Ford v. Memphis-Shelby Cnty. Schs.

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LUCY KIMBERLY FORD, Plaintiff, v. MEMPHIS-SHELBY COUNTY SCHOOLS A.K.A. SHELBY COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, Defendant.

No. 2:22-cv-02346-TLP-atc

United States District Court, W.D. Tennessee, Western Division

January 21, 2023

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON MOTION TO DISMISS

ANNIE T. CHRISTOFF, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.

Before the Court by order of reference^[1] is Defendant Memphis-Shelby County Schools (“MSCS”) A.K.A. Shelby County Board of Education's Motion to Dismiss, filed June 28 2022. (ECF No. 9.) Pro se Plaintiff Lucy Kimberly Ford filed her response on July 5, 2022. (ECF No. 10.) MSCS filed its reply on July 18, 2022. (ECF No. 12.) For the following reasons, it is recommended that the motion be DENIED.

PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT

Ford submitted a form-filled complaint on June 6, 2022, alleging employment discrimination against MSCS pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17.^[2](ECF No. 1.) She alleges MSCS engaged in acts of retaliation against her as well as acts of sexual discrimination in the form of sexual harassment. (Id. at 4.) She asserts that MSCS “engaged in unlawful employment practices” in violation of Title VII by discriminating against her in several ways “for making Sexual Harassment charges, testifying, assisting, and participating in enforcement proceedings.” (Id. at 7-9.)

Ford describes the incidents giving rise to her claims in the charge-of-discrimination form she filed with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the “EEOC”) on July 28, 2021. (ECF No. 1-1, at 3-4.)^[3]She alleges that MSCS hired her as a teacher in August 2016. (Id. at 3.) On August 21, 2019, “Mr. Paxton, [a] Music Teacher, made an unwelcomed sexual advancement towards [her] in front of [her] students.” (Id.) She filed a complaint with school principal Parchera James, human resources, and her union, requesting that Paxton have no further contact with her. (Id.) During the 2019-20 school year, Ford also requested a reasonable accommodation for her disability-which was not described in the charging document-but James denied that request. (Id.)

For the 2020-21 school year James assigned Paxton as Ford's music teacher, causing Ford emotional stress and creating what she describes as a hostile work environment. (Id.) Though she filed another complaint after this assignment, no action was taken. (Id.) In May 2021, Ford told another teacher that she was interested in a training program. (Id.) The same month, James told her she was no longer a lead teacher and did not select her for training, without explaining either decision. (Id.)

In her complaint, Ford alleges that MSCS violated Title VII in multiple ways.^[4] First, she asserts that MSCS misled her and the “Memphis Shelby County Association (M-SECA) that Plaintiff's Sexual Harassment complaint had been investigated, thereby failing to enforce Local, State and Federal policies,” consistent with its lawful responsibilities. (ECF No. 1, at 7.) Next, she asserts that MSCS “failed to exercise reasonable care to prevent and promptly correct the unlawful conduct of its Agents and Supervisory employee's discriminatory and retaliatory behavior of creating a hostile work environment” and “forced her to work with the co-worker who committed the original Sexual Harassment violation against” her. (Id.) She also alleges that MSCS wrongfully downgraded her performance reports, denied her professional development and training opportunities, and denied her an opportunity to teach during the summer. (Id. at 8.) Finally, she asserts that MSCS acted unlawfully when it failed to correct its agents and supervisors when they conspired to deprive her “of protections afforded by the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, OSHA Safety Protocols for Workplace, and [failed] to follow guidelines for COVID-19 Contract Tracing and quarantined,” as “required under the SCS and CDC Public School Re-Entry protocol(s).” (Id. at 9.) Ford lists several dates on which she alleges the discriminatory acts took place: in August and October 2019, two times in April 2021 in May and October 2021, and in May 2022. (Id. at 4.)

On March 28, 2022, the EEOC issued Ford a determination and notice of rights letter. (ECF No. 1-1.) The EEOC informed Ford that it would “not proceed further with its investigation and makes no determination about whether further investigation would establish violations of the statute.” (Id. at 1.) It informed Ford that her right to sue would be lost if she did not file a lawsuit within ninety days of her receipt of the letter. (Id.)

