Floyd v. Dross

442 S.C. 79

897 S.E.2d 191

Susan Brooks Knott FLOYD, Respondent,

v.Elizabeth Pope Knott DROSS, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2020-001354

Opinion No. 6044

Court of Appeals of South Carolina.

Heard September 13, 2023

Filed January 17, 2024

Rehearing Denied February 15, 2024

Appeal from Berkeley County, Roger M. Young, Sr., Circuit Court Judge

John William Fletcher, of Barnwell Whaley Patterson & Helms, LLC, and Joshua Steven Whitley, of Smyth Whitley, LLC, both of Charleston, and Todd Maurice Hess, of Wesley Chapel, North Carolina, for Appellant.

George Trenholm Walker and Charles P. Summerall, IV, both of Walker Gressette & Linton, LLC, of Charleston, for Respondent.

GEATHERS, J.:

In this declaratory judgment action, Appellant Elizabeth Pope Knott Dross (Betsy) seeks review of the circuit court’s order granting partial summary judgment to Respondent Susan Brooks Knott Floyd (Susan). Betsy argues the circuit court erred by concluding that Susan had an express easement over the roads on Betsy’s property in order to access Susan’s property. We reverse the circuit court’s order and remand for further proceedings in this case.

FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 2004, Benjamin Franklin Knott (Father) executed a will granting each of his daughters, Susan and Betsy, approximately one-half of a 371-acre tract of land (the Unified Tract) near Huger in Berkeley County (Susan’s Parcel and Betsy’s Parcel). The Unified Tract was subject to a conservation easement (the Conservation Easement) that Father had previously given to Wetlands America Trust, Inc., a non-profit organization affiliated with Ducks Unlimited, Inc. and dedicated to the conservation of natural areas.¹

The only direct road frontage for the Unified Tract was Cainhoy Road, west of, and adjacent to, the area that would become Betsy’s Parcel upon Father’s death. There was also indirect access to the Unified Tract from Charity Church Road, east of the Unified Tract, through a parcel adjacent to the Unified Tract that Susan already owned at the time Father executed his will in 2004 (the Access Parcel).

Conveniently, the Access Parcel was adjacent to the half of the Unified Tract that would become Susan’s Parcel upon Father’s death. The Access Parcel fronted Charity Church Road and provided vehicular access to the Unified Tract.² Father had conveyed the Access Parcel to Susan in 1996, but Susan sold almost all of this property in, 2007 to WH Land Company, LLC for $4,000,000; Susan retained ten acres bordering the part of the Unified Tract that would later become Susan’s Parcel. Although this resulted in Susan’s Parcel and the adjacent ten acres becoming landlocked,³ Susan retained an easement over the part of the Access Parcel that she sold.

Father died on November 18, 2009, and Susan and Betsy received deeds of distribution to their respective parcels on January 11, 2011. Subsequently, in 2015, Susan agreed to terminate her easement over the Access Parcel in favor of its owner—WH Land Company, LLC. Approximately three years later, Susan asked Betsy if she could use Betsy’s Parcel to access Susan’s Parcel. According to Susan, Betsy rejected Susan’s request. Susan has also claimed that she

requested access from Betsy to reach [Susan’s] Parcel to undertake activities in furtherance of the Conservation Easement purposes, including: (1) to preserve and protect the "Whiskey Still Dam" from erosion in order to maintain a large Cypress Pond[,] which is one of the "conservation values" on [Susan’s] Parcel identified in the Baseline. Report;⁴ and (2) to harvest some timber on [Susan’s] Parcel.

According to Betsy,

The road system on Betsy’s Parcel is fragile. Part of it is built on a water embankment. When heavy rains are present in the area [or] when property owners upstream of Betsy’s Parcel release water from their land, part of the road system on Betsy’s Parcel washes over with water and becomes impassable. [Betsy and her] husband have invested considerable time, effort, and money maintaining these roads so that they are passable under fair-weather conditions. If [they] had not, part of the road system Would have completely washed away.

On September 20, 2019, Susan filed the present action. In her amended complaint, Susan sought a judgment declaring, inter alia, that (1) she had "an appurtenant easement and right to use Duck Pond Road crossing over Betsy’s [P]arcel for all activities permitted under the Conservation Easement" and (2) Betsy was required to "provide Susan at all times with the key or code to Betsy’s locked gate." Susan claimed that she had an express easement over Betsy’s Parcel purportedly created by the language in section 4 of the Conservation Easement, which states, in pertinent part:

RESERVED RIGHTS

Notwithstanding any provision to the contrary contained in this Easement, the Grantor reserves for himself, his heirs, successors and assigns the "Reserved Rights" set forth in this Section.

