Flores v. Santos

Gladys Flores v. Joaquim Santo aka Jack Santos

No. CVH8562

Superior Court of Connecticut, Judicial District of Hartford, Hartford, Housing Session

November 24, 2015

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON ENTRY AND DETAINER COMPLAINT

Nicola E. Rubinow, J.

This memorandum of decision addresses the complaint brought by the plaintiff, Gladys Flores (Flores) alleging that against her will and without her consent, the defendant Joaquim Santo a/k/a Jack Santos (Santo), entered a rental dwelling unit of which she had actual possession and locked her out, in violation of General Statutes § 47a-43(a). Flores seeks an order: enjoining Santo from depriving her of access to the dwelling unit; providing her with restitution or access to personal property listed in her complaint; and awarding her such legal and equitable relief as the court deems proper.

The case was tried on October 21, 2015. Both parties represented themselves, testified and were available for cross-examination; Santo's witness Maria Ferreira (Ferreira) also was available for cross examination. The lease for the dwelling unit at issue was the sole item offered in evidence.

Flores the plaintiff, bears the burden of proving the essential allegations of her complaint by a fair preponderance of the evidence.^[1] As Flores has not met her burden of proof, the relief requested is not available, and judgment must enter in favor of the defendant.^[2]

I FACTUAL FINDINGS

The court has reviewed the pleadings and considered the evidence in its entirety using the applicable principles of law.^[3] The court finds that the following facts were proved at trial by a fair preponderance of the evidence.^[4]

Santo is the owner, landlord and lessor for the property located at 1768 Park Street in Hartford, Connecticut which includes the dwelling unit known as #203 (the dwelling unit). On December 19, 2014, Santo's authorized agent, acting on his behalf entered into a written lease agreement with Flores. In relevant part, the lease allowed Flores to have possession of the dwelling unit for a period of one year starting January 1, 2015, in exchange for rent of $475 payable to Santo on the first day of each month. Paragraph 15 of this rental agreement required Flores to leave the dwelling unit and to remove all her property when the lease ended; ¶ 15 further provided that if Flores did not remove her property when the lease ended, Santo " may consider such property abandoned and may dispose of it" as he deemed appropriate. (Ex. A; Tes. Flores, Santo.)

Credible and reliable the testimony establishes that on Thursday August 6, 2015, Flores came to Santo's office. There, in the presence of Santo and/or his agent Ferreira, Flores unequivocally stated that she was not paying any more rent for use of the dwelling unit as she was moving to Puerto Rico that Saturday. Flores effectively asked to be relieved of her obligations under the lease; under the circumstances, Santo and/or his authorized agent agreed to terminate the lease as requested.^[5] (Tes. Santo, Ferreira.) Consistent with her stated intention to permanently leave the dwelling unit in two days, Flores retained the keys and did not return them to Santo and/or Ferreira at their meeting on August 6 2015. There is no evidence from which the court could reasonably conclude that Flores paid the rent due under the lease for her August 2015 tenancy; this finding is further consistent with the other evidence establishing Flores's intention, stated on August 6, 2015, to terminate the rental agreement effective two days later. (Tes. Flores, Ferreira.)

Further credible and reliable testimony establishes that before leaving to commence residence elsewhere, Flores removed substantially all of her property from the dwelling unit; this conduct is consistent with ¶ 15 of the lease, which required removal of her personal property when the rental agreement ended. Flores had begun her residence on or about January 1, 2015; the dwelling unit consisted of a studio apartment with a kitchen area and a small storage room. Reasonably and accordance with Flores's stated intention to stop paying rent and to move out in early August 2015, Santo had his staff enter the dwelling unit at the end of August 2015 to conduct routine maintenance and inspection. There was no indication that any person was either occupying or storing possessions in the dwelling unit at that time: in late August, there was no food in the refrigerator, and only remaining items reasonably appeared to have been discarded, consisting of a non-working television, an air mattress, and two cardboard boxes containing items of indiscernible value.^[6] No bedding, clothing, other electronic devices, food or health-related items were present.^[7] (Tes. Santo, Ferreira.)

