Ford v. Bender

ALBERT FORD, Plaintiff, v. JAMES BENDER, et al., Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 07-11457-JGD

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

August 27, 2015

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S RENEWED MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS

DEIN, U.S.M.J.

I. INTRODUCTION

The First Circuit has remanded this matter for a recalculation of attorneys' fees and costs, consistent with its decision in Ford v. Bender, 768 F.3d 15 (1st Cir. 2014). Consequently, this matter is presently before the court on the "Plaintiff Albert Ford's Motion for Award of Attorneys' Fees and Costs." (Docket No. 249). Pursuant to this motion, plaintiff's counsel is seeking all of its costs ($20,456.36) and two-fifths of the original award of $258,000.00 in fees (i.e., $103,200.00), plus post-judgment interest, on the basis that the plaintiff "remains a prevailing party on two out of the five forms of relief (declaratory judgments, injunctions, and damages) originally granted[.]" (Docket No. 250 at 3). Defendants, in this court's view rather unhelpfully, argue generally that "[a] substantial reduction is in order." (Docket No. 251 at 1).

For the reasons detailed herein, this court finds that plaintiff's proposal is more than generous, and is justified under the lodestar analysis and the PLRA. Lest there be any question, this court finds that the amount requested does not begin to fully compensate court-appointed counsel for the years spent providing the plaintiff with very high quality representation in a highly contentious case involving complex and unsettled questions of constitutional law. Consistent with the defendants' decision not to appeal this court's rulings that they had violated Ford's constitutional rights, the First Circuit left intact this court's findings of fact and rulings of law, and did not reach the merits of the constitutional claims. See Ford v. Bender, 768 F.3d at 28, n.9. Rather, the First Circuit ruled that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because "reasonable officials in the defendants' shoes would not have understood that their actions violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights" as "the law was not clearly established[.]" Id. at 23. Thus, the First Circuit recognized that there was no easy answer to the constitutional issues raised by this litigation. Id. at 24-28. Nevertheless, the Court held that Ford was the "prevailing party" as to two types of relief awarded, and remanded the matter for this court "to determine the appropriate amount of attorneys' fees and costs for these two forms of relief." Id. at 31. As many courts have recognized, "special government immunities that restrict civil rights plaintiffs' recoveries weigh in favor of - and certainly not against - awarding Section 1988 fees." Lefemine v. Wideman, 758 F.3d 551, 557 (4th Cir. 2014), and cases cited. This is such a case.

For the reasons detailed herein and in this court's earlier decision on fees and costs, plaintiff's motion for fees and costs is ALLOWED in its entirety.

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS

The history of this litigation has been well-documented, and need not be repeated here. In addition to the First Circuit's decision, further details can be found in the following decisions: Ford v. Clarke (Ford I), 746 F. Supp. 2d 273 (D. Mass. 2010) (decision on cross motions for summary judgment); Ford v. Bender (Ford II), No. 07-11457, 2010 WL 4781757 (D. Mass. Nov. 16, 2010) (order on summary judgment); Ford v. Bender (Ford III), No. 07-11457, 2012 WL 262532 (D. Mass. Jan. 27, 2012) (post-trial findings of fact and rulings of law); Ford v. Bender (Ford IV); No. 07-11457, 2012 WL 1378651 (D. Mass. Apr. 19, 2012) (ruling on defendants' motion to vacate judgment); and Ford v. Bender (Ford V), 903 F. Supp. 2d 90 (D. Mass. 2012) (award of fees and costs). Therefore, only the facts necessary to put this court's present decision in context will be addressed herein.

In May 2008, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP ("WilmerHale") was appointed to represent the plaintiff Albert Ford, who was incarcerated in the Department Disciplinary Unit ("DDU") at MCI-Cedar Junction as a pretrial detainee, and later as a convicted inmate, without a hearing. In September 2010, summary judgment was entered in Ford's favor on his claim that his detention in the DDU without a hearing violated his constitutional rights. This court entered two declarations in connection with Ford's claims against various defendants, separately addressing his detention "as a pretrialdetainee as punishment for misconduct that occurred while Ford was serving a prior sentence" and his confinement in the DDU as a convicted felon. See Ford II, 2010 WL 4781757 at *1, ¶¶ 2, 3. The First Circuit ruled that Ford is the prevailing party in connection with the declaratory judgment regarding his detention in the DDU as a convicted felon, since he obtained the relief he was seeking and the judgment was not moot when issued. Ford v. Bender, 768 F.3d at 31. See also Diffenderfer v. Gomez-Colon, 587 F.3d 445, 454 (1st Cir. 2009) ("When plaintiffs clearly succeeded in obtaining the relief sought before the district court and an intervening event rendered the case moot on appeal, plaintiffs are still 'prevailing parties' for the purposes of attorney's fees for the district court litigation."). As a result, the First Circuit concluded that Ford is entitled to fees and costs in connection with this relief. Ford v. Bender, 768 F.3d at 31. On the other hand, the Court further ruled that the other declaration, relating to Ford's detention as a pre-trial detainee, was moot when issued. Id.

