Forrest v. Cnty. of Greene

1

TAYLOR FORREST et al., Plaintiffs, v. COUNTY OF GREENE et al., Defendants.

No. 1:22-cv-276 (GLS/ML)

United States District Court, N.D. New York

June 7, 2023

MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER

GARY L. SHARPE, SENIOR DISTRICT JUDGE

I. Introduction

Plaintiffs Taylor Forrest and Jimmy Diresta commenced this action against defendants County of Greene, Sheriff of Greene County, Meghan Downey, Charles Cole II, and Peter Kusminsky in their individual and official capacities, for violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Article I, Section 12 of the New York Constitution, and New York State law. (Am. Compl., Dkt. No. 12.) Pending before the court is a motion to dismiss the amended complaint filed by the County, Sheriff of Greene County, and Peter Kusminsky (hereinafter, collectively referred to as “the Moving Defendants”). (Dkt. No. 16.) For the reasons that follow, the Moving Defendants' motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied in part.

II. Background

A. Facts^[1]

On March 28, 2021, at or around 1:44 A.M., Forrest was operating a vehicle, owned by Diresta, at or near Route 23 and Route 32 near the Town of Cairo, New York. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 34, 35.) Diresta was a passenger in the vehicle. (Id. ¶ 36.) At the relevant time, Downey and Cole conducted a traffic stop, pulling the vehicle driven by Forrest over to the side of the road. (Id. ¶ 37.) The events at issue were recorded. (Id. ¶¶ 54-55.) As depicted in the videos, Downey, after walking to the driver's side window of the vehicle, informed plaintiffs that “I am pulling you over for your plate lamp, you have a plate lamp out.” (Id. at Ex. 1.^[2]) Downey then requested that Forrest turn over her driver's license and the vehicle's registration. (Id. ¶ 45.) In response, Diresta asked if he could “get out of the car to check the plate lamp” to which Downey replied “sure.” (Id. at Ex. 1.) Diresta exited the vehicle and walked towards the back of the vehicle, where Cole was standing. (Id.) After looking at the plate lamp, which appeared to be functioning properly, Diresta re-entered the vehicle and exclaimed: “the plate lamp is not out!” (Id.)

Downey took Forrest's driver's license and the vehicle's registration, (id. ¶ 45); after approximately one minute and thirty seconds, Downey walked back to the driver's side of the vehicle to return the documents, (id. at Ex. 1). Downey apologized and informed plaintiffs that the stop was an “error.” (Id.) Plaintiffs proceeded to argue with Downey about the circumstances of the stop and requested the badge numbers of both Downey and Cole. (Id.) Plaintiffs insisted that the stop was “for no reason,” to which Downey again apologized and stated that “errors happen” before walking back to her patrol vehicle. (Id.)

A few weeks later, on June 19, 2021, at approximately 2:00 A.M., Downey and Cole entered on to Diresta's property in a police patrol vehicle. (Id. ¶ 56.) Diresta recorded part of the events at issue.^[3] (Id. ¶¶ 64-65.) Cole walked up to the entrance of a structure on Diresta's property, a large garage-style door, which was open. (Id. at Ex. 1.) Diresta, holding a camera, immediately confronted Cole, who was standing outside of the garage-style door, and stated “please don't come in, just stay there.” (Id.) Cole remained outside of the structure and responded “I just saw the door open, so I wanted to come check and make sure everything was okay, I never see it open this late.” (Id.) Diresta told Cole that everything was “great” and Cole responded “no problem, have a good night sir” and proceeded to walk back towards his patrol vehicle. (Id.)

Diresta exited the structure, following Cole towards his patrol vehicle, and noticed Downey was sitting in the passenger seat. (Id.) Downey rolled down the passenger-side window and greeted Diresta, to which Diresta responded, “remember you lied to me about my licence plate? You pulled us over.” (Id.) Downey stated “sir, I apologize, it was a mistake,” and Cole drove the vehicle off of Diresta's property. (Id.)

