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Florida Real Property and Business Litigation Report
Volume XIV, Issue 3
January 19, 2021
Manuel Farach
City of Chicago v. Fulton, Case No. 19–357 (2021).
The mere retention of estate property after the filing of a bankruptcy petition does not violate the automatic stay
under 11 U.S.C. §362(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code.
United States of America ex rel Bibby v. Mortgage Investors Corporation, No. 19-12736 (11th
Cir. 2021).
The False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A)–(B), does not impart standing Article III to claimants seeking
avoidance of fraudulent claims.
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company v. Bessent-Dixon, Case No. 1D19-1995 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021).
A claimant seeking to prove the intentional tort of conspiracy to fraudulently conceal information must prove she
relied to her detriment on a false statement by the defendant.
Ramos v. Mississippi Real Estate Dispositions, LLC, Case No. 3D19-2513 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021).
Despite the equitable powers granted to judgment creditors by Florida Statute section 56.29(6), a judgment
creditor executing a judgment on a judgment debtor’s interest in a multi-member limited liability is constrained
by Florida Statute section 605.0503 and may only levy a charging lien.
National Medical Imaging, LLC v. Lyon Financial Services, Inc., Case No. 3D20-730 (Fla. 3d DCA
2021) (en banc).
The Third District recedes from Shop in the Grove, Ltd. v. Union Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n of Miami, 425 So.
2d 1138 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982), and holds that the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. 362 applies even when the
bankruptcy debtor is the appellant.
Amezcua v. Cortez, Case No. 3D20-1649 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021).
Florida recognizes international foreign judgments pursuant to Florida Statute section 55.064 while general
principles of comity allow for the discretionary enforcement of certain interlocutory rulings.
Florida Real Property and Business Litigation Report
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1
(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2020
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reade r.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
CITY OF CHICAGO, ILLINOIS v. FULTON ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 19–357. Argued Oc tober 13, 2020—Decided January 14, 2021
The filing of a petition under the Bankruptcy Code automatically “cre-
ates an estate” that, with some exceptions, comprises “all legal or eq-
uitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of
the case.” 11 U. S. C. §541(a). Section 541 is intended to include
within the estate any property made available by other provisions of
the Bankruptcy Code. Section 542 is one such provision, as it provides
that an entity in possession of property of the bankruptcy estate “shall
deliver to the trustee, and account for” that property. The filing of a
petition also automatically “operates as a stay, applicable to all enti-
ties,” of efforts to collect prepetition debts outside the bankruptcy fo-
rum, §362(a), including “any act to obtain possession of property of the
estate or of property from the estate or to exercise control over property
of the estate,” §362(a)(3). Here, each respondent filed a bankruptcy
petition and requested that the city of Chicago (City) return his or her
vehicle, which had been impounded for failure to pay fines for motor
vehicle infractions. In each case, the City’s refusal was held by a bank-
ruptcy court to violate the automatic stay. The Seventh Circuit af-
firmed, concluding that by retaining possession of the vehicles the City
had acted “to exercise control over” respondents’ property in violation
of §362(a)(3).
Held: The mere retention of estate property after the filing of a bank-
ruptcy petition does not violate §362(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code.
Under that provision, the filing of a bankruptcy petition operates as a
“stay” of “any act” to “exercise control” over the property of the estate.
Taken together, the most natural reading of these terms is that
§362(a)(3) prohibits affirmative acts that would disturb the status quo
of estate property as of the time when the bankruptcy petition was
