Flannery v. Holstein

1

ORVAL FLANNERY, Plaintiff, v. HOLSTEIN, et al., Defendants.

No. 2:22-cv-01518 DB P

United States District Court, E.D. California

March 30, 2023

ORDER

DEBORAH BARNES UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff an inmate proceeding pro se, seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff claims defendants violated his Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights when plaintiff was subject to an involuntary cavity search. Presently before the court is plaintiff's complaint for screening (ECF No. 1) and plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2).

For the reasons set forth below, plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis will be granted. Plaintiff will be given the option to proceed on his cognizable claims or be given leave to file an amended complaint.

IN FORMA PAUPERIS

Plaintiff has submitted a declaration that makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). (ECF No. 2.) Accordingly plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis will be granted.

Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1914(a), 1915(b)(1). By this order, plaintiff will be assessed an initial partial filing fee in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C § 1915(b)(1). By separate order, the court will direct the appropriate agency to collect the initial partial filing fee from plaintiff's trust account and forward it to the Clerk of the Court. Thereafter, plaintiff will be obligated for monthly payments of twenty percent of the preceding month's income credited to plaintiff's inmate trust account. These payments will be forwarded by the appropriate agency to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in plaintiff's account exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

SCREENING

I. Legal Standards

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) & (2).

A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227. Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “requires only ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).

However, in order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must contain more than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 555. In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff's favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969).

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides as follows:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.

42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See Monell v. Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). “A person ‘subjects' another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

Moreover, supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendant holds a supervisorial position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

II. Linkage Requirement

Under Section 1983, a plaintiff bringing an individual capacity claim must demonstrate that each defendant personally participated in the deprivation of his rights. See Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). There must be an actual connection or link between the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See Ortez v. Washington County, State of Oregon, 88 F.3d 804, 809 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989).

Government officials may not be held liable for the actions of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (stating vicarious liability is inapplicable in Section 1983 suits). Since a government official cannot be held liable under a theory of vicarious liability in Section 1983 actions, plaintiff must plead sufficient facts showing that the official has violated the Constitution through his own individual actions by linking each named defendant with some affirmative act or omission that demonstrates a violation of plaintiff's federal rights. Id. at 676.

III. Allegations in the Complaint

Plaintiff indicates that, at all relevant times, he was an inmate at the Amador County Jail. (ECF No. 1 at 2.) Plaintiff names Correctional Sergeant Holstein, Jackson Police Department (“JPD”) Lieutenant Daniel Barb, JPD Investigator Robert Harmon, and Amador Sutter Hospital (“SAH”) Nurse Jane Doe as defendants in this action. (Id. at 5.)

The complaint contains the following allegations: while a pretrial detainee at Amador County Jail, plaintiff was transferred to SAH with two other inmates as it was believed the three inmates had overdosed on fentanyl. (Id. at 2.) After plaintiff was “medically cleared,” defendant Holstein asked plaintiff to submit to a digital cavity search. (Id.) Plaintiff refused but stated he would submit to alterative search options. (Id.) Defendant Holstein spoke with defendants Barb and Harmon in the hallway. (Id.) When Holstein returned, he changed the position of the handcuffs on plaintiff and the two other inmates so that they were all laying on their sides. (Id.) Defendant Doe later entered and performed digital cavity searches on all of the inmates. (Id.) Plaintiff was “the last inmate searched and.. .tried to protest both verbally and by shifting [his] body....” (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff feared contracting Hepatitis C as one of the other inmates had it and defendant Doe “used the same glover for the other 2 inmates and did not change it when she came to [plaintiff.]” (Id.) Defendant Doe eventually succeeded in performing the cavity search “and spent a significantly longer period of time during my search as with the other inmates.” (Id.) Plaintiff noted defendant Barb and Harmon “standing by the open door and openly laughing.” (Id.) As a result of this search, his rectum bled due to a tear in his bowel. (Id.)

Plaintiff claims that there was no warrant for the digital cavity search and that it was done against his will. (Id. at 4.) He asserts that he did not knowingly take fentanyl but that he drank from a cup of water and later woke up in an ambulance. (Id.) Plaintiff states that he faced no disciplinary action. (Id.)

In the complaint, plaintiff argues that defendants Holstein, Barb, Harmon, and Doe violated his rights by “either ordering or failing to intervene in the digital cavity search without a warrant and against [plaintiff's] will.” (Id.) Plaintiff states that he seeks one million dollars ($1,000,000) in damages but does not include any other details regarding the monetary relief sought. (Id. at 8.)

IV. Does Plaintiff State a Claim under § 1983?

Plaintiff states that he seeks to bring claims for violation of his Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. (Id.) He does not elaborate on the nature of these claims further or identify which defendants plaintiff believes violated each of these rights. Out of an abundance of caution, the court will attempt to determine the nature of plaintiff's claims in connection with each right and screen all defendants in connection with that claim.

A. Fourth Amendment

1. Legal Standards

The Fourth Amendment protects...