87-1).)^[3] Plaintiff was under parole supervision by the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (“DOCCS”) at that time. (Def's 56.1 ¶ 62; Pl's 56.1 ¶ 62.)

In February 2019, Defendant was a Trooper for the New York State Police (“NYSP”). (Def's 56.1 ¶ 4; Pl's 56.1 ¶ 4.) As a Trooper, he was assigned to road patrol duty on I-84 out of the Montgomery, New York barracks (the “Montgomery Barracks”). (Def's 56.1 ¶ 4; Pl's 56.1 ¶ 4.)^[4] Troopers assigned to road patrol duty have a number of responsibilities, including ensuring the safety of roadways in New York, preventing and investigating crime, and providing support to other law enforcement agencies. (Def's 56.1 ¶ 5; Pl's 56.1 ¶ 5.)

2. Roadside Encounter on February 18, 2019

On February 18, 2019, Defendant was working either the 11:00 a.m. to 11:00 p.m. shift or the 12:00 p.m. to 12:00 a.m. shift. (Def's 56.1 ¶ 6; Pl's 56.1 ¶ 6.) Defendant's partner for that day was fellow NYSP Trooper Robert Brighton (“Brighton”). (Def's 56.1 ¶ 7; Pl's 56.1 ¶ 7.) As relevant here, during his shift Defendant was driving a state-issued patrol car. (Def's 56.1 ¶ 6; Pl's 56.1 ¶ 6.)

At around 8:30 p.m. that day, Defendant noticed a four-door 2001 Honda Accord (the “Honda”) pulled over to the side of the westbound lanes of I-84, just before Exit 5.

(Def's 56.1 ¶ 8; Pl's 56.1 ¶ 8; see also id. ¶ 69; Resp. to Pl's Counterstatement ¶ 69; Decl. of Lawrence Berben (“Berben Decl.”) ¶ 4 (Dkt. No. 91).) Defendant also noticed that someone appeared to be working on changing one of the Honda's tires. (Def's 56.1 ¶ 9; Pl's 56.1 ¶ 9; see also Pl. Dep. Tr. at 23:11-21, 25:7-24 (Plaintiff's deposition testimony noting that one of the Honda's tires had gone flat).) Thus, in order to assist the Honda's occupants and to ensure their safety while the tire was being changed, Defendant pulled over directly behind the Honda with his back-or “Level One”-lights activated so that others on I-84 would be aware of the Troopers' and the Honda's presence on the side of the road. (Def's 56.1 ¶ 10; Pl's 56.1 ¶ 10.)

Upon pulling over behind the Honda, Defendant and Brighton exited their patrol car and observed that the Honda had three occupants: (1) the driver, Jeffrey Garrison (“Jeff”); (2) a passenger named Thomas Cunningham (“Tom”); and (3) Plaintiff, who was working on changing the front passenger side tire. (Def's 56.1 ¶ 11; Pl's 56.1 ¶ 11; see also id. ¶¶ 70-71, 73; Resp. to Pl's Counterstatement ¶¶ 70-71, 73.)^[5] Because the Parties dispute certain aspects of what happened after Defendant's and Brighton's arrival, each Party's narrative will be set forth in turn.

a. Defendant's Version of Events

There is no dispute that, after arriving, Brighton spoke with Tom and Defendant spoke with Jeff. (Def's 56.1 ¶¶ 12-13; Pl's 56.1 ¶¶ 12-13.)^[6] While speaking with Jeff, Defendant asked him where he was coming from and where he was going, to which Jeff responded that he and Tom had picked up Plaintiff in Newburgh, New York and that they were heading home to the Bloomingburg, New York area. (Def's 56.1 ¶¶ 14-15; Pl's 56.1 ¶¶ 14-15.) Jeff was not able to tell Defendant where in Newburgh he had picked up Plaintiff, but suggested that it might have been “off of Exit 8.” (Def's 56.1 ¶ 15; Pl's 56.1 ¶ 15.) During this interaction, Jeff appeared to Defendant to be very nervous. (Def's 56.1 ¶ 16; Pl's 56.1 ¶ 16.)

