Fleger v. City of New Haven

Walter Fleger et al. v. City of New Haven et al.

No. NNHCV166062170

Superior Court of Connecticut, Judicial District of New Haven, New Haven

January 14, 2020

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

Judge (with first initial, no space for Sullivan, Dorsey, and Walsh): Kamp, Michael P., J.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO DISMISS DOCKET ENTRY 150

KAMP J.

The defendants, the city of New Haven and Craig Manemeit, move to dismiss counts two, four, six, eight, ten, twelve, fourteen sixteen, eighteen, and twenty of the plaintiffs’ operative complaint. The defendants argue that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ claims of breach of contract because the plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies, namely filing a grievance in accordance with the terms of the applicable collective bargaining agreement. In opposition to the defendants’ motion to dismiss, the plaintiffs argue that (1) the contracts are distinct from the collective bargaining agreement, (2) administrative remedy, even if necessary, would be demonstrably futile, and (3) the retired plaintiffs are not subject to the requirement to exhaust administrative remedies. The issues presented is whether the contracts are distinct from the collective bargaining agreement at issue and whether the plaintiffs are subject to the requirement to exhaust administrative remedies. For the reasons set forth below, the defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted as to counts two, six, and sixteen because the plaintiffs Walter Flegler, Juan Monzon, and Michael White failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. With regard to counts eight and fourteen the court defers a ruling pending jurisdictional discovery on the issue of whether (1) Mitchell Strickland’s purchase agreement is a distinct, separate, and fully executed contract from the collective bargaining agreement and (2) whether the grievances of Vernon Barham and Mitchell Strickland arose after they had retired.

FACTS

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to the present motion to dismiss. The plaintiffs, whom are all current or former members of the New Haven Police Department filed the operative twenty-count complaint on September 28 2018, alleging the following facts against the defendants, the city of New Haven and Craig Manemeit.^[1]

In 2005, the city offered the plaintiffs an opportunity to participate in a military buyback program, which was subject to certain terms and conditions as set forth by the city in documents provided to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs accepted the aforementioned offer and paid the city money from their personal funds as consideration for the city’s promise to credit the pensions of the plaintiffs with nine years comprised of four years of active duty military service and five years of accrued sick time while employed by the city. In 2008, the city changed the terms and conditions of the military buyback program offered to the members of the local police and fire unions to credit only a maximum of five years of either active duty military service and/or accrued sick time toward an eligible employee’s pension. In 2009, the city represented to the plaintiffs that the city would perform its promise as agreed in the 2005 agreement in which the plaintiff would be credited with nine years of combined active duty military service and accrued sick time toward the pensions of the plaintiffs. In 2011, the plaintiff Mitchell Strickland learned that the city would not perform its promise as agreed in the 2005 agreement. In 2012, the plaintiff Vernon Barham learned that the city would not perform its promise as agreed in the 2005 agreement. In 2015, the plaintiffs Walter Flegler, Elliot Rosa, Juan Monzon, Robert Maturo, Alberto Merced, Michael White, Joshua Armistead, and Michael Styles learned that the city would not perform its promise as agreed in the 2005 agreement. The plaintiffs allege that the city has breached its agreement with the plaintiffs and that the plaintiffs have suffered damages as a result of the breach.

On September 28, 2018, the plaintiffs filed the operative complaint with attached exhibits of the plaintiffs’ purchase agreements.^[2] On October 1, 2018, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss counts two, four, six, eight, ten, twelve, fourteen, sixteen, eighteen, and twenty of the plaintiffs’ operative complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that the plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. In November of 2018, the plaintiffs Elliot Rosa, Robert Maturo, Alberto Merced, Joshua Armistead, and Michael Styles withdrew from the action. Thus, the defendants’ motion to dismiss as to counts four, ten, twelve, eighteen, and twenty are rendered moot. On April 8, 2019, the remaining plaintiffs, Walter Flegler, Juan Monzon, Vernon Barham, Mitchell Strickland, and Michael White, ^[3] filed an objection to the defendants’ partial motion to dismiss on the grounds that (1) the contracts are distinct from the collective bargaining agreement and are not subject to the requirement to exhaust administrative remedies and (2) administrative remedy, even if necessary, would be demonstrably futile. Additionally, the plaintiffs contend that, with a sole exception, the plaintiffs in the present matter are retired. Therefore, the plaintiffs contend that the retired plaintiffs are not subject to the requirement to exhaust their administrative remedies.

