Ford v. City of Myrtle Beach

James Wilburn Ford, as the Personal,Representative for the Estate of Mark Alexander Ford, Plaintiff, v. The City of Myrtle Beach, Myrtle Beach Police Department,Ryan Alvarado, Sandy Eveges, Tammy Taylor, Betty Reitzel,John Doe, and Warren Gall, Defendants.

C/A No. 9:18-cv-00459-SAL

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA

September 8, 2020

OPINION & ORDER

This matter is before the court for review of the Report and Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge Bristow Marchant, made in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.) (the "Report").

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff James Ford, as the Personal Representative of the Estate of Mark Alexander Ford ("Plaintiff"), filed this action against Defendants, alleging constitutional violations as well as two state law causes of action. The claims stem from the death of Mr. Mark Alexander Ford ("Mr. Ford") after he was arrested and detained for public intoxication.

Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on November 25, 2019, Plaintiff filed his response on December 19, 2019, and Defendants filed a reply. [ECF Nos. 42, 46, 47.] On April 23, 2020, the Magistrate Judge issued the Report, recommending that this court grant in part and deny in part Defendants' motion. [ECF No. 52.] More specifically, the Report recommends granting summary judgment on Plaintiff's Second Cause of Action, denying Defendants' motion as to Plaintiff's First, Third, and Fourth Causes of Action, and dismissing Defendant Warren Gall as a party to this case. Id. Additionally, with the consent of Plaintiff, the Report recommends dismissing Defendants Ryan Alvarado and Sandy Eveges as parties to this case. Id.

Attached to the Report was the notice of right to file objections. Defendants filed objections on May 1, 2020, and Plaintiff filed a response. [ECF Nos. 53, 56.] The matter is ripe for consideration by this court.

REVIEW OF A MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT

The Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to this court. The recommendation has no presumptive weight, and the responsibility to make a final determination remains with this court. See Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270-71 (1976). The court is charged with making a de novo determination of only those portions of the Report that have been specifically objected to, and the court may accept, reject, or modify the Report, in whole or in part. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). In the absence of objections, the court is not required to provide an explanation for adopting the Report and must "only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation." Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).

"An objection is specific if it 'enables the district judge to focus attention on those issues—factual and legal—that are at the heart of the parties' dispute.'" Dunlap v. TM Trucking of the Carolinas, LLC, No. 0:15-cv-04009, 2017 WL 6345402, at *5 n.6 (D.S.C. Dec. 12, 2017) (citation omitted). A specific objection "requires more than a reassertion of arguments from the [pleading] or a mere citation to legal authorities." Sims v. Lewis, No. 6:17-cv-3344, 2019 WL 1365298, at *2 (D.S.C. Mar. 26, 2019). It must "direct the court to a specific error in the magistrate's proposed findings and recommendations." Orpiano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1982). Thus, "[i]nthe absence of specific objections . . . this court is not required to give any explanation for adopting the recommendation." Field v. McMaster, 663 F. Supp. 2d 449, 451-52 (4th Cir. 2009).

DISCUSSION

The Report sets forth in detail the relevant facts and standards of law on this matter, and this court incorporates those facts and standards without a recitation.¹ Each objection, however, is addressed in turn below.

I. Objections 1 and 2: Deliberate Indifference to Medical Needs.

Defendants object to the Report's conclusion that the evidence presented was sufficient to create a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether Defendants Betty Reitzel ("Defendant Reitzel") and Tammy Taylor ("Defendant Taylor") knew that a substantial risk of serious harm to Mr. Ford existed, and that they drew that inference. In reaching its conclusion, the Report points to the fact that "Defendants were aware that Ford was in his cell for several hours basically unable to get off his mat on the floor or to even sit up, that he was observed to be 'gray in color', and that during that period of time he was also 'nonsensical.'" [ECF No. 52 at p.9.] Defendants disagree, arguing that "[t]he facts . . . do not show or give rise to an inference that Reitzel and Taylor actually recognized a substantial risk of harm to Ford or that they actually recognized that the actions they took were inappropriate." [ECF No. 53 at p.5.] This court declines to adopt the Report as to Defendant Reitzel and adopts the Report as to Defendant Taylor.

