Foreman v. State

903 S.E.2d 303

FOREMAN

v.The STATE.

Hallett

v.The State.

A24A0411

A24A0412

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

June 14, 2024

Adrian Lopez Patrick, for Appellant.

Cheryl Banks Hightower, Louie Craig Fraser, Dublin, for Appellee.

Barnes, Presiding Judge.

In these consolidated appeals, Jamal Ramon Foreman and Byron DeShawn Hallett (collectively, "Appellants") each appeal from a trial court order denying their respective motions for a plea in bar as to charges brought against them in 2017. Both Foreman and Hallett assert that the trial court erred in finding that the State had not violated their constitutional rights to a speedy trial. They further contend that the court erred in concluding their prosecutions were not barred by the applicable statutes of limitation. For reasons explained more fully below, we find that the trial court committed legal error in analyzing the Appellants’ speedy trial claims. We further find that the trial court’s order fails entirely to address the Appellants’ statute of limitation argument. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s orders and remand these cases for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The appellate records show that both Foreman and Hallett were employed by the Georgia Department of Corrections as officers at Johnson State Prison. In late autumn of 2017, both men were arrested on charges related to the alleged abuse of inmates under their supervision. Approximately seven months later, on June 18, 2018, both Appellants, as well as nine of their coworkers, were indicted for the crimes that had led to their arrests.¹ The charges against Foreman included one count of violating his oath as a public officer, five counts of simple battery, and one count of making a false statement to a law enforcement officer. The charges against Hallett were substantially similar, and included one count of violation of his oath as a public officer, four counts of simple battery, and a single count each of influencing a witness and making a false statement to a law enforcement officer.

Shortly after the indictments issued, one of the Appellants’ co-defendants, Wesley O’Neal,² filed a motion to quash the indictment against him, arguing that the State had failed to comply with OCGA § 17-7-52.³ See State v. O’Neal, 352 Ga. App. 228, 834 S.E.2d 317 (2019). Shortly thereafter, Foreman filed a motion to quash that was virtually identical to that filed by O’Neal.⁴ On October 2, 2018, while Foreman’s motion to dismiss was pending, the trial court granted O’Neal’s motion and quashed all counts of the indictment against him. Id. at 230, 834 S.E.2d 317. The State filed a notice of appeal as to that order on October 18.

One week after the State filed its appeal in O’Neal’s case, the trial court held a calendar call as to the remaining 10 defendants. At that hearing, the trial court continued any proceedings in the remaining cases, including any hearings on the pending motions to quash, until after the appeal. The attorney who then represented Hallett⁵ had filed a request for continuance, and the court therefore noted that Hallett’s case was "continued by the defense." There is no evidence, however, that Foreman ever requested a continuance, and it appears his case was continued by the court, without any input from Foreman. While the O’Neal appeal was pending, Hallett filed a motion to quash the indictment against him.

In October 2019, this Court issued an opinion affirming in part and reversing in part the trial court’s order quashing the O’Neal indictment. O’Neal, 352 Ga. App. at 228, 834 S.E.2d 317. We concluded that the trial court did not err in quashing the indictment as to the charge that O’Neal violated his oath of office because O’Neal had not been provided with notice and an opportunity to be heard, as required by OCGA § 17-7-52. Id. at 231, 834 S.E.2d 317. We further concluded, however, that the remaining charges against O’Neal (battery and making a false statement), did not implicate OCGA § 17-7-52 because the indictment did not allege that O'Neal was in the performance of his duties as a corrections officer when he committed those offenses. Id. at 231-232, 834 S.E.2d 317. The Supreme Court of Georgia subsequently denied the State’s petition for writ of certiorari, State v. O'Neal, Case No. SC20C0418 (April 20, 2020), and the remittitur was issued in July 2020. At that time, the State’s courts were operating under a judicial emergency order issued in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic.⁶

The record indicates that no action was taken in the case for almost a year following remittitur. On June 24, 2021, shortly before the expiration of the pandemic emergency order, Foreman filed a statutory speedy trial demand. The State, however, made no effort to proceed with the prosecution. In February 2022, both Freeman and Hallett filed a general demurrer to the indictments against them and moved to adopt the briefs and other pleadings filed on this issue by another co-defendant. A month later, in March 2022, the trial court held a hearing in the case and orally granted the Appellants’ motion to adopt their co-defendant’s pleadings as to the general demurrer.⁷ At that hearing, counsel for the Appellants’ asked when the State anticipated going to trial. The State responded that it planned to seek new indictments, which it anticipated would be coming forth in April 2022, meaning the Appellants could be arraigned in May.

