Flynn v. Stamford Hospital

John FLYNN v. STAMFORD HOSPITAL

No. FSTCV165015932S

Superior Court of Connecticut, Judicial District of Stamford-Norwalk, Stamford

September 6, 2018

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

POVODOTAR, JTR

Introduction

Improper billing practices, especially when intentional, are an ongoing problem and a societal concern. See, e.g. Edelstein v. Department of Public Health and Addiction Services, 240 Conn. 658, 692 A.2d 803 (1997). Legitimate concerns about identity theft have become almost commonplace given the frequency of reported breaches of computerized databases that contain information that could facilitate identity theft- to the point that the second or third paragraph in news stories about security breaches- after the initial description of the breach itself- typically indicates the types of information exposed or obtained and whether the information potentially impacts identity theft and access to financial records/information that have the potential for being misused. News stories as well as advertising campaigns often describe the tortuous path that needs to be taken in order to clear up problems arising from identify theft and similar activities. The court is aware of at least one instance where it was claimed to have contributed to a homicide, eventually advanced as part of the basis for a defense of extreme emotional disturbance to a charge of murder (State v. Orlando, 163 Conn.App. 155, 156, 134 A.3d 708; cert. denied, 320 Conn. 930 (2016)^[1] ). See, also, Peterson v. Swain, No. CV 055001192S, 2010 WL 1795883, at *7 (Conn.Super.Ct. Apr. 6, 2010), where a 25-year-old individual leased a car (in 2003) based on identification including a driver’s license indicating a date of birth in 1937, and submitted a credit application indicating almost 40 years of self-employment, with the allegedly-irresponsible lessee subsequently involved in a serious motor vehicle accident.

In dealing with identity theft and associated mis-billing, there is not always a clear answer as to how much blame or responsibility- legal or moral- can be attributed to various actors in the chain of events. The person whose identity has been stolen is always cast in the role of a victim, although there sometimes may be a modest level of moral contributory responsibility when the victim was careless with respect to protection or dissemination of what should be private information. The person who misused the information- stole the victim’s identify and/or illegally used credit information- clearly is a wrongdoer. But the status of individuals/entities in the middle is somewhat situation-dependent. Returning to the Equifax breach, many have blamed the company for lax security measures, but is the company legally responsible/liable?

The analogy that the court believes is closest to the one at hand is when a credit card company bills a customer for a purchase that the customer did not make. Sometimes the credit card company catches suspicious transactions as they are occurring, but sometimes the first awareness is when the customer challenges a charge, asserting that he/she did not make that purchase. In that situation, the cardholder may be the nominal or presumed victim, but the actual victim often is the merchant or credit card company (depending on the terms of their relationship), because the actual loss from the fraudulent purchase is absorbed by one of those intermediaries, not the cardholder.

Procedural Background/Claims

The self-represented plaintiff has asserted a number of claims against the defendant hospital, all relating to the claimed improper billing practices of the hospital. In construing the claims set forth in a complaint, and especially one filed by a self-represented party, the court is guided by principles set forth in appellate decisions, applicable to both functions.

In our review of the plaintiff’s claim, we must evaluate the allegations in the complaint. The interpretation of pleadings is always a question of law for the court ... In addition, [t]he allegations of the complaint must be given such reasonable construction as will give effect to [it] in conformity with the general theory which it was intended to follow, and do substantial justice between the parties ... It is axiomatic that the parties are bound by their pleadings. (Internal quotation marks and citation, omitted.) Sempey v. Stamford Hospital, 180 Conn.App. 605, 613, 184 A.3d 761, 766 (2018).

[C]onstruction of a self-represented party’s pleading should not focus on technical defects, but should afford the [appellant] a broad, realistic construction of the pleading under review. (Internal quotation marks and citation, omitted.) Macellaio v. Newington Police Department, 145 Conn.App. 426, 431 (2013).

Connecticut courts are solicitous of self-represented parties when it does not interfere with the rights of other parties. Our courts allow self-represented parties some latitude, but that latitude is constrained by our rules of practice; the purpose of which is to provide a just determination of every proceeding. (Citations and internal quotation marks, omitted.) Argentinis v. Fortuna, 134 Conn.App. 538, 539 (2012).