MSCS seeks to dismiss Ford's complaint on multiple grounds. First, it asserts that Ford's claims are either partially or completely time-barred under both Title VII and the THRA. (ECF No. 9-1, at 2.) Next, it asserts that Ford has failed to plead the elements of a sex discrimination claim, including that one of her similarly situated colleagues was treated differently than she was. (Id.) Finally, MSCS contends that Ford's retaliation claim is so sparsely pled that it cannot be said to put MSCS on notice of the basis of her claim. (Id.)

PROPOSED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

I. Standard of Review for Failure to State a Claim

To determine whether Plaintiff's complaint states a claim on which relief may be granted, the Court applies the standards under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), as articulated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, in order to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal citations and quotations omitted). The Court “construes the complaint in a light most favorable to [the] plaintiff” and “accepts all factual allegations as true” to determine whether they plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief. HDC, LLC v. City of Ann Arbor, 675 F.3d 608, 611 (6th Cir. 2012). Pleadings provide facial plausibility when they present “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. However, “pleadings that . . . are no more than conclusions[] are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.” Id. at 679; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3 (“Rule 8(a)(2) still requires a ‘showing,' rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief. Without some factual allegation in the complaint, it is hard to see how a claimant could satisfy the requirement of providing not only ‘fair notice' of the nature of the claim, but also ‘grounds' on which the claim rests.”).

“[A] pleading filed pro se is to be liberally construed and held to less stringent standards than a pleading filed by counsel.” Kondaur Cap. Corp. v. Smith, 802 Fed.Appx. 938, 945 (6th Cir. 2020) (citing Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)); see also Vandiver v. Vasbinder, 416 Fed.Appx. 560, 562 (6th Cir. 2011) (finding the less stringent standard applies to pro se complaints, “however inartfully pleaded”). Nevertheless, pro se litigants “are not exempt from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Wright v. Penguin Random House, 783 Fed.Appx. 578, 581 (6th Cir. 2019) (citing Fox v. Mich. State Police Dep't, 173 Fed.Appx. 372, 376 (6th Cir. 2006)); see also Young Bok Song v. Gipson, 423 Fed.Appx. 506, 510 (6th Cir. 2011) (“[W]e decline to affirmatively require courts to ferret out the strongest cause of action on behalf of pro se litigants. Not only would that duty be overly burdensome, it would transform the courts from neutral arbiters of disputes into advocates for a particular party. While courts are properly charged with protecting the rights of all who come before it, that responsibility does not encompass advising litigants as to what legal theories they should pursue.”); Brown v. Matauszak, 415 Fed.Appx. 608, 613 (6th Cir. 2011) (“[A] court cannot ‘create a claim which a plaintiff has not spelled out in his pleading.'”) (quoting Clark v. Nat'l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975)).

II. The Timeliness of Ford's Claims Under Title VII and the THRA

MSCS asserts that the unwelcome sexual advancement Ford alleges in her complaint took place on August 21, 2019, but she did not file her charge of discrimination with the EEOC until July 28, 2021, more than 700 days later, rendering her Title VII claim untimely as to that claim. (ECF No. 9-1, at 4-5.) In fact, MSCS asserts that “any Title VII claims based on alleged incidents occurring prior to October 1, 2020 (300 days prior to Ms. Ford filing her EEOC Charge) . . . are time-barred and must be dismissed.” (Id. at 5.) Ford appears to confront these arguments by referencing “her compliance with timelines requirements mandated in the Defendant's human resources harassment policy governing sex discrimination complaints.” (ECF No. 10, at 2.)

“Before a plaintiff alleging discrimination under Title VII can bring suit in federal court, she must satisfy two administrative prerequisites: ‘(1) by filing timely charges of employment discrimination with the EEOC, and (2) receiving and acting upon the EEOC's statutory notices of the right to sue.'” Nichols v. Muskingum Coll., 318 F.3d 674, 677 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Puckett v. Tenn Eastman Co., 889 F.2d 1481, 1486 (6th Cir. 1989)). “The statute requires that an aggrieved individual file a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission . . . within 300 days ‘after the alleged unlawful...