In July 2022, after four more months passed without the State taking any further action in the case, the Appellants filed the pleas in bar currently at issue. In support of their respective motions, both Appellants argued that the delay caused by the State’s failure to act in the case constituted a violation of their constitutional right to a speedy trial and that their prosecution was barred by the State’s failure to obtain a valid indictment within the statute of limitations. The trial court held a calendar call on October 19, 2022, at which it orally granted the motion to dismiss the counts in each indictment charging a violation of the oath of a public officer on the grounds that the State had failed to properly indict that count within the applicable statute of limitations. The court also orally denied the motion to dismiss all remaining counts of the indictment, finding that no constitutional speedy trial violation had occurred, and stating, "I’m satisfied and I do find that all of the parties involved agreed to wait for … a determination by the Court of Appeals in Mr. [O’Neal’s] case …."

Three months later, on January 10, 2023, the trial court entered written orders denying each Appellant’s plea in bar. Although entered separately, the orders were substantively identical and found that no constitutional speedy trial violation had occurred. Notably, neither order addressed the argument that the prosecution was barred by the applicable statutes of limitation. Nor did the orders reflect the trial court’s oral ruling dismissing those counts of the indictments alleging violation of an oath of a public officer.

Following entry of the orders, the Appellants obtained certificates of immediate review, and each filed an application for interlocutory appeal. This Court granted both applications, and these appeals followed.

[1, 2] 1. Appellants assert that the trial court erred in finding that the State had not violated their constitutional right to a speedy trial. In analyzing a defendant’s claim that he has been denied a speedy trial, a trial court must apply the two-part test set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U. S. 514, 530-533 (IV), 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972) and Doggett v. United States, 505 U. S. 647, 651-658 (II)-(III), 112 S.Ct. 2686, 120 L.Ed.2d 520 (1992). Under that test, the trial court must first determine "whether the length of time between the defendant’s arrest and trial is sufficiently long to be considered ‘presumptively prejudicial.’ " (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Redding v. State, 313 Ga. 730, 732 (2), 873 S.E.2d 158 (2022). If the delay is insufficient to give rise to presumptive prejudice, "the speedy-trial claim fails at the threshold." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id.

[3–5] The existence of presumptive prejudice, however, requires the trial court to proceed to the second part of the speedy-trial framework. At this stage, the court applies "a context-focused, four-factor balancing test to determine whether the defendant was denied the right to a speedy trial." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Redding, 313 Ga. at 732 (2), 873 S.E.2d 158. See also Jenkins v. State, 294 Ga. 506, 513 (2) (c), 755 S.E.2d 138 (2014) ("This test compels the examining court to consider and weigh all four factors in the context of the particular circumstances of the case at issue.") "This second part of the speedy-trial analysis requires courts to engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing process and necessarily compels them to approach speedy-trial cases on an ad hoc basis." Redding, 313 Ga. at 732 (2), 873 S.E.2d 158 (Citation and punctuation omitted.) In applying this test, courts must be aware that "no single factor is necessary or sufficient to sustain a speedy trial claim[.]" (Citation and punctuation omitted.) State v. Adams, 364 Ga. App. 864, 865, 876 S.E.2d 719 (2022). Put another way, none of the four factors have any "talismanic qualities and [they] must be considered together with such other circumstances as may be relevant in light of the animating principles of the speedy trial guarantee." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Durham v. State, 355 Ga. App. 426, 428 (1), 844 S.E.2d 499 (2020).

a. Presumptive prejudice.

[6–8] "The right to a speedy trial attaches at the time of arrest or formal accusation or indictment, whichever occurs first, and the courts measure the delay from the time the right attaches." Williams v. State, 362 Ga. App. 383, 385 (a), 867 S.E.2d 819 (2022). "That time then runs until the date on which the defendant’s trial begins."...