Fort Yates Pub. Sch. Dist. # 4 v. Murphy

786 F.3d 662

FORT YATES PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICT # 4, Plaintiff–Appellant

v.Jamie MURPHY, for C.M.B. (a minor);

Standing Rock Sioux Tribal Court, Defendants–Appellees.

Fort Yates Public School District # 4, Plaintiff–Appellee

v.Jamie Murphy, for C.M.B. (a minor), Defendant–Appellant

Standing Rock Sioux Tribal Court, Defendant.

Nos. 14–1549

14–1702.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: Dec. 10, 2014.

Filed: May 15, 2015.

Rachel Bruner–Kaufman, argued, Jonathan P. Sanstead, on the brief, Bismarck, ND, for appellant/cross-appellee in 14–1549 and 14–1702.

Constantinos DePountis, argued, Christopher Glenn Lindblad, on the brief, Fort Yates, ND, for appellee, Standing Rock Sioux Tribal Court in 14–1549.

Chad Christopher Nodland, argued and on the brief, Bismarck, ND, for appellee /cross-appellant, Jamie Murphy in 14–1549 and 14–1702.

Before BYE, SMITH, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.

Opinion

SMITH, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff–Appellant Fort Yates Public School District # 4 (“School District”) brought an action against Defendant–Appellees “Jamie Murphy for C.M.B. (a minor)” and the Standing Rock Sioux Tribal Court (“Tribal Court”), seeking (1) a declaration that the Tribal Court lacks jurisdiction over claims that Murphy filed against the School District in Tribal Court, and (2) injunctions prohibiting the prosecution of the claims in Tribal Court. The district court dismissed the Tribal Court on sovereign immunity grounds. Later, the district court dismissed the entire case on the grounds that the Tribal Court had jurisdiction. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm in part and reverse in part.

I. Background

The School District is a political subdivision of the State of North Dakota, Bismarck Public School District # 1 v. State By and Through North Dakota Legislative Assembly, 511 N.W.2d 247, 251 (N.D.1994), that operates within the exterior boundaries of the Standing Rock Indian Reservation (“Reservation”). The Constitution of North Dakota requires that the School District provide education to all children in the State of North Dakota, including children who are Indians or reside on reservations. N.D. Const. art. VIII, § 1 (“[P]ublic schools [ ] shall be open to all children of the state of North Dakota....”).

In 2003, the School District and the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe (“Tribe”) entered into a Joint Powers Agreement (“Agreement”) to “combine the educational, social, cultural and physical opportunities of all K–12 students” who attend schools on the Reservation regardless of Indian heritage.¹ The Agreement provided that both the Standing Rock Community School Board and the Fort Yates School Board would govern the school system. It also provided that all “real property or equipment” purchased under the Agreement would generally be “joint property” of the Tribe and School District.² The Agreement made clear that “[e]ach of the parties recognize[s] the sovereignty of the other. In executing the Agreement, no party waive[s] any rights, including treaty rights, immunities, including sovereign immunities, or jurisdiction. This Agreement neither diminishes nor expands rights or protections afforded other persons or entities under tribal, state or federal law.”

A fight between C.M.B. and A.K., two students at a school subject to the Agreement, triggered the dispute at the heart of this litigation. After the altercation, the school suspended A.K. for ten days, and C.M.B. obtained a restraining order against A.K. A.K. allegedly violated the restraining order several months later by verbally harassing C.M.B. at the school. In response, the school suspended A.K. for ten additional days.

Jamie Murphy filed suit on behalf of her daughter, C.M.B., a Tribe member, in the Tribal Court against the School District, alleging a breach of its duty to provide a safe learning environment, negligent hiring and training, failure to respect a Tribal Court order, and failure to restrain a known violent student. The School District moved to dismiss the action on the grounds that the Tribal Court lacked jurisdiction over the School District. The Tribal Court denied the motion, concluding that it had jurisdiction.

The School District did not appeal the Tribal Court's decision to the Standing Rock Supreme Court; instead, it filed the instant suit in federal court against “Jamie Murphy for C.M.B. (a minor)” (the named party pursuing the Tribal Court action) and the Tribal Court, seeking (1) a declaration that the Tribal Court lacks jurisdiction to decide Murphy's claims, and (2) an injunction prohibiting prosecution of the claims before the Tribal Court. The district court granted a temporary restraining order prohibiting Murphy from prosecuting her claims before the Tribal Court. The district court dismissed the Tribal Court from the case, however, finding sua sponte that the Tribal Court had sovereign immunity.

