Fishman v. Williams

STEVEN FISHMAN, Plaintiff, v. CHARLES WILLIAMS, et al., Defendants.

Case No. CV 14-4823 MWF(JC)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

September 13, 2017

ORDER (1) DISMISSING SECOND COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND; (2) DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS AS MOOT; (3) DENYING MOTION FOR PERMISSIVE JOINDER; AND (4) DENYING PETITIONS FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT AND RELATED WRITS/REQUEST FOR SPEEDY HEARING RE SAME

[DOCKET NOS. 61, 66, 82-87]

I. BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY

On July 16, 2014, Steven Fishman ("plaintiff"), who is in custody at the Federal Correctional Institution, Terminal Island ("FCI-TI"), is proceeding pro se, and has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis, filed a Civil Rights Complaint ("Original Complaint") pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) against the following FCI-TI and Federal Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") officials: (1) FCI-TI Warden Charles Williams; (2) BOP National Director Charles E. Samuels; (3) BOP Western Regional Director Juan D. Castillo; (4) Senior Attorney-Advisor, BOP Los Angeles Consolidated Legal Center, Corinne M. Nastro; and (5) BOP National Inmate Appeals Administrator Harrell Watts. The Original Complaint essentially alleged that all such defendants violated and conspired with one another to violate plaintiff's Fifth Amendment right to equal protection by discriminating against plaintiff based upon his gender in connection with his custody level classification and resulting housing assignment. Plaintiff sued all defendants in their individual capacities only, and sought monetary, declaratory, and injunctive relief.

On September 15, 2014, the assigned United States Magistrate Judge ("Magistrate Judge") screened and dismissed the Original Complaint and granted plaintiff leave to file a First Amended Complaint ("First Screening Order").

On October 6, 2014, plaintiff voluntarily dismissed defendants Williams, Castillo, Nastro, and Watts from this action.

On October 31, 2014, plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint ("First Amended Complaint" or "FAC") with attached exhibits ("FAC Ex.") against defendant Samuels, Former BOP Director Harley G. Lappin, and multiple unnamed individuals. Plaintiff essentially alleged that defendants' inmate classification policies violated equal protection. Plaintiff sued defendants in their individual capacities only, and sought monetary, declaratory, and injunctive relief.

On September 21, 2015, defendants Samuels and Lappin filed a motion to dismiss the First Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim, which plaintiff opposed.

On October 27, 2016, the Magistrate Judge screened and dismissed the First Amended Complaint, granted plaintiff leave to file a Second Amended Complaint and denied the motion to dismiss the First Amended Complaint as moot ("Second Screening Order").

On November 4, 2016, plaintiff filed the operative Second Amended Complaint ("Second Amended Complaint" or "SAC") with attached exhibits ("SAC Ex.") and an attached declaration of plaintiff ("Fishman Decl.") suing twodefendants: Samuels and Lappin. Plaintiff essentially alleges that defendants established, implemented, and/or perpetuated an inmate classification policy which contravened the BOP anti-discrimination policy and regulations and deprived plaintiff of equal protection. Plaintiff sues defendants in their individual capacities only, and seeks monetary, declaratory, and injunctive relief. (SAC ¶¶ 8, 10, 69-89).

On January 10, 2017, defendants filed a motion to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim ("Defendants' Motion" or "MTD"). On February 17, 2017, plaintiff filed an Opposition ("Opp.") with an attached exhibit ("Opp. Ex. A"). On March 31, 2017, defendants filed a Reply.

Also pending before the Court and addressed herein are: (1) plaintiff's Motion for Permissive Joinder pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20 ("Joinder Motion") filed on January 27, 2017, with an attached Declaration of Samuel Cohen ("Cohen Decl."), which seeks to add Mr. Cohen as a plaintiff to the instant action, and which defendants opposed on April 3, 2017; (2) plaintiff's Petitions for Declaratory Judgment ("Petitions") filed on June 2, 2017 and August 2, 2017; (3) plaintiff's Motions for Speedy Hearing on the Petitions ("Speedy Hearing Motions") filed on June 2, 2017 and August 2, 2017; and (4) plaintiff's Writs of Praecipe to the Clerk Requesting Docketing and Scheduling of the Petitions and Speedy Hearing Motions ("Writs"), filed on July 13, 2017 and August 2, 2017.

