Fitzpatrick v. Ford Motor Co.

680 F.Supp.3d 1177

Kyle FITZPATRICK v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY et al.

Case No.: 2:22-cv-01924-FWS-JPR

United States District Court, C.D. California

Filed July 5, 2023

Mani Arabi, Nadine Alsaadi, Tionna Grace Dolin, Ariel Harman-Holmes, Elizabeth A. LaRocque, Joy Moiselle De Leon, Rabiya F. Tirmizi, Nino Sanaia, Daniel A. Law, Strategic Legal Practices, APC, Los Angeles, CA, Steven Whang, Kaufman Borgeest and Ryan LLP, Woodland Hills, CA, for Kyle Fitzpatrick.

Amy Patricia Maclear, Rodrigo E. Salas, Shane Bays Kolding, Amir M. Nassihi, Shook Hardy and Bacon LLP, San Francisco, CA, for Ford Motor Company.

PROCEEDINGS: ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT [42]

FRED W. SLAUGHTER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Before the court is Defendant Ford Motor Company's ("Defendant") Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Kyle Fitzpatrick's ("Plaintiff") Second Amended Complaint ("SAC") ("Motion" or "Mot."). (Dkt. 42.) On March 2, 2023, Plaintiff opposed the Motion ("Opposition" or "Opp."). (Dkt. 43.) Plaintiff's Opposition is supported by the declaration of Plaintiff's counsel Daniel Law ("Law Decl.") and exhibits thereto. (Id.) On the same day, Plaintiff filed a Request for Judicial Notice in support of the Opposition. (Dkt. 44.)¹ On March 9, 2023, Defendant filed a Reply ("Reply"). (Dkt. 45.)

The court finds this matter appropriate for resolution without oral argument. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b) ("By rule or order, the court may provide for submitting and determining motions on briefs, without oral hearings."); L. R. 7-15 (authorizing courts to "dispense with oral argument on any motion except where an oral hearing is required by statute"). Based on the state of the record, as applied to the applicable law, the Motion is DENIED.

I. Background

a. Summary of Allegations

On or about August 9, 2018, Plaintiff entered into a warranty contract with Defendant for a 2017 Ford Focus with vehicle identification number WF0DP3TH4H4126069 ("Vehicle"), which was manufactured and/or distributed by Defendant. (SAC ¶ 9.) The warranty contract contained various warranties on the Vehicle, including but not limited to a bumper-bumper warranty, powertrain warranty, and emission warranty. (Id. ¶ 10.) A copy of the warranty contract is attached to the Complaint. (Id., Exh. A.) Defendant also provided Plaintiff with a California Emission Warranty and the Owner's Manual for the Vehicle. (Id. ¶ 10.) On information and belief, Plaintiff alleges Defendant deliberately refuses to include the terms of the California Emission Warranty in its main express warranty booklet so that California consumers are "kept in the dark" when Defendant fails to comply with its warranty obligations. (Id. ¶ 11 n.1.)

Plaintiff has used the Vehicle primarily for family or household purposes. (Id. ¶ 11.) Plaintiff alleges the Vehicle constitutes "consumer goods"; Plaintiff is a "buyer"; and Defendant a "manufacturer" and/or "distributor" under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, Cal. Civil Code §§ 1790 et seq. ("Song-Beverly Act"). (Id.) Manufacturing defects in materials and/or workmanship and nonconformities to warranty manifested themselves within the express warranty period. (Id. ¶ 14.) Plaintiff alleges these defects and nonconformities substantially impair the use, value, or safety of the Vehicle. (Id. ¶ 15.) For example, the Vehicle lost motor power and/or acceleration on multiple occasions while Plaintiff was driving it and Plaintiff lost use of the Vehicle for "substantial" periods of time. (Id.)

Defendant had an affirmative duty to promptly offer to repurchase or replace the Subject Vehicle at the time if it failed to conform the Vehicle to the terms of the express warranty after a reasonable number of repair attempts. (Id. ¶ 16.) Plaintiff alleges Defendant failed to replace the Vehicle or make restitution and Plaintiff is entitled to damages in an amount exceeding $75,000. (Id. ¶¶ 17-23.)

