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First Amend. Coal. v. Sup. Ct. of S.F.
Law Office of Michael T. Risher, Michael T. Risher, San Francisco; Davis, Wright, Tremaine LLP, Thomas R. Burke, San Francisco, and Sarah E. Burns; California First Amendment Coalition, David Edward Snyder; First Amendment Coalition, John David Loy for Plaintiff and Petitioner
Rob Bonta, Attorney General of California, Thomas S. Patterson, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Mark R. Beckington, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, John D. Echeverria, Deputy Attorney General, and Natasha Saggar Sheth, Deputy Attorney General for Respondent and Real Party In Interest
In acknowledgment of the extraordinary authority vested in peace officers and custodial officers and the serious harms occasioned by misuses of that authority, the Legislature enacted section 832.7, subdivision (b), of the Penal Code1 (hereafter section 832.7(b)) to promote transparency and public access to certain records in the possession of state and local agencies. Under section 832.7(b), records relating to officers who engage in specified types of harmful or unlawful conduct are deemed nonconfidential and must be made available for public inspection pursuant to the California Public Records Act, Government Code sections 7920.000 et seq. (CPRA).
Though section 832.7(b)(1) calls for public availability of these nonconfidential records "[n]otwithstanding subdivision (a) [of section 832.7], Section 7923.600 of the Government Code, or any other law," Government Code section 7927.705 states the CPRA "does not require disclosure of records, the disclosure of which is exempted or prohibited pursuant to … state law." (Italics added.) Applying settled rales of statutory construction, we conclude that, notwithstanding Government Code section 7927.705’s incorporation of disclosure exemptions codified outside the CPRA, section 832.7(b) supersedes state law disclosure exemptions that, like the two statutory provisions specifically mentioned in section 832.7(b)(1), pose a direct conflict with its decree that records within its scope are not confidential and shall be made available to the public.
Accordingly, we shall issue a peremptory writ of mandate directing respondent court to vacate its judgment to the extent it denies petitioners’ motion for judgment based on Government Code section 11183, which prohibits the disclosure of subpoenaed records. In all other respects, the petition for writ of mandate is denied.
Section 832.7(b) changed the law formerly protecting personnel records of peace officers and custodial officers as confidential and generally exempt from public disclosure. (Stats. 2018, ch. 988, §§ 1, 2; see Becerra v. Superior Court (2020) 44 Cal. App.5th 897, 914–915, 257 Cal.Rptr.3d 897 (Becerra).) Under the new law, personnel records regarding specified types of peace officer and custodial officer conduct "shall not be confidential and shall be made available for public inspection pursuant to the [CPRA]." (§ 832.7(b)(1)(A)–(E).)
Soon after section 832.7(b) became effective in 2019, petitioners First Amendment Coalition and KQED Inc. filed requests under the CPRA to obtain records in the possession of the Attorney General and the Department of Justice (collectively, the Department) relating to: (1) the discharge of a firearm at a person by a peace or custodial officer; (2) any use of force by a peace or custodial officer resulting in death or great bodily injury; and (3) a sustained finding of dishonesty or sexual assault by an officer. Section 832.7(b) includes these types of records among those that are deemed not confidential and must be made available for public inspection pursuant to the CPRA. (See § 832.7(b)(1)(A)–(C).2) We will hereafter refer to these nonconfidential records as "officer-related records."
Our first decision in this matter, Becerra, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th 897, 257 Cal. Rptr.3d 897, addressed the Department’s initial objections to disclosure and held that, as a matter of statutory interpretation, section 832.7(b) "generally requires disclosure of all responsive records in the possession of the Department, regardless whether the records pertain to officers employed by the Department or by another public agency and regardless whether the Department or another public agency created the records." (Becerra, at p. 910, 257 Cal.Rptr.3d 897.) Becerra also concluded the CPRA’s so-called " ‘catchall’ " exemption—which allows a public agency to justify the withholding of a public record upon a showing that the public interest served by nondisclosure "clearly outweighs" the public interest served by disclosure (Gov. Code, § 7922.000)—may apply to records within the scope of section 832.7(b). (Becerra, at p. 910, 257 Cal. Rptr.3d 897.)3
Following remand, and after further litigation, petitioners voluntarily narrowed their requests to reduce the burden of production, and the Department produced some 3,000 documents. But relying on Government Code section 7927.705, the Department withheld certain officer-related records on the basis that their disclosure is either exempted or prohibited by statutes not specifically mentioned in the CPRA. In response, petitioners filed a motion for judgment compelling disclosure of the withheld documents.
