Finnegan v. State

221 N.E.3d 1232

Russell G. FINNEGAN, Appellant-Defendant,

v.STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff

Court of Appeals Case No. 23A-MI-442

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

Filed October 17, 2023

Attorney for Appellant: Kay A. Beehler, Terre Haute, Indiana

Attorneys for Appellee: Theodore E. Rokita, Indiana Attorney General, Courtney Staton, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana

Crone, Judge.

Case Summary

[1] Russell G. Finnegan appeals the trial court's finding that he was in indirect criminal contempt of court. He contends that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to act on his notice of intent to file an insanity defense and appoint medical personnel to evaluate his mental health and testify at his criminal contempt hearing. We agree and therefore reverse and remand.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On June 17, 2021, Finnegan was charged with indirect criminal contempt of court under cause number 66C01-2106-MC-99 and ordered to show cause at a hearing as to why he should not be held in contempt. Special Judge John Potter was selected to preside over the hearing. Following a hearing, Judge Potter issued an order finding Finnegan in indirect criminal contempt. Thereafter, "the Court began to receive vulgar, misogynistic, inappropriate, and harassing correspondence" from Finnegan that was "in blatant disrespect of the Court's authority." Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 12. On October 12, 2021, Judge Potter, sua sponte, initiated proceedings under cause number 66C01-2110-MC-168 and ordered Finnegan to show cause at a hearing as to why he should not again be held in indirect criminal contempt of court. Special Judge David Chidester was selected to preside over the hearing.

[3] During a hearing on January 3, 2023, Finnegan's counsel alerted the trial court that there is a "mental health issue with [Finnegan]" and that counsel was in the process of having mental health evaluations completed in an unrelated criminal case also pending in the Pulaski Circuit Court. Tr. Vol. 2 at 7. On January 19, 2023, Finnegan filed a notice of intent to raise the defense of mental disease or defect and requested the trial court to appoint medical personnel to evaluate his mental health and testify at the contempt hearing. In the notice, defense counsel again informed the trial court that evaluations were still pending in the unrelated criminal case. Counsel also filed a motion for continuance to allow for more time to obtain results. Judge Chidester never ruled on Finnegan's notice but denied the motion for continuance. Following the final contempt hearing held on January 27, 2023, Judge Chidester issued an order finding Finnegan in indirect criminal contempt pursuant to Indiana Code Section 34-47-3-1.¹ The trial court imposed a sanction of 170 days in the Department of Correction.² This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[4] Finnegan challenges the trial court's finding that he was in indirect criminal contempt of court. As a general matter, our supreme court has explained,

Contempt of court generally involves disobedience of a court or court order that undermines the court's authority, justice, and dignity. There are two kinds of contempt: direct contempt and indirect contempt. Indirect contempt, which is at issue in this case, involves those acts committed outside the presence of the court which nevertheless tend to interrupt, obstruct, embarrass or prevent the due administration of justice.

Reynolds v. Reynolds , 64 N.E.3d 829, 832 (Ind. 2016) (citations and quotation marks omitted). It is within the trial court's discretion to determine whether a party is in contempt, and we review the judgment under an abuse of discretion standard. Id. This Court will reverse a trial court's finding of contempt only if there is no evidence or inference therefrom to support the finding. Id.

[5] Finnegan raises two issues for our review, one of which we find dispositive. He asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to appoint medical personnel to evaluate his mental health and testify at his criminal contempt hearing.³ Specifically, he argues that a trial court "abuses its discretion when it improperly denies a defendant the evaluations contemplated by statute when a Notice of Mental Disease or Defect has been filed." Appellant's Br. at 16. We agree.

[6] Indiana Code Section 35-36-2-2 provides:

(a) At the trial of a criminal case in which the defendant intends to interpose the defense of insanity, evidence may be introduced to prove the defendant's sanity or insanity at the time at which the defendant is alleged to have committed the offense charged in the indictment or information.

(b) When notice of an insanity defense is filed in a case in which the defendant is not charged with a homicide offense under IC 35-42-1, the court shall appoint two (2) or three (3) competent disinterested:

(1) psychiatrists;

(2) psychologists endorsed by the state psychology board as health service providers in psychology; or

(3) physicians;

who have expertise in determining insanity. At least one (1) of the individuals appointed under this subsection must be a psychiatrist or psychologist. The individuals appointed under this subsection shall examine the defendant and testify at the trial. This testimony shall follow the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution and for the defense, including the testimony of any mental health experts employed by the state or by the defense.

