Fitzgerald v. Faucette

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Kristin L. Fitzgerald, Plaintiff, v. Carter Faucette and Pulte Home Company, LLC d/b/a PulteGroup, Inc., Defendants.

No. 9:24-cv-00908-BHH-MGB

United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Beaufort Division

April 23, 2024

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Mary Gordon Baker, United States District Judge

Plaintiff through counsel, filed the instant employment action in the Beaufort County Court of Common Pleas on January 24, 2024. (Dkt. No. 1, 1-1.) Defendants removed the case to federal court on February 22, 2024. (Dkt. No. 1.) Currently before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Complaint and Compel Arbitration. (Dkt. No. 6.) Pursuant to the provisions of Title 28, United States Code, Section 636(b)(1)(A), and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(g), D.S.C., all pretrial matters in employment discrimination cases are referred to a United States Magistrate Judge. For the reasons stated herein, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Court GRANT Defendants' motion (Dkt. No. 6), compel arbitration, and dismiss Plaintiff's case in full.

RELEVANT FACTUAL SUMMARY

According to the Complaint, Plaintiff “is a Caucasian female over the age of forty who suffers from a disability.” (Dkt No. 1-1.) Plaintiff alleges that she began working for a subsidiary of Defendant PulteGroup, Inc. as a design consultant in December of 2020. (Id.) She claims that she was trained at the Charleston office and then was moved “to the office in Bluffton where she would be working [with] and supervised by Carter Faucette.” (Id.)

Plaintiff alleges that she “received several policies and procedures regarding her responsibilities and how to perform her position” but that “[m]any of the policies and procedures were not reviewed with [her].” (Id.) The Complaint explains that “[a]fter arriving at the Bluffton office, [Plaintiff] realized that there was a significant difference in how Faucette ran the Bluffton office compared to the Charleston office that was run by a different General Sales Manager.” (Id.)

Plaintiff alleges that “[a]lmost immediately upon her arrival at the Bluffton office, [Plaintiff] was subjected to differential treatment based on her age.” (Id.) Specifically, Plaintiff claims that “Faucette failed and refused to train [her] and maintained a hands off [policy] regarding the Plaintiff whereas younger non-disabled individuals were given training and guidance.” (Id.) Plaintiff further alleges that she “was subjected to extensive commentary regarding her age and mental activity,” which was impaired by the medication she took for her disabling Rheumatoid Arthritis. (Id.) According to the Complaint, Plaintiff “informed her employer that she suffered from Rheumatoid Arthritis and that her medication could affect her thought process.” (Id.) She claims that her requests for time off due to her disability were denied. (Id.) She further claims that she requested an accommodation with respect to studying for her real estate license exam-which she was required to pass to keep her job-but that her requested accommodation was denied. (Id.)

Plaintiff alleges that she was terminated on October 31, 2022 “for pretextual reasons” and that “Faucette published false statements . . . regarding her ability to perform her position in order to facilitate her termination from her employment with the PulteGroup, Inc.” (Id.) As such, Plaintiff filed the instant civil action, alleging: discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act; discrimination, hostile work environment and retaliation in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act; and state law claims for slander and intentional interference with a contract. (Id.)

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

As noted, Plaintiff originally filed this lawsuit in the Beaufort County Court of Common Pleas on January 24, 2024. (Dkt. No. 1, 1-1.) Defendants then removed the case to federal court on February 22, 2024. (Dkt. No. 1.) On March 5, 2024, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint and Compel Arbitration (Dkt. No. 6). After requesting and receiving an extension of time to respond, Plaintiff filed her response in opposition to Defendants' motion on March 29, 2024. (Dkt. No. 13.) Defendants replied to Plaintiff's response on April 5, 2024. (Dkt. No. 14.) Accordingly, the motion before the Court has been fully briefed and is ripe for disposition.