Murphy then moved to dismiss the action on the grounds that “she [was] not an appropriate party to this action on an individual basis, nor can she appear on behalf of C.M.B.... as C.M.B. is no longer a minor and was an adult at the time this action was initiated.” The case was thereafter reassigned to a new judge. Upon review, the district court concluded that the Tribal Court did have jurisdiction to resolve Murphy's suit against the school district and dismissed and remanded the case to the Tribal Court. In finding that jurisdiction lay with the Tribal Court, the district court found inapplicable the United States Supreme Court's decision in Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 101 S.Ct. 1245, 67 L.Ed.2d 493 (1981). The court further concluded that, even if Montana were applicable, the Tribal Court would nevertheless have jurisdiction because the School District entered into the Agreement with the Tribe. Because the court dismissed the case on these grounds, it also dismissed Murphy's motion to dismiss as moot.

II. Discussion

A. Tribal Court Jurisdiction

The School District argues on appeal that the district court erred in finding that the Tribal Court had jurisdiction over Murphy's claims. “The extent of tribal court subject matter jurisdiction over claims against nonmembers of the Tribe is a question of federal law which we review de novo.” Attorney's Process & Investigation Servs., Inc. v. Sac & Fox Tribe of Miss. in Iowa, 609 F.3d 927, 934 (8th Cir.2010) (citation omitted).

No federal statute or treaty specifically provides the Tribal Court with jurisdiction over the claims at issue in this case; therefore, the Tribal Court's jurisdiction must stem from its “retained or inherent sovereignty.” Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 649–50, 121 S.Ct. 1825, 149 L.Ed.2d 889 (2001). We analyze the contours of a tribal court's inherent jurisdiction over nonmembers of the tribe within the framework and principles set forth in Montana, which remains the “ ‘pathmarking case’ ” on the subject. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 358, 121 S.Ct. 2304, 150 L.Ed.2d 398 (2001) (quoting Strate v. A–1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 445, 117 S.Ct. 1404, 137 L.Ed.2d 661 (1997) ). In Montana, the Supreme Court addressed whether a tribe could prohibit hunting and fishing activities by non-Indians on reservation land owned in fee simple by non-Indians. As a general matter, the Court held, “the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of non members of the tribe.”

450 U.S. at 565, 101 S.Ct. 1245 (emphases added). The Court then noted, however, two relatively narrow exceptions to this general rule:

To be sure, Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign power to exercise some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservations, even on non-Indian fee lands. A tribe may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other means, the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements. A tribe may also retain inherent power to exercise civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.

Id. at 565–66, 101 S.Ct. 1245 (emphases added) (internal citations omitted).³ Indian tribes may regulate these two categories of nonmember conduct (that is, activities of nonmembers who enter into consensual relationships with the tribe or activities that threaten the tribe), which are referred to as the “Montana exceptions.” The Court in Montana ultimately found that neither exception provided the Tribe with jurisdiction over non-Indians' hunting and fishing on non-Indian land. Id. at 566, 101 S.Ct. 1245.

Given the general rule set forth and applied in Montana —that a tribe's inherent sovereign powers do not vest it with jurisdiction over the activities of nonmembers—the Tribal Court presumably does not have jurisdiction over the claims asserted in this case. “The burden rests on the tribe” members to establish that one of the Montana exceptions applies. Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 330, 128 S.Ct. 2709, 171 L.Ed.2d 457 (2008).

1. First Montana Exception

The School District entered into the Agreement with the Tribe to provide administrative and educational services for students, both Indian and non-Indian, residing on the Reservation. Although it is a consensual arrangement, this Agreement, alone, does not confer jurisdiction on the Tribal Court under the first Montana exception because North Dakota law restricts state school districts' contractual authority. North Dakota law specifies that a school district cannot “[a]uthorize an agreement that enlarges or diminishes the jurisdiction over civil or criminal matters that may be exercised by ... tribal governments located in North Dakota.” N.D. Cent.Code § 54–40.2–08. The agreements evince nothing indicating that the School District intended to, or represented that it...