Given Flores's expressly stated desire to stop paying rent because she was leaving Connecticut, corroborated by her removal of substantially all personal belongings before her announced departure date, Santo reasonably determined that Flores had surrendered the dwelling unit and abandoned any contents that remained, as contemplated by ¶ 15 of the previously extant lease. Accordingly, Santo disposed of the television, air mattress and the boxes containing items of indiscernible value. Santo changed the locks to the dwelling in September 2015. (Ex. A; Tes. Flores, Santo, Ferreira.)

On October 8, 2015, without having contacted Santo or his staff since August 6, 2015, and without having paid rent for August or September or October 2015, Flores returned to 1768 Park Street and attempted to enter dwelling unit #203.^[8] She had access to the building's open common lobby, but the key she had retained did not allow her entry into the dwelling unit. On that date, Flores came to Santo's office and complained about the fact that her key would no longer unlock the dwelling unit. After telling Ferreira that she had been away because she had been hospitalized, Flores was unwilling or unable to provide documents or other verification of this newly stated cause for her absence.^[9] (Tes. Flores, Santo, Ferreira.)

Flores then prepared and filed the pending lockout complaint which, with attendant documents, was duly served upon Santo on October 14, 2015.

II RESOLUTION OF THE PARTIES' CLANS

To prevail on her complaint Flores must prove, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, that Santo and/or his agent made " (1) . . . forcible entry into [the] dwelling unit and with a strong hand detain[ed] the same or (2) having made a peaceable entry, without the consent of the actual possessor, [held] and detain[ed] the same with force and strong hand, or (3) enter[ed] into [the] dwelling unit and caused . . . removal of or detention of the personal property of the possessor ." ^[10] (Emphasis added.) § 47a-43(a) (presenting alternative elements for recovery). To access relief under the " forcible entry" element of § 47a-43(a)(1), Flores must establish that she " was in actual possession [of dwelling unit #203] at the time of the defendant's entry . . ." Quinto v. Boccanfusco, 54 A.3d 1069, 139 Conn.App. 129 (2012). To meet her burden on any of the three relevant elements of § 47a-43(a)(1), (2) and/or (3), then, the evidence must be sufficient to prove that Flores had actual possession, or was in possession, of the dwelling unit when Santo's agents entered the dwelling unit in late August 2015 and removed the personalty left there, and/or when Santo's agents changed the lock to the dwelling unit.^[11]

Here, a fair preponderance of the evidence establishes that Flores was neither in " actual possession" of the dwelling unit nor in possession of the dwelling unit when Santo's agents entered, discarded the property left behind, and changed the locks. Instead, a fair preponderance of the evidence establishes that Flores and Santo and/or or Santo's agent, had mutually assented to termination of the lease as of August 6, 2015, with the following Saturday agreed upon as the final date for Flores to have lawful access to the dwelling unit.^[12] Applying that the relevant intent is to be inferred from the attendant circumstances and conduct of the parties.' (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Smith & Smith Building Corp. v. DeLuca, 36 Conn.App. 839, 842-43, 654 A.2d 368 (1995); see also Herman S. Newman & Partners, P.C. v. CFC Construction Ltd., Construction Ltd. Partnership, 236 Conn. 750, 762, 674 A.2d 1313 (1996)." Young v. Young, 78 Conn.App. 394, 402, 827 A.2d 722 (2003). these principles, Flores cannot meet her burden of proving possession, a predicate to any of the applicable elements of the entry and detainer statute. Accordingly, the court cannot find in Flores's favor.

Prior to August 6, 2015, Flores was a lawful tenant in actual possession of the dwelling unit at issue, pursuant to the lease. (Ex. A.) However, as found in Part I, Flores provided Santo and/or his agent with an express declaration on August 6, 2015 establishing that she did not intend reside at, use occupy the premises or continue to honor the lease terms any longer because she was moving out of the premises on the following Saturday, a specified date. Consistent with her stated intention to vacate the premises, Flores requested relief from her obligation to pay any further rent. Further consistent with her stated intention to move from the premises, Flores neither paid rent nor made arrangements for suspension of her obligation to pay the rent that would be due, under the lease, for the months of August, September or October 2015. These findings support the determination that, acquiescing to Flores's request, Santo and/or his agent agreed on August 6, 2015 to grant Flores's request for release from her obligations under the lease; on that date, the parties...