Folse v. W.Va. Univ., CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:19-cv-00488

JAY FOLSE, Plaintiff, v. WEST VIRGINIA UNIVERSITY, et al., Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:19-cv-00488

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA CHARLESTON DIVISION

September 27, 2019

PROPOSED FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION

This matter is assigned to the Honorable Joseph R. Goodwin, United States District Judge, and it is referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for submission of proposed findings and recommendations for disposition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B).

Plaintiff Jay Folse ("Plaintiff") brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and West Virginia state law, alleging that he was unlawfully prevented from attending a public meeting of the WVUBOG at the Summit Bechtel Reserve in Fayette County, West Virginia, on June 20, 2019. (ECF No. 1.) Before this Court is the motion to dismiss filed by Defendants West Virginia University ("WVU"), West Virginia University Board of Governors ("WVUBOG"), William Wilmoth ("Wilmoth"), West Virginia University Police Department ("WVUPD"), John Doe WVU Police Officer #1, and John Doe WVU Police Officer #2 (collectively, "Defendants"). (ECF No. 6.) For the reasons explained more fully herein, the undersigned respectfully RECOMMENDS that Defendants' motion to dismiss (ECF No. 6) be GRANTED IN PART as to Plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims and that Plaintiff's state-law claims be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

I. LEGAL STANDARD¹

In general, a pleading must include "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); see McCleary-Evans v. Md. Dep't of Transp., State Highway Admin., 780 F.3d 582, 585 (4th Cir. 2015) (stating that this requirement exists "to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests" (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007))). However, to withstand a motion to dismiss made pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint must plead enough facts "to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Wikimedia Found. v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 857 F.3d 193, 208 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Stated another way, the factual allegations in the complaint "must be sufficient 'to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.'" Woods v. City of Greensboro, 855 F.3d 639, 647 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). A complaint that alleges enough facts "to satisfy the elements of a cause of action created by [the relevant] statute" will survive a motion to dismiss. Id. at 648 (quoting McCleary-Evans, 780 F.3d at 585).

In evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint, this Court first "identif[ies] pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption oftruth." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. This Court then "assume[s] the[] veracity" of the complaint's "well-pleaded factual allegations" and "determine[s] whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Id. Review of the complaint is "a context-specific task that requires [this Court] to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id. "[T]o satisfy the plausibility standard, a plaintiff is not required to plead factual allegations in great detail, but the allegations must contain sufficient factual heft to allow a court, drawing on judicial experience and common sense, to infer more than the mere possibility of that which is alleged." Nanni v. Aberdeen Marketplace, Inc., 878 F.3d 447, 452 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted).

II. ANALYSIS²

A. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

Defendants first argue that Plaintiff's claims against them should be dismissed because they are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. (ECF No. 7 at 7-8.) The Eleventh Amendment shields states, state agencies, and state officials acting in their official capacities from suits for money damages in federal court. Adams v. Ferguson, 884 F.3d 219, 224-25 (4th Cir. 2018); Lee-Thomas v. Prince George's Cty. Pub. Schs., 666 F.3d 244, 248 (4th Cir. 2012). Defendants contend that they are either state agencies or state officials sued in their official capacities. (ECF No. 7 at 7-9.) Plaintiff agrees that WVU, WVUBOG, and WVUPD "are a part of state government." (ECF No. 10 at 10.)

