Foster v. Raspberry

652 F.Supp.2d 1342

Gail FOSTER, Individually and as Natural Parent of M.K., a Minor Child, Plaintiff, v. Sidney RASPBERRY, Individually and in his Official Capacity as a Teacher and Employee of Randolph County School District, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 4:08-CV-123 (CDL).

United States District Court, M.D. Georgia, Columbus Division.

July 29, 2009.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

John Cromer Durham, Cuthbert, GA, Julee Brooke Lewis, Douglas, GA, for Plaintiff.

John M. Stephenson, Albany, GA, for Defendants.

ORDER

CLAY D. LAND, District Judge.

This action arises from the alleged strip search of high school student Maci King over a missing iPod. Plaintiff, King's mother, contends that the search was a violation of King's Fourth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution and asserts a federal claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("§ 1983"). Plaintiff also asserts state law claims of assault, battery, false imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Defendants contend that they are entitled to summary judgment as to all of Plaintiff's claims. Presently pending before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 18). For the following reasons, Defendants' motion is granted in part and denied in part.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment may be granted only "if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). When a movant moves for summary judgment, it is the movant's burden to show that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). To meet this burden, the movant may point to "affirmative evidence demonstrating that the non-moving party will be unable to prove its case at trial." Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1116 (11th Cir.1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). In the alternative, the movant may show "that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548. A movant is not required to come forth with evidence negating the nonmovant's claim. See id.

Once a movant meets its burden, the nonmoving party must produce evidence to show that there is a genuine issue of material fact. See id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The nonmoving party must "go beyond the pleadings," id., and point to "specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial," Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(e)(2); accord Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. A nonmovant is not required to produce evidence in a form that would be admissible at trial, but he or she must point to some evidence to show a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Such evidence may be in the form of affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories, or admissions on file. Id. The movant is entitled to summary judgment if, after construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and drawing all justifiable inferences in his or her favor, no genuine issues of material fact remain to be tried. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

It is not enough to have some alleged factual dispute; there must be a genuine issue of material fact to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505. A fact is material if it is relevant or necessary to the outcome of the suit. Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. A factual dispute is genuine if the evidence would allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmovant—there must be more than "some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); accord Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND¹

I. The iPod

On November 26, 2007, seven students attended Defendant Sidney Raspberry's junior ROTC class at Randolph-Clay High School. They were Maci King ("King"), Kuonteisha Thomas ("Thomas"), Lashondra Williams ("Williams"), Tiara Starling ("Tiara"), Tish Starling ("Tish"), Darius Small ("Small"), and Marquavis James ("James"). (Defs.' [M.D. Ga. R.] 56 Statement of Material Fact[s] on Which There [Are] No[] Genuine Issue[s] to Be Tried [hereinafter SOF] ¶ 1.) At least one of these students, King, possessed the ubiquitous teenage accessories-an iPod and a cell phone. Regrettably, she apparently could not part with them during the school day and brought them into the classroom, which was a violation of school policy. (Id. ¶ 2; see Defs.' Ex. 1 to Kellogg Dep., Feb. 17, 2009, Randolph-Clay High Sch. Parent & Student Handbook 2007-08 at 10; id. at 31 ("Pocket Pagers, cellular phones or electronic communication devices are not permitted on school property during the regular school day and at all school-sponsored activities.").) King compounded her error in judgment when she unselfishly permitted Tiara to retrieve the iPod from King's book bag. Finding the temptation irresistible, Tiara began listening to the iPod, which led to the predictable accompanying dance around the classroom. (SOF ¶ 4.) Unfortunately for Tiara (and eventually for King), Raspberry, who was in his side office doing some paperwork, observed Tiara dancing around the class-room. He confiscated the iPod from her and placed it in the center drawer of his desk in his side office. (Id. ¶ 5.)

Some time later during the class, Raspberry excused himself to use the restroom, providing the opportunity for further mischief involving the tempting iPod. When the coast was clear, another student in the class, Thomas, deftly retrieved the contraband iPod from Raspberry's desk drawer. (Id. ¶ 6.) Upon returning from the restroom, Raspberry opened his desk drawer and noticed that the iPod was missing. (Id. ¶ 8.) Raspberry first attempted to reason with his seven-member class to return the iPod but to no avail. Recognizing the apparent need for reinforcements, Raspberry called the front desk for assistance. (Id.)

Shortly thereafter, the reinforcements arrived: Defendant Eddie Sullivan, the school's resource officer/security guard, entered the classroom and demanded that the students identify the culprit. No one talked, and the situation escalated. (Id. ¶ 9.) Defendant Tyrone Kellogg, the assistant principal in charge of discipline, and Defendant Mary Perryman, Kellogg's discipline secretary, next arrived on the scene. (Id. ¶ 10.) Apparently recognizing that the matter had proceeded over their heads, Sullivan left the classroom and Raspberry returned to his office, leaving Kellogg and Perryman to break the high school code of silence and locate the missing iPod. (Id.) Kellogg first gave the students an opportunity to confess or at least "rat out" the culprit. Either out of loyalty or fear, the students remained steadfast in their silence. (Id.) The investigation then shifted into high gear. With interrogation failing to achieve the desired result, the school officials moved forward with a more aggressive physical search for the missing iPod.

II. The Search

Apparently having no idea who had the iPod, Kellogg initially instructed everyone in the classroom to open their book bags, pull out their pockets, and untuck their shirts. (Id. ¶ 11.) That general search yielded a cell phone in King's possession, but no iPod. (Id.) The general search did weaken the resolve of one student, however, who decided to come clean. After the search, Tish confided in Kellogg in the hallway that Thomas had taken the iPod. (Id. ¶ 12.) Hot on the trail of the contraband iPod but also wanting to protect the identity of his informant, Kellogg decided not to confront the alleged culprit Thomas directly at that time. Instead, he instructed Perryman to "take the [five] girls in the class individually into a storage closet to the side of the classroom and have them shake out their blouses and roll down their waste [sic] bands in an effort to locate the missing iPod." (Id. ¶ 13.)

At this point, the facts become disputed. Taking Plaintiff's version as true, as the Court is required to do at this stage of the proceedings, the school officials did more than have the girls shake out their blouses and roll down their waistbands. According to King, Perryman asked her to remove both her pants and underwear, which is curious since the informant had identified Thomas as the culprit to Kellogg. (See, e.g., King Dep. 35:2-36:11, Feb. 16, 2009.)² It is undisputed that Perryman did not find the iPod on King. It is also undisputed that no boys (or men) were present for the actual strip part of the search. Furthermore, no evidence exists that Defendants Jenkins, Byrd, Sullivan, or Raspberry actually participated in the search of King. (See SOF ¶ 18.)

III. Plaintiff's Claims

Plaintiff maintains that the Defendants had no right to force King to remove her clothes in their search for the contraband iPod. Plaintiff asserts claims arising from the botched search against the following: Raspberry, individually and in his official capacity as teacher and employee of the RCSD; Sullivan, individually and in his official capacity as resource officer and employee of the RCSD; Perryman, individually and in her official capacity as secretary and employee of the RCSD; Kellogg, individually and in his official capacity as coach and employee of the RCSD; Byrd, individually and in his official capacity as principal and employee of the RCSD; Jenkins, individually and in his official capacity as superintendent and employee of the RCSD; and the RCSD.³ Plaintiff contends that Defendants violated King's Fourth Amendment rights and asserts a federal claim pursuant to § 1983. (Compl. ¶ 56.) Plaintiff also asserts the following state law claims: (1) assault (id. ¶¶ 48-49); (2) battery (id. ¶¶ 50-51); (3)...