Flynn v. Big Spring Sch. Dist.

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LAWRENCE FLYNN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. BIG SPRING SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant.

CIVIL No. 1:22-CV-00961

United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania

September 19, 2024

MEMORANDUM OPINION

SUSAN E. SCHWAB, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. Introduction.

The plaintiffs, Lawrence Flynn (“Flynn”) and Arlene Reinford (“Reinford”), bring claims against the Big Spring School District (“School District” or “District”) for violations of their First Amendment and Procedural Due Process rights. The case concerns the School District's policy that restricted placards and signs during School Board meetings (“Policy 903”) and the School District's decision to ban Flynn and Reinford from future meetings. Currently pending is the School District's motion for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth below, we will deny the School District's motion for summary judgment in part and grant it in part.

II. Background and Procedural History.

Flynn and Reinford (collectively “the plaintiffs”) began this action on June 16, 2022, by filing a complaint against the School District, the Big Spring School Board (“School Board”), the Superintendent of Schools, and members of the School Board. Doc. 1. Soon after, the plaintiffs filed a motion for temporary restraining order seeking to enjoin the defendants from “selective [sic] enforcing Big Spring School District Policy 903 with respect to placards and signs and from barring Plaintiffs from attending public meetings and offering public comments.” Doc. 4. The motion for temporary restraining order was dismissed, however, upon the parties' stipulation. Doc. 16.

The defendants answered the complaint (doc. 19), and consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction (doc. 20, 21). The case was then assigned to us. Doc. 21. We held a case management conference with the parties (doc. 22, 24), and we issued a case management order (doc. 25). After we issued five amended case management orders (docs. 29, 31, 38, 40, 49), the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint (doc. 56).

The amended complaint named only the School District as a defendant and brought five counts against it, all alleging violations of the plaintiffs' First and Fourteenth Amendment rights and brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. Specifically, Count One is a facial challenge to the constitutionality of the School District's Policy 903; Count Two is an as-applied challenge to the constitutionality of Policy 903; Count Three asserts that the School District retaliated against the plaintiffs for their exercise of free speech; Count Four is an as-applied challenge to the School District's policy for banning individuals from public meetings and limiting their ability to make public comments at those meetings; and Count Five asserts that the School District violated the plaintiffs' procedural due process rights when it banned them from public meetings and thereby limited their ability to make public comments Id.

On November 20, 2023, the School District filed a motion for summary judgment (doc. 59), a brief in support thereof (doc. 60), and a statement of material facts as required by our local rules (doc. 61). After seeking and being granted an extension of time to do so (doc. 62, 63), the plaintiffs filed a brief in opposition of the motion for summary judgment and a counterstatement of material facts (doc. 64). The time for filing a reply brief has passed (see M.D. Pa. L.R. 7.7), and the motion is now ripe.

III. Summary Judgment Standards.

Here, the School District moved for summary judgment under Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “Through summary adjudication the court may dispose of those claims that do not present a ‘genuine dispute as to any material fact' and for which a jury trial would be an empty and unnecessary formality.” Goudy-Bachman v. U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Services, 811 F.Supp.2d 1086, 1091 (M.D. Pa. 2011) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a)).

The moving party bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). With respect to an issue on which the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof, the moving party may discharge that burden by “‘showing'-that is, point out to the district court-that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case.” Id. at 325.

Once the moving party has met its burden, the nonmoving party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of its pleading; rather, the nonmoving party must show a genuine dispute by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials” or “showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence . . . of a genuine dispute.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).

If the nonmoving party “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden at trial, summary judgment is appropriate. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.

Summary judgment is also appropriate if the nonmoving party provides merely colorable, conclusory, or speculative evidence. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). There must be more than a scintilla of evidence supporting the nonmoving party and more than metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. Id. at 252. “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.'” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).

The substantive law identifies which facts are material, and “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. A dispute about a material fact is genuine only if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis that would allow a reasonable fact finder to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. at 248-49.

When “faced with a summary judgment motion, the court must view the facts ‘in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.'” N.A.A.C.P. v. N. Hudson Reg'l Fire & Rescue, 665 F.3d 464, 475 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007)). At the summary judgment stage, the judge's function is not to weigh the evidence or to determine the truth of the matter; rather it is to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. The proper inquiry of the court “is the threshold inquiry of determining whether there is the need for a trial-whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.” Id. at 250.

Summary judgment is warranted against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. “Under such circumstances, ‘there can be no genuine issue as to any material fact, since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.'” Anderson v. Consol. Rail Corp., 297 F.3d 242, 247 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323). “[S]ummary judgment is essentially ‘put up or shut up' time for the non-moving party: the non-moving party must rebut the motion with facts in the record and cannot rest solely on assertions made in the pleadings, legal memoranda, or oral argument.” Berckeley Inv. Group, Ltd. v. Colkitt, 455 F.3d 195, 201 (3d Cir. 2006).

IV. Material Facts.

The following facts are the material facts for purposes of the pending summary judgment motion.^[1]

Flynn and Reinford both reside in the School District. Doc. 61 ¶¶ 1, 2. None of Flynn's six children or Reinford's four children are enrolled in the District's schools, however. Id. ¶¶ 3, 19. Instead, all of the plaintiffs' school-aged children are homeschooled. Id. Nevertheless, between September 7, 2021, and February 7, 2022, both Flynn and Reinford attended multiple public School Board meetings and, while in attendance, publicly commented and held signs. Id. ¶¶ 5, 20. Prior to February 7, 2022, neither Flynn nor Reinford were “prevented . . . from making public comment or . . . from displaying signs.” Id. ¶¶ 5, 20; see also doc. 64-1 ¶¶ 5, 20. During the January 10, 2022 public meeting, Reinford also placed a sticker^[2] on a bathroom door. Doc. 64-1 ¶ 23; doc. 61-4 at 12-13. Following this incident, Reinford spoke “with Superintendent Roberts to resolve the January 2022 sticker issue” such that she could, and did, attend the February 2022 Board meeting. Doc. 64-1 ¶ 28.

On February 7, 2022, Flynn and Reinford both attended a School Board meeting. Doc. 61 ¶¶ 5, 20. During the meeting, Flynn held a sign that criticized the School District's use of taxpayer funds and its masking and vaccination policies (“the sign”). Doc 64-1 ¶ 5. While seated, Flynn held the sign above his head “in a relatively stationary manner, without twirling it in any way.” Id. ¶ 7 (citing doc. 64-5 at 37, 43-44). At one point, Flynn turned the sign “around to face the camera...