Flavell v. Collier

SARA GONZALEZ FLAVELL, Plaintiff, v. REBECCA PATTERSON COLLIER, et al., Defendants.

No. 20-cv-0959 (DLF)

United States District Court, District of Columbia

August 30, 2021

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Sara Gonzalez Flavell, proceeding pro se, brings this action alleging eight claims including negligence, medical practice, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, tortious interference with a contract or business relationship intentional infliction of emotional distress, violation of the Mental Health Information Act, and violation of the Nurse Practice Act. Before the Court is the defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint, Dkt. 21 and the plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Surreply Dkt. 25. For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant the plaintiff's motion for leave to file a surreply^[1] and grant the defendants' motion to dismiss.

I.BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

In May 2015, Flavell, then an employee at the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, applied to her employer's disability program after “suffering trauma from workplace abuse.” Second Am. Compl. ¶ 5, Dkt 20.^[2] Defendant Reed Group is a third-party company responsible for administering the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development disability program. Def.'s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss at 3, Dkt. 21. Defendant Collier, an employee of Reed Group, was the nurse case manager assigned to administer Flavell's disability leave, but she did not treat Flavell. Id.; Compl. ¶ 6. Instead, Flavell's medical care was provided through independent medical examinations conducted by physicians outside of Reed Group. See Compl. ¶ 8.

On June 30, 2015, Collier contacted Flavell in order to introduce herself and speak about the disability program. Compl. ¶ 6. Flavell alleges that Collier told her: “(i) Plaintiff's medical information and records would be maintained confidential, including from her employer. (ii) For disability leave extension, the Plaintiff's treating physician's Statement of Claim would be necessary . . . [.] Disability leave could not be approved without an operative treating physician[']s Statement of Claim for each period. (iii) On recovery Plaintiff would be required to provide Reed Group's standard Return to Work (RTW) Form signed by her treating physician as medical evidence.” Id. ¶ 7.

Flavell remained on short-term disability leave from June 2, 2015, until June 1, 2017. Pl.'s Opp'n Ex. 3, at 2, Dkt. 23. Her time on disability was measured in eight periods of roughly three months each. Id. For the first seven of these periods, Flavell submitted a statement from her treating physician that supported her need to continue in the disability program. Compl. ¶ 11-12. But Flavell alleges that during her seventh physician visit, which provided support for her short-term disability period between December 19, 2016, and March 19, 2017, her physician informed her that she would soon be medically fit to return to work. Id. ¶ 11. Flavell alleges that on or about December 16, 2016, she shared this information with Collier and requested information regarding the process for returning to work. Id. According to Flavell, “Collier confirmed [Flavell] would not require further [independent medical evaluations] and could return” once she “provid[ed] her treating physician's RTW form.” Id.

In January 2017, employees from the Reed Group scheduled an unexpected independent medical evaluation for Flavell with a different physician than the one she was seeing previously. Id. ¶ 13. In her communications with various Reed Group employees, Flavell was told that Reed Group requested this independent medical evaluation for the purpose of determining her eligibility for long-term disability leave as is their policy when a claimant approaches the end of their available short-term disability. See Pl.'s Opp'n Ex. 4, at 2-5. Reed Group employees scheduled two different independent medical evaluations for Flavell, neither of which she claims to have attended. Id. And around this time, Flavell revoked Reed Group's authorization to share her medical information. See Id. at 4 (“Reed group had no authorization on file and knew this.”).

On March 16, 2017, Flavell's treating physician signed Reed Group's “Release to Work” form, indicating that Flavell was medically fit to return to work starting on March 19, 2017. Compl. Ex. 1. Flavell then submitted this form to Reed Group. Three days later Flavell presented for work, but she was not allowed into her office because her return to work form had not been approved by Reed Group. Compl. ¶ 15.

Afterwards, Flavell was notified that, against her wishes, she had been approved for another period of short-term disability from March 20, 2017, to June 1, 2017. See Id. ¶ 37. Reed Group employees also informed Flavell that, in order to update her claim and process her return to work form, she would have to sign an authorization for release of medical information. See Pl.'s Opp'n Ex. 4, at 10. In response, Flavell sent Reed Group employees an email in which she provided, in her own words, certain authorizations for Reed Group to receive information from her doctor. See Id. at 11 (stating that she “offer[ed] to provide further authorizations if” Reed Group “specif[ied] exactly which doctors and/or medical facilities or others [it] need[ed] to contact for further information (ideally also stating the medical information necessary)”). Flavell does not claim to have ever signed the medical record release authorization provided to her by Reed Group. See Compl.

Flavell claims that she returned to work in June 2017. Compl. ¶ 40. But she does not explain whether that return was authorized by Reed Group. And though Flavell was later terminated from her position, she does not provide the date of her termination in any of her pleadings. See, e.g., Pl.'s Opp.'n at 24 (“Plaintiff was terminated and did not resign”). In January 2018, Flavell appealed her case decisions by Collier and Reed Group under the disability program's Administrative Review Panel. Compl. ¶ 51. She claims that during this review, Reed Group “made fraudulent or reckless misrepresentations to the [Administrative Review Panel], refusing to supply any supporting evidence or reasons, stating its decision as to Plaintiff's health and continuing disability to June 2017 was medically correct and supported.” Id. ¶ 52.

Flavell claims that, because of the defendants' actions, she incurred medical expenses of $3, 375, lost 30 percent of her salary from March 17, 2017, to June 1, 2017, while on disability leave, and incurred legal expenses totally more than $25, 000. Id. ¶ 118. She also seeks damages for the loss of her job and benefits package, as well as future salary increases. Id. Finally, she claims to have suffered mental pain and severe emotional distress worth $1, 500, 000 in damages. Id.

B. Procedural History

Flavell filed her initial complaint on February 26, 2020 in the Superior Court for the District of Columbia. See generally Notice of Removal Ex. A, Dkt. 1. After removal to this Court, Flavell filed a Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint, Dkt. 7, which this Court granted by minute order on April 30, 2020. Flavell then filed an amended complaint on June 19, 2020. Am. Compl., Dkt. 10. The amended complaint was 146 pages in length and contained 189 pages of exhibits. Id. The Court found that the complaint failed to meet the pleading standards of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) and 9(b) as well as the requirements as to form in Rule 10(b) and granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the amended complaint. Order, Dkt. 19. Defendants sought a dismissal with prejudice, but the Court granted Flavell one final opportunity to file an amended complaint that complies with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id.

Flavell's second amended complaint asserts eight claims against the defendants, including negligence (Count I); medical malpractice (Count II), fraud (Count III); negligent misrepresentation (Count IV); tortious interference with contract or business relationship (Count V); intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count VI); violation of the Mental Health Information Act (Count VII); and violation of the Nurse Practice Act (Count VII). The defendants have moved to dismiss Flavell's complaint, see Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss, Dkt. 21, and that motion is ripe for review.

II.LEGAL STANDARDS

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a defendant to move to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must contain factual matter sufficient to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A facially plausible claim is one that “allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). This standard does not amount to a specific probability requirement, but it does require “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id.; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (“Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”). A complaint need not contain “detailed factual allegations, ” but alleging facts that are “merely consistent with a defendant's liability . . . stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Well-pleaded factual allegations are “entitled to [an] assumption of truth, ” id. at 679, and the court construes the complaint “in favor of the plaintiff, who must be granted the benefit of all inferences that can be...