However, Plaintiff argues that the WVUPD officers were not acting in their official capacities because they were "out of their jurisdictional area" and that Wilmoth is notentitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity because he "acted in an unconstitutional manner." (Id. at 11.) An action against a state official in his official capacity "represent[s] only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent." Adams, 884 F.3d at 225 (quoting Monell v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1985)). As such, the distinction between official capacity and individual or personal capacity "is 'best understood as a reference to the capacity in which the state officer is sued, not the capacity in which the officer inflicts the alleged injury.'" Id. (quoting Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 26 (1991)). To determine whether a state official is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity, "the most important consideration is whether the state treasury will be responsible for paying any judgment that might be awarded." Hutto v. S.C. Ret. Sys., 773 F.3d 536, 543 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting Ram Ditta ex rel. Ram Ditta v. Md. Nat'l Capital Park & Planning Comm'n, 822 F.2d 456, 457 (4th Cir. 1987)). If by suing a state official in his official capacity the plaintiff means to recover money damages from the state as opposed to the official himself, the Eleventh Amendment bars that suit. See Adams, 884 F.3d at 226 ("Adams sued Ferguson in her personal capacity and seeks to recover only from her, not from the Commonwealth of Virginia. Eleventh Amendment absolute immunity does not bar the suit."). Here, Plaintiff has sued Wilmoth and the WVUPD officers in both their personal and official capacities. (ECF No. 1 at 1; ECF No. 10 at 11.) He requests money damages. (ECF No. 1 at 4.) It is thus clear that Plaintiff sued Wilmoth and the WVUPD officers in their official capacities in an attempt to recover money damages from the state. The Eleventh Amendment prohibits such actions. Adams, 884 F.3d at 224-25.

Plaintiff further argues that Wilmoth and the WVUPD officers are subject to the Ex Parte Young exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity. (ECF No. 10 at 9-10.)This exception "permits a federal court to issue prospective, injunctive relief against a state officer to prevent ongoing violations of federal law, on the rationale that such a suit is not a suit against the state for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment." McBurney v. Cuccinelli, 616 F.3d 393, 399 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908)). Plaintiff's only request for non-monetary relief in this case is for a declaration that "Defendants [are] in violation of the Open Governmental Proceedings Act," a West Virginia state law. (ECF No. 1 at 4.) As such, the Ex parte Young doctrine does not apply here.³

Relatedly, Defendants assert that Plaintiff's § 1983 claims against them are barred because state agencies are not "persons" who may be sued under § 1983. (ECF No. 7 at 15.) Indeed, "[t]o state a claim under § 1983 a plaintiff 'must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.'" Loftus v. Bobzien, 848 F.3d 278, 284-85 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting Crosby v. City of Gastonia, 635 F.3d 634, 639 (4th Cir. 2011)). The meaning of the term "person" as it is used in the statute "does not include the sovereign." Va. Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Reinhard, 405 F.3d 185, 189 (4th Cir. 2005); id. ("[A] state is not a 'person' for purposes of determining who can be sued under § 1983." (citing Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989))). This is in part because "in enacting § 1983, Congress did not intend to override [Eleventh Amendment] immunities." Will, 491 U.S. at 67. Put another way,if a defendant is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity, it is likewise not a "person" who may be sued under § 1983. Id. at 70; Harter v. Vernon, 101 F.3d 334, 338 n.1 (4th Cir. 1996) ("[I]f the Eleventh Amendment applies, the entity or official is not a person under § 1983.").

Accordingly, the undersigned FINDS that WVU, WVUBOG, WVUPD, Wilmoth in his official capacity, and the WVUPD officers in their official capacities are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to Plaintiff's § 1983 claims against them and are likewise not "persons" who may be sued under § 1983.

B. Qualified Immunity

Wilmoth and the WVUPD officers also argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity with respect to Plaintiff's claims against them in their personal capacities. (ECF No. 7 at 11-14.) "Qualified immunity protects officials who commit constitutional violations but who, in light of clearly established law, could reasonably believe that their actions were lawful." Booker v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., 855 F.3d 533, 537-38 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). To determine whether a state official is entitled to qualified immunity, this Court first "identif[ies] the specific right that the plaintiff asserts was infringed by the challenged conduct." Id. at 538 (quoting Winfield v. Bass, 106 F.3d 525, 530 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc)). This Court then considers, in either order, "whether a constitutional violation occurred and whether the right violated was clearly established at the time of the official's conduct." Id. (...