First, the Court agrees with and adopts the First and Second Screening Orders, and finds that the Magistrate Judge properly dismissed the Original and First Amended Complaints with leave to amend for the reasons discussed therein and properly denied the motion to dismiss the First Amended Complaint as moot.

Second, the Court concludes, based upon its screening of the Second Amended Complaint, and for the reasons explained below, that the Second Amended Complaint fails adequately to state a claim against defendants and thatdismissal of all claims against defendants with leave to amend is appropriate.

Third, in light of the foregoing determination, Defendants' Motion is moot and is denied as such without prejudice.

Fourth, plaintiff's Joinder Motion is denied for the reasons explained below.

Finally, plaintiff's Petitions, Speedy Hearing Motions, and Writs are likewise denied.

II. SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

A. The Screening Requirement

As plaintiff is a prisoner proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must screen the Second Amended Complaint, and is required to dismiss the case at any time it concludes the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c).

When screening a complaint to determine whether it states any claim that is viable (i.e., capable of succeeding), the Court applies the same standard as it would when evaluating a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). Rule 12(b)(6), in turn, is read in conjunction with Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Zixiang Li v. Kerry, 710 F.3d 995, 998-99 (9th Cir. 2013). Under Rule 8, a complaint must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). While Rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, at a minimum a complaint must allege enough specific facts to provide both "fair notice" of the particular claim being asserted and "the grounds upon which [that claim] rests." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 & n.3 (2007) (citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (Rule 8 pleading standard "demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation") (citing id. at 555).

Thus, to survive screening, a complaint must "contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2014) (citations and quotation marks omitted). A claim is "plausible" when the facts alleged in the complaint would support a reasonable inference that the plaintiff is entitled to relief from a specific defendant for specific misconduct. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted). Allegations that are "merely consistent with" a defendant's liability, or reflect only "the mere possibility of misconduct" do not "show[] that the pleader is entitled to relief" (as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)), and thus are insufficient to state a claim that is "plausible on its face." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79 (citations and quotation marks omitted).

At the screening stage, "well-pleaded factual allegations" in a complaint are assumed true, while "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action" and "legal conclusion[s] couched as a factual allegation" are not. Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted); Jackson v. Barnes, 749 F.3d 755, 763 (9th Cir. 2014) ("mere legal conclusions 'are not entitled to the assumption of truth'") (quoting id.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 980 (2015). The Court is "not required to accept as true conclusory allegations which are contradicted by documents referred to in the complaint," Steckman v. Hart Brewing, Inc., 143 F.3d 1293, 1295-96 (9th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted), and "need not [] accept as true allegations that contradict matters properly subject to judicial notice or by exhibit," Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir.), amended on denial of reh'g, 275 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted); see also Mangiaracina v. Penzone, 849 F.3d 1191, 1193 n.1 (9th Cir. 2017) (taking take judicial notice of jail regulations in connection with review of screening dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A); Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1116 & n.1 (9th Cir. 2012) (when screening complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, court may accept as true facts fromcomplaint and supporting documentation, including complaint exhibits) (citations omitted); Diamond v. Pitchess, 411 F.2d 565, 566 (9th Cir. 1969) (court may consider matters properly subject of judicial notice in assessing whether in forma pauperis complaint should be summarily dismissed).

Pro se complaints are interpreted liberally to give plaintiffs "the benefit of any doubt." Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). If a pro se complaint is dismissed because it does not state a claim, the court must freely grant "leave to amend" (that is, give the plaintiff a chance to file a new, corrected complaint) if it is "at all possible" that the plaintiff could fix the identified pleading errors by...