4. The exercise of all Reserved Rights will be in full accordance with all applicable local, state and federal laws and. regulations, as well as in accordance with the intent and Purpose of this Easement. Grantor hereby agrees to give written notice to the Grantee prior to constructing any new buildings or extracting any minerals pursuant to the Reserved Rights contained herein.

….

4.3 Roads. The right to maintain and replace existing roads at the same location with roads of like size and composition. The right to construct new roads to the New Structures using permeable materials (e.g.[,] sand, gravel, crushed stone). Grantor shall use existing roads whenever possible for access to the New Structures. The right to widen existing roads for utility rights-of-way. The right to use roads for all activities permitted under this Easement. Maintenance of roads shall be limited to normal practices for non-paved roads, such as the removal of dead vegetation, scraping and crowning, necessary pruning or removal of hazardous trees and plants, application of permeable materials necessary to correct erosion, placement of culverts, water control structures, and bridges, and maintenance of roadside ditches.

(emphases added).

Susan’s amended complaint also asserted claims for "Reformation of Deeds of Distribution," "Easement Implied By Prior Use," "Easement By Necessity," and an injunction preventing Betsy from locking out Susan "or otherwise impeding her right to use that portion of Duck Pond Road crossing over Betsy’s Parcel to access Susan’s Parcel for all activities permitted under the Conservation Easement."

Betsy filed an answer and counterclaim, seeking a judgment declaring that Susan had "no easement of any kind over Betsy’s Parcel and [did] not otherwise have any rights regarding Betsy’s Parcel." Subsequently, Susan filed a motion for partial summary judgment as to her express easement claim and Betsy’s counterclaim. After conducting a hearing on the motion, the circuit court granted partial summary judgment to Susan, concluding,

Pursuant to the unambiguous terms of the governing Conservation Easement, including the expressly reserved rights in Section 4.3 thereof, Susan, as owner of approximately half of the Conservation Easement Property, has the right to use the roads crossing over Betsy’s Parcel to access Susan’s Parcel for all activities permitted under the Conservation Easement[.]

Specifically, the circuit court ordered, "[T]his partial summary judgment is granted pursuant to the First Cause of Action for Declaratory Judgment in Susan’s Amended Complaint, and the [c]ourt hereby denies Betsy’s Counterclaim to the extent it requests a Declaratory Judgment that Susan has no right to use the roads crossing over Betsy’s Parcel." The circuit court later denied Betsy’s Rule 59(e), SCRCP, motion. This appeal followed.

ISSUES ON APPEAL

I. Did the circuit court err by concluding that the Conservation Easement’s disputed language was unambiguous?

II. Did the circuit court err by concluding that the Conservation Easement’s language expressly created a right for Susan to use the roads on Betsy’s Parcel to access Susan’s Parcel?

III. Did the circuit court err by granting partial summary judgment to Susan when there was evidence that Susan’s conduct was not equitable?

IV. Does the circuit court’s construction of the Conservation Easement produce an unreasonable result?

V. Does the Conservation Easement Act preclude Susan’s claims?

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court reviews the grant of a summary judgment motion under the same standard applied by the circuit court pursuant to Rule 56(c), SCRCP. Jackson v. Bermuda Sands, Inc., 383 S.C. 11, 14 n.2, 677 S.E.2d 612, 614 n.2 (Ct. App. 2009). Summary judgment must be granted when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Rule 56(c), SCRCP. "In determining whether any triable issues of fact exist, the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." Osborne v. Adams, 346 S.C. 4, 7, 550 S.E.2d 319, 321 (2001).

Likewise, "[o]n appeal from an order granting summary judgment, the appellate court will review all ambiguities, conclusions, and inferences arising in and from the evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving party below." Id. Further, "[w]hen a circuit court grants summary judgment on a question of law, this [c]ourt will review the ruling de novo." Wright v. PRG Real Est. Mgmt., Inc., 426 S.C. 202, 212, 826 S.E.2d 285, 290 (2019).

LAW/ANALYSIS

Betsy’s issues I, II, and IV all assign error to the circuit court’s interpretation of section 4 of the Conservation Easement. Accordingly, we will combine these issues for purposes of our analysis. For the reasons that follow, we agree with Betsy’s argument that the language in section 4 did not create a right for Susan to access...