Against this general background and context, the court will review the history of this case. The original complaint, dated July 8, 2016, contained the following allegations:

Complaint

Stamford Hospital billed Flynn for hospital expenses.

Flynn has had no employees since 2000.

Through JJF Consulting Engineers, Clairvoyant Capital, LLC and GGLP, Flynn had employees none by the name Giordano. Flynn has hired subcontractors.

Flynn is a licensed home improvement contractor.

Flynn has had no employees since September 30, 2000.

Stamford Hospital has billed Flynn $25,992.66. Stamford Hospital has threatened to place a [lien] on Flynn’s house. This is fraud.

The defendant moved to strike this complaint, which was granted by the court, resulting in the filing of an amended/substitute complaint (Practice Book § 10-44), denominated by the plaintiff as a revised complaint. The defendant subsequently filed an answer (categorized for e-filing purposes as a reply), and the case was assigned for trial on May 22, 2018. The plaintiff himself was the only witness to testify on behalf of the plaintiff. Eight exhibits were submitted and entered into the record as full exhibits. There was no cross examination of the plaintiff by the defendant. After the plaintiff rested, the defendant put on a single witness, who testified essentially solely as to Exhibit 1. The plaintiff cross examined the witness. After the defendant rested, the plaintiff added some clarifying testimony and the case was submitted, without briefs, for determination.

Turning to the specifics of this dispute as presented to the court at trial, the operative complaint is brief enough that it can be set forth in full:

[Caption and handwritten notations, including handwritten designation as "Revised Complaint"]

Under Connecticut General Statute 42-110b Unfair trade practice deceptive acts under any trade or practice.

Defendant 1) Stamford Hospital

1. Plaintiff Flynn lives at 27 Quintard, Norwalk.

2. Stamford Hospital billed Plaintiff for a broken arm and treatment of a heart condition.

3. Plaintiff has never been treated for a broken arm or a heart condition.

4. The defendant did not notify the plaintiff of any services being rendered to anyone. These are fraudulent billing practices.

5. Defendants billed Plaintiff $28,286.36.

Under Connecticut General Statute 53a-290 Vendor fraud presented a false claim for goods and services.

Under Connecticut General Statute 52-562 Liability for fraud, the defendant created a lien on the plaintiff’s assets for services never rendered.

The defendant used unfair trade practices. The defendant treated an illegal alien from Guatemala.

[Signature and related information, and certification]

The court will start with a relatively detailed discussion of the evidence and factual claims. After concluding that analysis, the court will proceed to address the applicability of those facts (and findings) to the specific claims asserted by the plaintiff, including/especially the statutory claims recited in the operative complaint.

To start, the court noted a numerical inconsistency between the amount claimed to have been improperly billed in the original complaint, and the amount claimed to have been improperly billed in the operative complaint, which will be addressed at the outset. The court recognizes that, after the granting of a motion to strike, the filing of an amended/substitute complaint negates any legal effect of the original complaint and waives any claim of error in the granting of the motion to strike; see, e.g., Ed Lally and Associates, Inc. v. DSBNC, LLC, 145 Conn.App. 718, 745-46; cert. denied, 310 Conn. 958 (2013) and Rockstone Capital, LLC v. Sanzo, 175 Conn.App. 770, 787-88 (2017); but to the extent that a superseded pleading might be deemed an evidentiary admission, reconciliation of the apparent discrepancy is appropriate. A number of the exhibits submitted were captioned "statement of account"- Exhibits 2, 3, and 8. The recitation of $25,992.66 corresponds to the total amount set forth on Exhibit 3; the recitation of $28,286.36 corresponds to the amount set forth on Exhibit 8 ($26,630.66) added to the amount set forth on Exhibit 1 ($1,655.80).^[2] Exhibit 8 reflects a statement date approximately 3 months later than Exhibit 3, and includes an additional entry for $638, thereby reconciling the figures on Exhibits 3 and 8.

As mentioned earlier, the defendant presented evidence only relating to Exhibit 1. For reasons that will be discussed below, Exhibit 1 requires separate treatment from all of the other exhibits (and related testimony).

Exhibit 1 is the only Exhibit...