B. Procedural History

Plaintiffs commenced this action on February 28, 2022, in New York State Supreme Court in Greene County. (Dkt. No. 2.) The action was removed to this court. (Dkt. No. 1.) Defendants then filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. (Dkt. No. 5.) Shortly thereafter, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint asserting the following causes of action: 1) unlawful search and seizure under New York State law against all defendants; 2) unlawful search and seizure under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Kusminsky, Downey, and Cole (hereinafter, referred to collectively as “the Individual Defendants”); 3) false arrest and false imprisonment under New York State law against all defendants; 4) false arrest and false imprisonment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Individual Defendants; 5) failure to intervene under New York State law against all defendants^[4]; 6) failure to intervene under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Individual Defendants; 7) negligent hiring, training, retention, and supervision under New York State law against the County and Sheriff of Greene County; 8) negligent training and supervision under New York State law against the County and Sheriff of Greene County; and, 9) municipal “ Monell” liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the County and the Sheriff of Greene County. (Dkt. No. 12.) Moving Defendants now seek dismissal of the amended complaint. (Dkt. No. 16.)^[5]

Moving Defendants moved to dismiss, (Dkt. No. 16), which motion is now pending before this court, and Downey and Cole answered, (Dkt. No. 17).

III. Standard of Review

The standard of review under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) is well settled and will not be repeated here. For a full discussion of the governing standard, the court refers the parties to its prior decision in Ellis v. Cohen & Slamowitz, LLP, 701 F.Supp.2d 215, 218 (N.D.N.Y. 2010), abrogated on other grounds by Altman v. J.C. Christensen & Assocs., Inc., 786 F.3d 191 (2d Cir. 2015).

IV. Discussion

A. Claims Against the Sheriff of Greene County

Moving Defendants seek dismissal of plaintiffs' claims against the Sheriff of Greene County^[6] because such an agency is a subdivision of the County of Greene, and does not have a legal identity separate and apart from the municipality, so it is, therefore, as Moving Defendants assert, not amendable to suit. (Dkt. No. 16, Attach. 2 at 2-3.) Plaintiffs briefly address this issue, arguing that Moving Defendants “fail[ed] to submit a verified answer or an affidavit of a person with knowledge of the facts who can attest to the fact that the defendant Sheriff of Greene County is not an independent entity” and “fail[ed] to cite any statutory authority stating the Sheriff of Greene County is not an independent entity.” (Dkt. No. 18, Attach. 1 at 22.)

Federal courts apply state law to determine whether an entity has capacity to be sued. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 17(b). “Under New York law, a county is a municipal corporation capable of bringing suit and being sued.” Baker v. Willett, 42 F.Supp.2d 192, 198 (N.D.N.Y. 1999) (citing N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 2)). However, a sheriff's department or a police department is an administrative arm of the municipal corporation and does not have a separate identity from the municipality. See id.; Long v. City of Orleans, 540 F.Supp.3d 344, 350 (W.D.N.Y. 2021). Because a sheriff's department “does not exist separate and apart from the municipality and does not have its own legal identity,” it cannot sue or be sued. Baker, 42 F.Supp.2d at 198. See Jenkins v. Onondaga Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, No. 5:12-CV-855, 2012 WL 4491134, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. June 28, 2012) (“[U]nder New York law, departments, like the Onondaga County Sheriff's Department, that are merely administrative arms of a municipality, do not have a legal identity separate from the municipality and may not sue or be sued.”).

The amended complaint explicitly alleges that the Sheriff of Greene County is a “department,” “bureau,” “office,” “unit,” and “subdivision” of the County (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 5-9), and lacks factual allegations to support that it is an independent entity. Therefore, all claims asserted against the Sheriff of Greene County are dismissed because it is not amendable to suit.

B. Monell Liability

Moving Defendants contend that the Monell claim should be dismissed because the amended complaint only contains “boilerplate language” that does not provide specific information or factual allegations sufficient to support it. (Dkt. No. 16, Attach. 2 at 5-8.) Additionally, Moving Defendants argue that plaintiffs did not identify a specific policy, procedure, or custom, which is required to properly state a Monell claim. (Id. at 7.) The only incidents alleged in support of an inference that an unconstitutional policy, custom, or practice promulgated by the County exists, Moving Defendants argue, are the isolated events of this case, which cannot establish municipal liability. (Id. at 6-8.)

Plaintiffs respond by arguing two theories in support of their Monell claim: 1) “a practice so persistent and widespread, or permanent and well settled, as to constitute a custom or usage with force of law and to imply the constructive knowledge of policymaking officials,” otherwise known as a de facto policy; and 2) “by a failure to train or supervise subordinates amounting to deliberate indifference to the [rights] of those with whom the municipalities [sic] employees come into contact.” (Dkt. No. 18, Attach. 1 at 18-19.) In the amended complaint, plaintiffs also allege that the County acted with “deliberate indifference,” which is a third theory upon which Monell liability may be founded. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 155, 161.) Plaintiffs support these theories with a comment made by Diresta to Forrest in...