[7] Here, well before the final criminal contempt hearing, Finnegan's counsel alerted the trial court that there is a "mental health issue with [Finnegan]" and that he was in the process of having mental health evaluations completed in an unrelated criminal case also pending in the Pulaski Circuit Court. Tr. Vol. 2 at 7. In response, Judge Chidester remarked that he personally did not believe that Finnegan was mentally ill based upon prior observations of and interactions with him. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court scheduled the final criminal contempt hearing for January 27, 2023. On January 19, 2023, Finnegan's counsel filed a notice of his intent to raise the defense of mental disease or defect along with a request for the appointment of medical personnel to examine Finnegan pursuant to Indiana Code Section 35-36-2-2. Defense counsel informed the court that one of the evaluations had been completed in the unrelated criminal matter and that the other evaluation was still pending. The trial court never ruled on Finnegan's notice or request, and the criminal contempt hearing proceeded on January 27, 2023, after which Finnegan was found in contempt and sentenced to just under six months of jail time.

[8] The State's sole response to the trial court's "fail[ure] to act upon Finnegan's request to assert an insanity defense" is its claim that Finnegan was simply "not entitled" to file that notice and obtain the statutory mental health evaluations because a contempt proceeding is not a "trial of a criminal case" as contemplated by Indiana Code Section 35-36-2-2. Appellee's Br. at 17-18. The State likens contempt proceedings to "other civil matters[,]" see id. , and directs us to case law in which Indiana courts have recognized the general proposition that contempt is a "sui generis proceeding neither civil nor criminal in nature, although both of those labels are used to describe certain categories of contempt." Buford v. State , 139 N.E.3d 1074, 1079 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (quoting State v. Heltzel , 552 N.E.2d 31, 33 (Ind. 1990) ).⁴

[9] It is well established that contempt proceedings are categorized as either civil or criminal, according to the nature and purpose of the sanction imposed. Gerber v. State , 167 N.E.3d 792, 798 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), trans. denied.

A civil contempt is a violation of a court order resulting in a proceeding for the benefit of the aggrieved party. As such, any type of penalty in a civil contempt proceeding must be coercive or remedial in nature. By contrast, a criminal contempt is an act directed against the dignity and authority of the court that obstructs the administration of justice and tends to bring the court into disrepute. Accordingly, a criminal contempt sanction is punitive in nature because its purpose is to vindicate the authority of the court, and it benefits the State rather than the aggrieved party.

Id. (citation omitted).

[10] Indeed, this Court has recognized that "[o]ne who is subject to criminal contempt is afforded many of the same constitutional safeguards that a defendant in a criminal trial enjoys because of the penalties that may be imposed." Wine v. State , 147 N.E.3d 409, 415-16 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied. "Criminally contemptuous conduct may violate other provisions of the criminal law; but even when this is not the case convictions for criminal contempt are indistinguishable from ordinary criminal convictions, for their impact on the individual defendant is the same. " Id. at 416 (emphasis in Wine ) (quoting Bloom v. Illinois , 391 U.S. 194, 201, 88 S.Ct. 1477, 20 L.Ed.2d 522 (1968) ). That is to say, "the role of criminal contempt and that of many ordinary criminal laws seem identical—protection of the institutions of our government and enforcement of their mandates." Id. (quoting Bloom , 391 U.S. at 201, 88 S.Ct. 1477 ). Simply put, criminal contempt is "a crime in every fundamental respect" as it "is a violation of the law, a public wrong which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both." Id. (quoting Bloom , 391 U.S. at 201, 88 S.Ct. 1477 ).

[11] We conclude that a criminal contempt proceeding is a "trial of a criminal case" as contemplated by Indiana Code Section 35-36-2-2.⁵ Accordingly, defendants like Finnegan, who are held to answer for criminal contempt and face the same array of punishments as do other criminal defendants, are entitled to the same statutory protections afforded other criminal defendants, including the right to file a notice of insanity defense and obtain the...