Defendant then switched places with Brighton and spoke with Tom. (Def's 56.1 ¶ 17; Pl's 56.1 ¶ 17.) In response to a similar line of questioning, Tom provided Defendant with the same information that Jeff had-that he and Jeff had picked up Plaintiff in Newburgh, New York and that they were heading home. (Def's 56.1 ¶ 18; Pl's 56.1 ¶ 18.)

Thereafter, Defendant went to speak with Plaintiff, who was still working on changing the tire, but Plaintiff wanted to wait to speak with Defendant until after he finished with the tire. (See Def's 56.1 ¶¶ 19-20; Pl's 56.1 ¶¶ 19-20.) At that time, it appeared to Defendant that Plaintiff was nervous, and “his overall behavior seemed suspicious.” (Def's 56.1 ¶ 21; see also Berben Decl. ¶ 11 (Defendant's sworn statement that he “ha[s] a lot of experience dealing with people and something ‘seemed off' with [Plaintiff]).)^[7] When Plaintiff did speak with Defendant, unlike Jeff and Tom, he told Defendant that the group had driven together to Newburgh and were leaving from Newburgh together. (See Berben Decl. ¶ 12.)

After speaking with Plaintiff, Defendant contends that he then went back to Jeff and told Jeff that he had been given two different versions of events as to their whereabouts earlier that day-Jeff and Tom told Defendant that they drove to Newburgh to pick up Plaintiff, but Plaintiff told Defendant that all three men had driven to Newburgh together. (See Berben Decl. ¶ 13.) According to Defendant, Jeff then became very nervous and repeated that he had picked up Plaintiff in Newburgh. (Id.) Something seemed “off” with Jeff, so Defendant asked him if there was something in particular that was making him nervous, such as something illegal in the car. (Id.) Jeff denied that there was anything untoward “going on.” (See id.)

In light of his interactions with Jeff, Tom, and Plaintiff-and given that Jeff and Plaintiff seemed nervous, and that Plaintiff appeared “off” to Defendant-Defendant asked Jeff for his permission to search the Honda. (See Def's 56.1 ¶¶ 22-23; Pl's 56.1 ¶¶ 22-23; see also Berben Decl. ¶ 14.) Jeff gave his consent for Defendant to perform such a search. (See Def's 56.1 ¶ 24; Pl's 56.1 ¶ 24.) According to Defendant, before he began searching the car, he instructed Plaintiff-who was still changing the tire-to go to the front of the Honda. (Berben Decl. ¶ 15.) As he began his search, Defendant noticed that Plaintiff was crouched down in front of the Honda, moving around, and otherwise acting “funny.” (Id. ¶¶ 15-16.) Given that Plaintiff was kneeling down with his hands inside his sweatshirt and was moving around, Defendant asked him what he was doing and walked over to him. (Id. ¶ 16.) When he got to the front of the Honda, Defendant noticed a clear plastic bag containing a white powdery substance that appeared to be cocaine sticking out of the grill. (Id.; see also Def's 56.1 ¶ 25.) Defendant asserts that, after recovering the plastic bag, Jeff, Tom, and Plaintiff were each handcuffed and searched. (See Def's 56.1 ¶ 26.)^[8]

b. Plaintiff's Version of Events

Plaintiff disputes certain aspects of Defendant's narrative. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that, when Defendant and Brighton pulled over behind the Honda, the weather was cold he was tired and wearing only a hooded sweatshirt and sweatpants, and he wanted to change the tire and get home as quickly as possible. (Pl's 56.1 ¶ 74.)^[9] After Plaintiff changed the tire, he put the flat tire in the Honda's trunk and then walked to the passenger side of the Honda, at which time Defendant asked him where the group was coming from and where they were going. (Id. ¶ 78.) In response, Plaintiff pointed toward the rear of the Honda, said they were “coming from that way,” then pointed toward the front of the Honda, and said they were “going that way.” (Id. ¶ 79 (quoting Pl. Dep. Tr. at 30:20-31:4); see also Resp. to Pl's Counterstatement ¶ 79 (reflecting Defendant's admission that Plaintiff had responded to his question in this...