Fitzpatrick v. Little

1

ROBERT FITZPATRICK; ALICIA PHILLIPS; DAVID FRAIZER; JERRY MULLENIX; TIMOTHY CHRISTENSEN; YOLANDA PULLMAN; and VERONICA WALKER Plaintiffs, v. BRAD LITTLE, in his official capacity as the Governor of the State of Idaho; KEITH REYNOLDS, in his official capacity as the Director of the Idaho Department of Administration and in his individual capacity; and COLONEL KENDRICK WILLS, in his official capacity as the Director of the Idaho State Police, Defendants.

No. 1:22-cv-00162-DCN

United States District Court, D. Idaho

January 9, 2023

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

David C. Nye Chief U.S. District Court Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Pending before the Court is the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. Dkt. 3. The Court held a hearing on the Motion on September 28, 2022, and took it under advisement. For the reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss but provides an opportunity for Plaintiffs to amend their Complaint on some of their claims.

II. BACKGROUND

This case concerns a camping expedition that lasted from January to March 2022. Specifically, a group of homeless Idahoans and their supporters erected an encampment at Idaho's Capitol Annex to protest a lack of affordable housing and shelter space in Idaho. Dkt. 1, ¶¶ 5-9. Each of the eight Plaintiffs (“Campers”) are or were homeless individuals who participated in the three-month-long demonstration.^[1] See generally id. at ¶¶ 14-108. At the protest site, the Campers had tents, sleeping bags, blankets, heaters, foam pads, clothing, and other personal property. See id. at ¶¶ 22, 36, 44, 54, 77, 105.

The State of Idaho, including Defendants Governor Brad Little, Idaho Department of Administration Director Keith Reynolds, and Director of the Idaho State Police Colonel Kedrick Wills (collectively “Officials”^[2]), considered the tent-city protest unlawful under Idaho Code section 67-1613 (“anti-camping statute”). Consequently, they took steps to enforce the anti-camping statute, including issuing citations, removing property, and, ultimately, breaking down the encampment. See generally Dkt. 1. This and other conduct ultimately gave rise to the allegations in the Campers' Complaint.

The anti-camping statute prohibits any person from camping “on or in any state-owned or leased property or facility including, but not limited to, the capitol mall, except those that are designated as a recreational camping ground, area or facility.” Idaho Code § 67-1613. Within the statute, camping is defined as using “as a temporary or permanent place of dwelling, lodging or living accommodation, and which indicia of camping may include, but are not limited to, storing personal belongings, using tents or other temporary structures for storing personal belongings or for sleeping, carrying on cooking activities, laying out bedding or making any fire.” Id. Violating the anti-camping statute may result in an infraction, and violators are required to remove all personal property from prohibited state-owned property. Id. Additionally, Idaho Code section 67-1613A operationalizes the anti-camping statute by setting forth how notice of seizure is given and how property is handled and disposed of post-seizure.

During the protest, the Campers were asked by the Idaho State Police (“ISP”) to move their tents and other property from one area of the Annex to another. Dkt. 1, ¶ 138. The stated purpose of the direction was to prevent damage to the grass. Id. The Campers complied. In addition, toward the end of March, Director Reynolds ordered that the Annex be temporarily closed for scheduled maintenance on the irrigation system. Dkt. 1, ¶¶ 16064 (Exs. 5-6); Dkt. 3-2, ¶ 4. Again, it seems that every Camper complied. See id. And since then, no Camper has returned to the Annex grounds, thus ending the encampment. Id.

Following the end of the demonstration, on April 12, 2022, the Campers brought six claims against the Officials and sought injunctive and declaratory relief based on the Officials' alleged acts during the encampment. Dkt. 1, ¶¶ 1, 13. Specifically, the Campers contend that the Officials violated their (1) freedoms of assembly, petition, and speech, (2) right against unreasonable seizure, (3) right to due process, (4) protection from cruel and unusual punishment, and (5) right against excessive fines. Id. at ¶¶ 166-210. Additionally, as their sixth count, the Campers allege that the Officials' actions subjected them to a state-created danger. Id. at ¶ 203.