A three day jury-waived trial on the issue of damages was held in July 2011. This court awarded Ford $47,500 in damages, and injunctive relief (1) declaring his DDU sanction satisfied, and (2) ensuring his access to transitional programming prior to his release from incarceration. The First Circuit subsequently reversed the award of damages on the grounds of qualified immunity. Id. at 19. The Court further found that the declaration that Ford's DDU sanction was satisfied was not only moot when issued but also unnecessary since "the defendants would . . . be flouting the declaratory judgment, now in effect, were they to return Ford to the DDU without a new hearing on the basis ofthe 2003 sanction." Id. at 31 (emphasis added). Finally, the Court ruled that Ford was the prevailing party as to the injunction related to transitional programming. Id.

Following the trial, WilmerHale had filed a motion seeking fees in the amount of $345,542.00 (a significantly reduced amount from the hours actually expended in Ford's defense) and costs in the amount of $20,456.36. For the reasons described in a lengthy and detailed decision, on August 17, 2012, this court ordered that the defendants pay WilmerHale attorneys' fees in the amount of $258,000.00 and costs in the amount of $20,456.36. See Ford V. In calculating the fee award, this court undertook a lodestar analysis, further modified by the limitations imposed by the PLRA. This court reviewed all of the significant court proceedings, carefully scrutinized all of the time records submitted, and awarded only those fees which were necessary and appropriate. As this court concluded in its decision:

Finally, the $258,000 in fees is commensurate with the amount of work needed to bring this case to resolution. The fact discovery was appropriate in scope and necessary to all the legal claims presented. The core issue throughout the case remained the same — whether Ford was appropriately detained in the DDU for years without a hearing for a disciplinary infraction. Although a number of legal theories were proffered, they were all premised on a common nucleus of facts. In addition, there were several rounds of summary judgment pleadings, a three day trial, and extensive post-trial pleadings involving difficult and complex legal issues. Under such circumstances, this court finds the amount of $258,000 to be appropriate.

Ford V, 903 F.2d at 104.

The defendants appealed to the First Circuit. In a decision dated September 24, 2014, the First Circuit reversed in part, vacated in part and, as noted above, remanded the matter for reconsideration of attorneys' fees and costs consistent with its ruling that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity, that certain equitable relief issued by this court was moot when issued, and that Ford was the prevailing party for "two forms of relief" issued by this court - specifically, the declaratory judgment that the plaintiff's procedural due process rights had been violated in 2008 when he was confined "in the DDU without a new hearing as a convicted felon serving a sentence[,]" and the injunctive relief issued by this court ensuring the plaintiff's access to transitional programming for the remainder of his sentence. Ford v. Bender, 768 F. 3d at 19-20, 28, 31. Thus, this court is to assess "the appropriate amount of attorneys' fees and costs for these two forms of relief." Id. at 31.

On remand, WilmerHale filed the instant motion for attorneys fees and costs. As the firm recognized, accurately, the First Circuit did not vacate this court's legal or factual rulings on the merits of Ford's constitutional claims. (See Docket No. 250 at 1). Moreover, as this court had previously determined (and as quoted above), "whether Ford was appropriately detained in the DDU for years without a hearing" remained the "core" issue throughout the litigation, despite the myriad of legal theories presented, and all the issues presented arose out of "a common nucleus of facts." (Id. at 2). WilmerHale further noted that Ford was the "prevailing party" in connection with relief issued as a result of both the summary judgment motions and the trial. (Id. at 1-2). Thus, asWilmerHale noted, an argument could be made that Ford "remains entitled to the fees previously awarded." (Id. at 2).

Nevertheless, the plaintiff recognized "that a decrease in fees may be...