Plaintiff seeks to recover against Defendant Reitzel and Defendant Taylor for violations of his constitutional right to adequate and proper medical care. Because Mr. Ford was a pretrial detainee, Plaintiff's claims are evaluated under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. SeeYoung v. City of Mt. Ranier, 238 F.3d 567, 575 (4th Cir. 2001). For purposes of determining whether Mr. Ford received constitutionally adequate medical care, the standard is essentially the same as for a claim under the Eighth Amendment.

To succeed on an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim, a plaintiff "must show that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). Stated differently, "the Eighth Amendment bars inhumane 'conditions of confinement'—such as depriving an inmate of 'adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care.'" Campbell v. Florian, No. 19-6417, 2020 WL 5014880, at *5 (4th Cir. Aug. 20, 2020) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832)). The claim has two elements—one objective and one subjective.

First, the "deprivation . . . must be, objectively, sufficiently serious; . . . the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis added). The objective prong requires the plaintiff to show that he suffered from a serious medical need, a need "that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention." Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 241 (4th Cir. 2008). This first element is not in dispute. Mr. Ford was suffering from a serious medical need.

Second, the "prison official must have a sufficiently culpable state of mind"—the subjective element. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (internal quotation marks omitted). The subjective prong requires the plaintiff to show that the prison official acted with deliberate indifference. See id. at 835-36. "[D]eliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm to a [plaintiff] is the equivalent of recklessly disregarding that risk." Id. at 836. In this context, acting recklessly means "a person must consciously disregar[d] a substantial risk of serious harm." Id. at 839. While theplaintiff does not have to show that the defendant acted or failed to act "for the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result," he must show "more than mere negligence." Id. at 835.

The Fourth Circuit has recognized deliberate indifference as "a very high standard." Grayson v. Peed, 195 F.3d 682, 695 (4th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). It also requires two showings: (1) the prison official subjectively recognized a risk of substantial harm and (2) he subjectively recognized that his actions were inappropriate in light of that risk. Campbell, 2020 WL 5014880, at *6 (citing Anderson v. Kingsley, 877 F.3d 539, 545 (4th Cir. 2017)) (internal quotation marks omitted). As recognized by the Magistrate Judge, "in order to survive the Defendants' motion for summary judgment, the evidence must be sufficient to create a genuine issue of fact as to whether either named Defendant was deliberately indifferent to Ford's serious medical needs." [ECF No. 52 at p.6.]

Defendants' objections focus on the two subjective requirements of deliberate indifference. [ECF No. 53 at p.5.] Defendants argue that the "facts . . . do not show or give rise to an inference that Reitzel and Taylor actually recognized a substantial risk of harm to Ford or that they actually recognized that the actions they took were inappropriate." Id. Defendants point to the following facts:

• Mr. Ford was arrested for public intoxication and was examined by EMTs before he was placed in an observation cell;

• Defendants Reitzel and Taylor, on separate occasions, asked Mr. Ford if he wanted medical attention, and Mr. Ford declined;

• Following his fall in the observation cell, Mr. Ford was examined and no bruises or wounds were found on him;• Defendant Taylor instructed Mr. Ford to stay on the mat and, on at least one occasion, helped him get back on the mat after he was observed laying on the floor of the cell;

• When they realized Mr. Ford was not improving as he would have, Defendants, also on two separate occasions, notified their supervisor, who then authorized Mr. Ford's transport to the hospital;

• Upon arrival at the hospital, the treating physician's initial observation was that Mr. Ford was suffering from liver disease and hyperammonemia; and

• It was not until after a CAT scan was performed that the doctors discovered an internal hemorrhage.

[ECF No. 53 at pp.5-7.] According to Defendants, these facts are in line with Sixth Circuit and Eleventh Circuit cases, both of which affirmed grants of summary judgment in favor of the defendants in those cases. See Shaver v. Brimfield, 628 F. App'x 378 (6th Cir....