As relevant here, the trial court interpreted Becerra as holding that section 832.7(b) preserves all disclosure exemptions codified in the CPRA, with the exception of Government Code section 7923.600, which section 832.7(b)(1) expressly overrides. Pursuant to that understanding, and as pertinent here, the court ruled the Department may withhold officer-related documents pursuant to Government Code section 11183, Penal Code section 6126.3, and Unemployment Insurance Code section 1094. The court issued an order denying petitioners’ motion for judgment pertaining to the following three categories of officer-related records: (1) documents obtained by the Department under subpoena; (2) a single report prepared by the Office of the Inspector General; and (3) records relating to unemployment benefits.
Petitioners filed a petition in this court for a writ of mandate directing the trial court to order disclosure of these records. We issued an order to show cause why the relief requested by petitioners should not be granted.
[1] Under section 832.7(b), officer-related records falling within its scope are deemed nonconfidential and open to public inspection. (§ 832.7(b)(1).) This disclosure requirement expressly applies to records in the possession of "a state or local agency" which relate to investigations and findings by agencies with oversight authority over peace or custodial officers. (E.g., § 832.7(b)(1)(A)–(E).) However, Government Code section 7927.705 states the CPRA "does not require disclosure of records, the disclosure of which is exempted or prohibited pursuant to federal or state law, including, but not limited to, provisions of the Evidence Code relating to privilege." Government Code section 7927.705 is " ‘not an independent exemption’ " to disclosure; rather, it " ‘merely incorporates other prohibitions established by law.’ " (Copley Press, Inc. v. Superior Court (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1272, 1283, 48 Cal. Rptr.3d 183, 141 P.3d 288 (Copley Press).)
The question here is whether the nonconfidential officer-related records that are subject to disclosure under section 832.7(b) may be withheld by the Department pursuant to the state law confidentiality and disclosure prohibitions codified in Government Code section 11183, Penal Code sections 6126 and 6126.3, and Unemployment Insurance Code section 1094. These prohibitions are included in statutory schemes that allow the Department and other state oversight bodies to collect records and information for various purposes that can include the investigation of matters falling outside the scope of section 832.7(b).
[2–5] Whether section 832.7 overrides the application of these statutory exemptions in the context of officer-related records presents an issue of statutory interpretation, which we review de novo. (See Becerra, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 917, 257 Cal.Rptr.3d 897.) The rules governing our analysis are settled. Our goal in interpreting a statute is to effectuate the Legislature’s intent. (Davis v. Fresno Unified School Dist. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 671, 687, 307 Cal.Rptr.3d 568, 528 P.3d 1 (Davis).) We look first to the statutory language, and if the language is clear and unambiguous, we adhere to its plain meaning unless a literal interpretation would result in absurd consequences. (Ibid.) But when the statutory language is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, we may consider other aids, including the statute’s purpose, legislative history, and public policy. (Ibid.) The portions of a statute must be viewed " ' " ' "in the context of the entire statute and the statutory scheme of which it is a part, giving significance to every word, phrase, sentence, and part of an act in pursuance of the legislative purpose." ' " ' " (Ibid.)
Section 832.7(b)(1) states: "Notwithstanding subdivision (a), Section 7923.600 of the Government Code, or any other law, [the officer-related records described in section 832.7(b)] shall not be confidential and shall be made available for public inspection pursuant to [the CPRA]." Subdivision (a) of section 832.7 (hereafter section 832.7(a)) articulates the long-established rule that peace and custodial officer personnel records are "confidential and shall not be disclosed in...
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