Plaintiff alleges the Vehicle has the following repair history. (Id. ¶¶ 24-28.) On or about April 2, 2020, with approximately 9,956 miles on the odometer, Plaintiff presented the Vehicle to Defendant's authorized repair facility with complaints that the engine was losing coolant and overheating and there was no acceleration while driving. (Id. ¶ 25.) The dealer noted that "the steering gear, brake lines from HCU unit to rear calipers, turbo, clutch pressure plates & disc, as well as all required hardware, seals and gaskets" were damaged and repaired and/or replace these parts. (Id.) The Vehicle was out of service for over 45 days. (Id.)

On or about June 4, 2020, with approximately 10,198 miles on the odometer, Plaintiff presented the Vehicle to Defendant's authorized repair facility with complaints about the air conditioning. (Id. ¶ 26.) The dealer replaced a leaking valve that, on information and belief, was damaged from the engine overheating during the prior repair visit. (Id.) The Vehicle was out of service for two days. (Id.)

On or about June 11, 2020, Plaintiff presented the Vehicle to Defendant's authorized repair facility with complaints that the brake pedal was hard to engage when braking. (Id. ¶ 27.) The dealer replaced the brake booster under warranty. (Id.) The Vehicle was out of service for two days. (Id.)

On or about August 11, 2020, with approximately 10,377 miles on the odometer, Plaintiff presented the Vehicle to Defendant's authorized repair facility complaining of lack and/or loss of power. (Id. ¶ 28.) Plaintiff stated that the Vehicle's engine lacks power because "there is no turbo boost & can hear a high-pitched sound under the hood when trying to accelerate." (Id.) The dealer conducted repairs to the charge-air-cooler, which cools the airflow moving from the turbocharger to the engine intake manifold. (Id.) The Vehicle was out of service for ten days. (Id.)

Plaintiff alleges Defendant and its authorized dealers failed to conform the Vehicle to warranties after a reasonable number of repair attempts and the symptoms of the Vehicle's defects persisted. (Id. ¶ 29.) Plaintiff further alleges the statute of limitations has been tolled here because Plaintiff discovered Defendant's conduct shortly before commencing the lawsuit. (Id. ¶¶ 34-36.)

II. Procedural History

On March 24, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Complaint asserting five claims against Defendant for violations of the Song-Beverly Act; breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301 et seq.; and fraudulent inducement. (See Dkt. 1.) On May 13, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Dismissal as to the sixth claim for fraudulent inducement. (Dkt. 19.)

On May 27, 2022, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss as to all claims in the Complaint. (Dkt. 20.) On November 15, 2022, the court granted Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. (Dkt. 36.) On December 15, 2022, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint. (Dkt. 37.) On January 23, 2023, the court granted the parties' Stipulation permitting Plaintiff to file a Second Amended Complaint. (Dkt. 40.) On January 23, 2023, Plaintiffs filed the Second Amended Complaint ("SAC"). (Dkt. 41.) Plaintiff now asserts three claims against Defendant: (1) violation of Cal. Civil Code § 1793.2(d); (2) violation of Cal. Civil Code § 1793.2(b); and (3) breach of the implied warranty of merchantability. (Id.) Defendant now moves to dismiss the SAC. (Dkt. 42.)

III. Legal Standard

a. Motion to Dismiss Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)

Rule 12(b)(6) permits a defendant to move to dismiss a complaint for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To withstand a motion to dismiss brought under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). While "a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations," a plaintiff must provide "more than labels and conclusions" and "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action" such that the factual allegations "raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (reiterating that "recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice").

"Establishing the plausibility of a complaint's allegations is a two-step process that is 'context-specific' and 'requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.' " Eclectic Props. E., LLC v. Marcus & Millichap Co., 751 F.3d 990, 995-96 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937). "First, to be entitled to the presumption of truth, allegations in a complaint . . . must contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively." Id. at 996 (quoting Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011)). "Second, the factual allegations that are taken as true must plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief, such that it is not unfair to require the opposing party to be subjected to the expense of discovery and continued litigation." Id. (quoting Starr, 652 F.3d at 1216); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681, 129 S.Ct. 1937.

Plausibility "is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (2007)). On one hand, "[g]enerally, when a plaintiff alleges facts consistent with both the plaintiff's and the defendant's explanation, and both explanations are plausible, the plaintiff survives a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)." In re Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) Indirect Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 28...