DISCUSSION

Defendants argue that Plaintiff's claims must be arbitrated because they are within the scope of a valid arbitration agreement. (Dkt. No. 6-1 at 4.) Defendants assert that Plaintiff's case should therefore be stayed or, more appropriately dismissed. (Id. at 13.) In response, Plaintiff contends that the agreement at issue “is unenforceable as it was not [a]greed upon, is not an enforceable Contract, not favorable under the law, unconscionable, and unilateral.” (Dkt. No. 13 at 9.) For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned agrees with Defendants. The undersigned therefore RECOMMENDS that Defendants' motion be GRANTED, that the parties be COMPELLED to arbitrate, and that Plaintiff's case be DISMISSED.

I. Relevant Law

A. Motions to Compel Arbitration

In ruling on a motion to compel arbitration in which the parties dispute the validity of an arbitration agreement, the Court employs the same standard as when ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Rowland v. Sandy Morris Fin. & Est. Plan. Servs., LLC, 993 F.3d 253, 258 (4th Cir. 2021); Cummings v. NC Fin. Sols. of S.C., No. 3:22-cv-2430-SAL-SVH, 2022 WL 18717553, at *1 (D.S.C. Nov. 30, 2022), adopted, 2023 WL 2025167 (D.S.C. Feb. 15, 2023). Thus, the Court should grant a motion to compel arbitration only if the moving party “shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the [moving party] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a).

B. Federal Arbitration Act

The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) governs the arbitrability of this dispute. (See generally Dkt. Nos. 6-1, 6-2, 6-3.) Section 4 of the FAA, provides, in part, that a “party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration may petition any United States district court . . . for an order directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in such agreement.” 9 U.S.C. § 4. “[Q]uestions of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard for the federal policy favoring . . . [and] any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration.” Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25-26 (1983). “In the Fourth Circuit, a litigant can compel arbitration under the FAA if he can demonstrate ‘(1) the existence of a dispute between the parties, (2) a written agreement that includes an arbitration provision which purports to cover the dispute, (3) the relationship of the transaction, which is evidenced by the agreement, to interstate or foreign commerce, and (4) the failure, neglect or refusal of [a party] to arbitrate the dispute.'” Adkins v. Lab. Ready, Inc., 303 F.3d 496, 500-01 (4th Cir. 2002) (citing Whiteside v. Teltech Corp., 940 F.2d 99, 102 (4th Cir. 1991)). Plaintiff makes no substantive arguments relating to elements one, three, and four.^[1](See generally Dkt. No. 13.) Rather, Plaintiff focuses her arguments on element two, contending that the arbitration agreement at issue is invalid and unenforceable. (Id.)

The FAA states that a written arbitration agreement “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” 9 U.S.C. § 2. Although federal law governs the arbitrability of disputes, state law principles apply when considering whether parties have an enforceable agreement to arbitrate. First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995); Am. Gen. Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Wood, 429 F.3d 83, 87 (4th Cir. 2005). “Thus, generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability, may be applied to invalidate arbitration agreements without contravening [the FAA].” Dr.'s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996).

II. Analysis

Defendants have provided a copy of the arbitration provision at issue-the Alternative Dispute Resolution Policy contained in Defendant PulteGroup, Inc.'s employment handbook-as an exhibit to their motion. (Dkt. No. 6-3 at 14-17.) According to Defendants, Plaintiff agreed to this policy when she began working for Defendant PulteGroup, Inc's subsidiary. (Dkt. No. 6-1 at 2-4.) The policy provides, in pertinent part:

As a condition of employment and in consideration for wages and continued employment, in the event an employment-related dispute, including a dispute related to hiring or termination, arises between an employee and the Company^[2]involving an alleged violation of the law, employee agrees to be bound by the Pulte ADR policy, which provides for final and binding arbitration as the exclusive forum for dispute resolution. As used in this policy, “employee” includes both current and former employees. Except for violations of confidentiality, trade secrets, or noncompetition obligations, or other breaches that would result in irreparable harm to the Company and require injunctive relief, the Company also agrees to be bound by this ADR policy with respect to employment-related disputes, except those specifically excluded below, including an alleged violation of the law. The Company need not sign this document or anything else in order for this policy to be effective. This ADR Policy applies to all disputes arising from or relating to an employee's employment with, compensation during, and separation from Pulte including: termination of employment, compensation and benefits,

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