On May 20, 2019, the parties’ arguments were heard at short calendar. On August 28, 2019, this court issued judicial notice regarding the court’s order, Pierson, J., (#150.30) that an evidentiary hearing shall be scheduled, prior to making a jurisdictional determination, to resolve critical issues of fact with regard to whether the dates of the plaintiffs’ retirement predate the discovery of the defendants’ conduct in breaching their agreements. In lieu of an evidentiary hearing, the parties filed a joint stipulation on September 30, 2019. The parties stipulate to the following facts in pertinent part: (1) Walter Flegler’s retirement was effective January 5, 2019, (2) Vernon Barham’s retirement was effective on July 15, 2012, (3) Mitchell Strickland’s retirement was effective June 29, 2011, (4) Michael White’s retirement was effective June 30, 2017, and (5) Juan Monzon is presently employed as a police officer for the city.

DISCUSSION

"A motion to dismiss shall be used to assert ... lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter ..." Practice Book § 10-30(a). "A determination regarding a trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law." Miller v. Egan, 265 Conn. 301, 313, 828 A.2d 549 (2003). "[T]he plaintiff bears the burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction, whenever and however raised." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. New London, 265 Conn. 423, 430 n.12, 829 A.2d 801 (2003).

"When a trial court decides a jurisdictional question raised by a pretrial motion to dismiss on the basis of the complaint alone, it must consider the allegations of the complaint in their most favorable light ... In this regard, a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Conboy v. State, 292 Conn. 642, 651, 974 A.2d 669 (2009).

In contrast, if the complaint is supplemented by undisputed facts established by [1] affidavits submitted in support of the motion to dismiss ... [2] other types of undisputed evidence ... and/or [3] public records of which judicial notice may be taken ... the trial court, in determining the jurisdictional issue, may consider these supplementary undisputed facts and need not conclusively presume the validity of the allegations of the complaint ... Rather, those allegations are tempered by the light shed on them by the [supplementary undisputed facts] ... If affidavits and/or other evidence submitted in support of a defendant’s motion to dismiss conclusively establish that jurisdiction is lacking, and the plaintiff fails to undermine this conclusion with counteraffidavits ... or other evidence, the trial court may dismiss the action without further proceedings ... If, however, the defendant submits either no proof to rebut the plaintiff’s jurisdictional allegations ... or only evidence that fails to call those allegations into question ... the plaintiff need not supply counteraffidavits or other evidence to support the complaint, but may rest on the jurisdictional allegations therein." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Norris v. Trumbull, 187 Conn.App. 201, 209-10, 201 A.3d 1137 (2019).

"Finally, where a jurisdictional determination is dependent on the resolution of a critical factual dispute, it cannot be decided on a motion to dismiss in the absence of an evidentiary hearing to establish jurisdictional facts ... Likewise, if the question of jurisdiction is intertwined with the merits of the case, a court cannot resolve the jurisdictional question without a hearing to evaluate those merits ... An evidentiary hearing is necessary because a court cannot make a critical factual [jurisdictional] finding based on memoranda and documents submitted by the parties." (Citations omitted; footnotes omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Conboy v. State, supra, 292 Conn. 652-54.

"It is a settled principle of administrative law that if an adequate administrative remedy exists, it must be exhausted before the Superior Court will obtain jurisdiction to act in the matter." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Board of Education v. Bridgeport, 191 Conn.App. 360 367, 214 A.3d 898 (2019). "The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is...