In response to the Campers' Complaint, the Officials filed a Motion to Dismiss on June 13, 2022. Dkt. 3. In addition to contesting the six claims in the Complaint, the Officials argue that sovereign immunity bars the Campers' claims for injunctive and declaratory relief and that the Campers lack standing to bring those claims. Id. at 4. The Campers filed a response (Dkt. 9), to which the Officials replied (Dkt. 10), leading us to this point.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Rule 12(b)(6)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a court to dismiss a claim if the plaintiff has “fail[ed] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal may be based on either a ‘lack of a cognizable legal theory' or ‘the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.'” Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare Sys., LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). In deciding whether to grant a motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations made in the pleading under attack. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663 (2009). A court is not, however, “required to accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). Dismissal without leave to amend is inappropriate unless it is beyond doubt that an amendment could not save the complaint. See Harris v. Amgen, Inc., 573 F.3d 728, 737 (9th Cir. 2009).

B. Rule 12(b)(1)

A motion to dismiss based on a lack of Article III standing arises under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). Maya v. Centex Corp., 658 F.3d 1060, 1067 (9th Cir. 2011). When such a motion is brought for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, it may challenge jurisdiction on the face of the pleadings or by presenting extrinsic evidence for the court's consideration. Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding a jurisdictional attack may be facial or factual). “In a facial attack, the challenger asserts that the allegations contained in the complaint are insufficient on their face to invoke federal jurisdiction. By contrast, in a factual attack, the challenger disputes the truth of the allegations that, by themselves, would otherwise invoke federal jurisdiction.” Id.

Where an attack is facial, the court confines its inquiry to allegations in the complaint. White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000). When ruling on a facial jurisdictional attack, courts must “accept as true all material allegations of the complaint and must construe the complaint in favor of the complaining party.” De La Cruz v. Tormey, 582 F.2d 45, 62 (9th Cir. 1978) (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501(1975)). However, the plaintiff bears the burden of alleging legally sufficient facts to invoke the court's jurisdiction. Leite v. Crane Co., 749 F.3d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir. 2014).

On the other hand, in a factual attack, “a district court may review evidence beyond the complaint without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.” Safe Air, 373 F.3d at 1039. When this is the case, “[t]he court need not presume the truthfulness of the plaintiff's allegations.” Id. Instead, “[o]nce the moving party has converted the motion to dismiss into a factual motion by presenting affidavits or other evidence properly brought before the court, the party opposing the motion must furnish affidavits or other evidence necessary to satisfy its burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction.” Id. If the court determines that it does not have subject matter jurisdiction, it must dismiss the claim. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3).

IV. ANALYSIS

The Court puts first things first by beginning with sovereign immunity and standing. It will then address each of the Complaint's counts one by one before briefly touching on Director Reynold's qualified immunity.

A. Sovereign Immunity

The Officials' first argument against the Complaint is sovereign immunity. This doctrine stems from the common law and is deeply entrenched in the Eleventh Amendment. Under the Eleventh Amendment, “[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. Const. amend. XI. In other words, a federal court is prohibited from entertaining a civil rights lawsuit brought by a citizen against a state unless that state waives its sovereign immunity. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 16-18 (1890). Notwithstanding the austere effects of the Eleventh Amendment, the Supreme Court carved out an exception in Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). This exception allows plaintiffs to bring official-capacity suits against state employees for “prospective injunctive relief to prevent a continuing violation of federal law.” Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985). The Campers allege their Complaint does just that.

The Campers contend the enforcement of the anti-camping statute during the protest constitutes an ongoing violation of federal law. Dkt. 1, ¶ 13. The Officials, however retort that the Campers “seek after-the-fact injunctive and declaratory relief against state...